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The recent emergence of “cyber warfare” in the contemporary strategic environ-
ment poses numerous conundrums, not the least of which is the basic meaning of 
this term� Is it a metaphor or a literal part of warfare writ large? A closely related 
issue is how cyber warfare relates to the law of armed conflict� In our lead article, 
“The Law of Cyber Targeting,” Michael N� Schmitt tackles this question� While 
developing cyber technologies and techniques have for some time been outrun-
ning accepted international legal frameworks and assumptions, this situation is 
beginning to change� The publication in 2013 of the Tallinn Manual on the Inter-
national Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare—of which Schmitt served as general 
editor—has gone a considerable way toward cementing a consensus among lead-
ing experts in the law of war on this subject� Here, Professor Schmitt systemati-
cally reviews the findings of that study, with particular emphasis on issues that 
remain controversial or contested� The central takeaway from his presentation is 
that in spite of the peculiar characteristics of cyber warfare and our so-far lim-
ited experience of it, existing international law in fact provides a workable if not 
completely satisfactory framework within which to place it� Michael N� Schmitt, 
a former U�S� Air Force officer, is the Charles H� Stockton Professor of Interna-
tional Law and director of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law 
at the Naval War College�
In the post–Cold War era, as Milan Vego points out, the term “the littorals” 
has gained currency in naval circles in this country and elsewhere, yet the specific 
character of war of naval war in proximity to land is seldom carefully explored� 
In “On Littoral Warfare,” Vego argues that the differences between this form of 
warfare and “blue water” naval warfare are substantial and that they need to be 
understood properly if navies are to fight effectively in this medium in the future� 
What he offers is a “theory” of littoral warfare that can serve as a foundation for 
appropriate joint doctrine and operations, something that is very much lacking 
today� Ranging widely over historical examples from many parts of the world 
and several centuries, Vego shows that littoral warfare has actually been more 
the rule than the exception in recent times—a fact that has been obscured by the 
dominance in classical naval strategic thinking of strongly “blue water”–oriented 
theorists, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan� Milan Vego is professor of joint military 
operations at the Naval War College�
FROM THE EDITORS
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For many smaller navies today, the littoral environment discussed by Vego is 
in fact the virtually exclusive focus. Deborah Sanders offers a case study of one 
such navy. In “The Bulgarian Navy after the Cold War,” she reviews the history 
of Bulgaria’s efforts to rebuild its nation and armed forces following the dissolu-
tion of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of communist rule in Eastern Europe. 
Not surprisingly, the Bulgarian navy fell on hard times given economic troubles 
during this period, in particular the end of Soviet military assistance, and severe 
political instability at home. With Bulgaria’s eventual turn to NATO and the Eu-
ropean Union and improvement in its economic situation, a modest program of 
modernization and professionalization of its navy could finally be undertaken. 
It remains unclear in what ways deteriorating relations between Russia and the 
West over Ukraine will affect NATO’s maritime frontier on the Black Sea for the 
future. Deborah Sanders is a senior lecturer in the Defence Studies Program of 
King’s College London.
The battle of Midway (4–5 June 1942) seems to be a gift to historians that 
never stops giving. In “A Question of Estimates: How Faulty Scouting Drove 
Estimates at the Battle of Midway,” Jonathan Tully and Yu Lu revisit the issue 
of the culpability of Admiral Nagumo Chuichi and his 1st Air Fleet staff in the 
Japanese defeat. They argue that the evidence now suggests that Nagumo’s failure 
to detect the American carriers on the morning of 4 June was not an idiosyncratic 
error but rather reflected standard Japanese scouting practice both then and later 
when intelligence otherwise had provided no indicators of the presence of pos-
sible enemy carriers. In fact, there is evidence that officers of the 1st Air Fleet 
staff later tampered with reports of the battle to obscure the fact that they were 
operating under an assumption that contact with the American carriers that day 
was unlikely. Indicators to the contrary were actually picked up by the Japanese 
but not disseminated to Nagumo, for reasons not altogether clear. Anthony Tully 
is coauthor, with Jon Parshall, of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle 
of Midway (2005). 
Finally, in “Revisiting the Navy’s Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer 
Conduct Improved?,” Captain Jason Vogt, USN, carries on a conversation that 
was initiated in these pages by Captain Mark Light, USN, in his “Navy’s Moral 
Compass: Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct” (Summer 2012). 
Vogt concludes that while the Navy seems to be making some progress in this 
area, there is more that could be done to improve the situation. 
The editors would like to recognize the contributions to the Naval War Col-
lege Review of its longtime book-review editor, Phyllis Winkler, who retired in 
January 2015. We wish her fair winds and following seas. For the future, Phyllis’s 
duties will be shared between our administrative assistant, Lori Almeida, and two 
6695_FromTheEditors.indd   4 2/11/15   8:43 AM
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Naval War College faculty members, Timothy J. Demy and Brad Carter. To them: 
Welcome aboard!
WILLIAM C. MARTEL (1955–2015)
It is with sadness that we note the passing of William Martel, a member of our 
Editorial Board for many years. Before moving on to the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Bill was a popular teacher on the faculty of the Naval War College 
and a good friend. He will be missed by all who knew him.
MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 
1941–1945
The newest, twenty-second title in our Historical Monograph book series is now 
available: Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945, by 
Milan Vego. It studies three major naval operations of World War II and the 
battles of the Coral Sea, Midway/Aleutians, and the Philippine Sea, which re-
sulted from them. Along with ample background on geographic and strategic 
context, Dr. Vego gives detailed accounts of the unfolding actions, utilizing much 
primary-source material from American and Japanese archives. Major Fleet- 
versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945 is available for sale at the 
U.S. Government Publishing Office online bookstore, at http://bookstore.gpo 
.gov.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
6695_FromTheEditors.indd   5 2/11/15   8:43 AM
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Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. He is 
a native of Jacksonville, Florida and was commis-
sioned in 1984 following his graduation from the 
U.S. Naval Academy.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a full 
range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint 
Special Operations communities. He commanded 
Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval 
Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special 
Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service 
overseas includes multiple deployments to the west-
ern Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in 
Operations EARNEST WILL, PROVIDE PROMISE, EN-
DURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.
His key joint and staff assignments include current 
operations officer at Special Operations Command, 
Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Op-
erations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare 
Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S. 
Special Operations Command; and Assistant Com-
manding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command. 
Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School 
in 1995 with a master of arts in national security af-
fairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and 
from the National War College in 2002 with a master 
of arts in national security.
6722_PresidentsForum copy.indd   6 2/11/15   11:00 AM
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
SHOOTING IS A core SEAL skill. Looking back at my early years, 
I remember spending a lot of time—at a lot of ranges—to build 
the ability to shoot quickly and accurately. And from the very beginning, I re-
member the emphasis our training cadre put on the importance of feedback to im-
prove shooting skills, whether through the careful analysis of the shot groups on 
the target at a flat range to improve sight alignment and sight picture or through 
the employment of steel targets for immediate auditory and visual cues during 
reactive shooting drills. 
Later in my career, as focus shifted from the tactical to the operational level of 
war, the importance of feedback remained constant. During these years, I gained 
a great appreciation for the importance of assessments as a form of operational 
feedback in the Plan-Direct-Monitor-Assess cycle. Absolutely critical to effective 
military operations in a complex, dynamic operational environment, the assess-
ment effort is key to understanding not only if you’re “hitting what you’re shoot-
ing at” but more importantly, if you’re “shooting at the right targets.”
Today, as my focus has shifted again, this time from the operational world to 
the Naval War College, it’s fascinating to see the continued criticality of feedback 
in our efforts. We are a multifaceted graduate institution chartered to provide 
professional military education to our talented and committed students; the 
desired outcome of our efforts is the creation of a cadre of well-informed critical 
thinkers who are prepared to address creatively the challenges they will face as 
military leaders in the decades that follow their graduation. In this Forum, I’d like 
to reflect on how the Naval War College employs its extensive program of internal 
and external assessment to ensure we are “on target” with our educational efforts 
(we’ll look at our research, gaming, and analysis efforts in a future Forum). 
Keeping Sights on Targets
6722_PresidentsForum copy.indd   7 2/11/15   10:52 AM
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Internal Assessments. Our faculty continually revises and updates our academic 
programs, developing new case studies as needed to maintain focus on current 
issues and to incorporate findings from emerging scholarly research� Many of our 
faculty members are actively engaged with leaders and operators from across the 
Department of Defense, and our subject-matter experts travel widely around the 
globe to maintain situational awareness over the full national-security spectrum� 
Since we value the opinion of our very professional student body, we gather feed-
back from our students as they arrive, as the classes progress, at the end of each 
term, and through alumni surveys� We also receive direction from the Navy Staff 
through the Advanced Education Review Board process, as well as recommen-
dations on process improvement from our Board of Advisors� On a continuing 
basis, our Office of Institutional Effectiveness measures the progress being made 
toward the goals established in our Strategic Plan� Assessment and introspection 
are woven into the fabric of the College’s existence� 
Joint Accreditation. At its core, the Naval War College is a Professional Military 
Education (PME) institution that, as a part of a Department of Defense–wide 
network of institutions, seeks to produce:
• Strategically minded officers educated in the profession of arms who pos-
sess an intuitive approach to joint war fighting built on individual service 
competencies�
• Critical thinkers who view military affairs in the broadest context and are 
capable of identifying and evaluating likely changes and associated responses 
affecting the employment of U�S� military forces�
• Senior officers who, as skilled joint war fighters, can develop and execute na-
tional military strategies that effectively employ the armed forces in concert 
with other instruments of national power to achieve the goals of national-
security strategy and policy in the air, land, maritime, and space physical 
domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace)�
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided guidance on how each 
military service should execute its joint education mission� The Officer Profes-
sional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) instruction delineates the specific 
subject matter and skills that must be included in each PME educational pro-
gram, and it establishes the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), 
which is a peer-review process that periodically (every six years) assesses the 
school’s and college’s educational programs to ensure that they are meeting all 
policy objectives� The Naval War College is currently conducting the final phases 
of its comprehensive self-study in preparation for two formal PAJE reviews that 
will take place during the 2015 calendar year� In May 2015, a PAJE team com-
posed of educators and administrators from sister institutions and headquarters 
Book 1.indb   8 2/4/15   10:24 AM
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staffs will review the Senior-Level College programs of our College of Naval War-
fare� Another group will visit in November 2015 to evaluate the College of Naval 
Command and Staff and the College of Distance Education’s Intermediate-Level 
College programs� Successful completion of these reviews will result in the reaf-
firmation of our status as an approved PME provider� 
Regional Accreditation. In addition to the assistance and oversight provided 
by the Joint Staff, we also voluntarily seek feedback from the professional or-
ganization that monitors the performance of institutions of higher education in 
our geographical region� The Commission on Institutions of Higher Education 
(CIHE) of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges is one of seven 
accrediting commissions in the United States that provide institutional accredita-
tion on a regional basis� In the most basic terms, accreditation is an expression of 
confidence in the institution’s purposes, performances, and human and financial 
resources� The CIHE, which is recognized by the U�S� Department of Education, 
accredits approximately 240 institutions in the six-state New England region and 
overseas� These institutions achieve accreditation by demonstrating they meet 
the commission’s eleven Standards for Accreditation, each of which articulates 
a dimension of institutional quality� The Naval War College has been accredited 
by the commission since 1989, when it became the first PME institution to be 
regionally accredited� For the past eighteen months we have been engaged in an 
intense and faculty-led process of self-study, addressing the CIHE standards� We 
completed a comprehensive evaluation visit in November 2014 by a team repre-
senting the commission, and in March 2015 the provost and I will appear before 
the commission to answer additional questions about our remarkable institution� 
We are confident that we will be recognized by our academic peers for the excel-
lent work being done by our dedicated faculty and staff� 
As you can imagine, we gather a lot of data from these detailed internal and 
external assessments� The key to future success is to capitalize on what we learn 
by having an open perspective and a willingness to make changes when and 
where necessary� We must preserve our impressive legacy but not be bound by it� 
We must be flexible and adaptable to accommodate ever-changing circumstances 
but not generate “churn” in our academic programs� We will continue to exercise 
rigor in our feedback and assessment efforts to ensure not only that we’re “hitting 
what we’re shooting at” but also that “we’re shooting at the right targets” in all our 
educational efforts� 
P� GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College 
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 The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia was predictably short, as Russian military might quickly trumped Georgian nationalist enthusiasm� Beyond its 
momentous geopolitical implications, it was the first war in which cyber activi-
ties loomed large; the conflict marked the public birth of “cyber war,” or at least 
cyber in war�1 
Cyber operations were not a completely new phenomenon� Most notably, they 
had played a significant geopolitical role in the previous year, when “hacktivists” 
around the world directed malicious cyber operations at NATO member Estonia 
following its transfer of a Soviet-era statue commemorating the Great Patriotic 
War from central Tallinn to the outskirts of the capital�2 But this was not “war” 
in the traditional sense of two or more states engaged in armed hostilities against 
each other� In the Georgian case, by contrast, the cyber activities took place on 
belligerent territory during an armed conflict that involved classic kinetic mili-
tary operations� Although civilians launched most of the attacks, and while they 
caused no physical damage or injury, there is no question that, unlike the events 
in Estonia, international humanitarian law (IHL, also known as the law of war, 
law of armed conflict, and jus in bello) applied�
Cyber activities have become an indelible facet of contemporary warfare, not 
just for cyber-empowered militaries such as that of the United States, but also for 
low-tech forces� Terrorist and insurgent groups benefit from the use of the Inter-
net to recruit fighters and to finance operations� Social media are exploited for 
purposes that range from passing targeting information to directing the deploy-
ment of forces (the insurgent “flash mob”)� Mobile phones are as much part of 
the twenty-first-century kit bag as weapons, and e-mail and texting have become 
Michael N. Schmitt
THE LAW OF CYBER TARGETING
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pervasive means of military communication� The Arab Spring was a watershed 
in this regard, and cyber operations are ongoing in the conflicts in Ukraine and 
Syria� It is quite simply unimaginable that a contemporary conflict would not in-
volve some manner of cyber operations, whether as simple as passing intelligence 
information using smartphones or as complicated as bringing down the enemy’s 
integrated air-defense system�
In light of the role that cyber operations are playing in contemporary conflicts, 
attention must be paid to the law that governs these activities—to borrow a sports 
analogy, a team that takes the field without knowing the rules is usually going to 
lose, even if it is the better team� International law, and particularly IHL, exerts a 
powerful influence on tactics, operational planning, and strategic decision mak-
ing in modern warfare� The fight can be won on the battlefield but lost in the 
court of public and international opinion when one side appears to have acted 
outside the law� Given the novelty of cyber operations as a method of warfare 
during an armed conflict, any alleged misuse, even at the tactical level, has the 
potential for strategic consequences� 
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn, 
Estonia, has taken the global lead in addressing this issue� In 2009 it launched a 
three-year project to examine the application of international law, especially that 
governing the use of force, to cyber operations� Over twenty distinguished legal 
scholars and government legal advisers came together to produce the Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, a resource cur-
rently being expanded in the Centre’s “Tallinn 2�0” project�3
Informed by the Tallinn Manual process, in which the author served as di-
rector, this article examines IHL’s core norms—those governing targeting—as 
applied to cyber operations� It does so by following the legal logic applicable to 
virtually every targeting operation, from naval gunfire and air attack to special-
forces operations and space attacks�4 In each such case, those who plan, approve, 
and execute targeting missions have to ask the following questions:
• What law applies to my operation?
• May I engage the intended target?
• Is the weapon I want to use legal?
• What precautions must I take to avoid collateral damage?
• Do the scope and degree of likely collateral damage prohibit me from 
engaging the target?
There is now widespread agreement that international humanitarian law ap-
plies in its entirety to cyber operations conducted during an armed conflict�5 
Thus, the questions set out above apply fully to targeting in the cyber context, 
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albeit with a degree of interpretive creativity at times� This article will explain how 
each is resolved with respect to cyber operations� The explanation is designed for 
policy makers and operators who conduct, rely on, approve, or are targeted by 
cyber operations� In the contemporary strategic environment, knowledge of the 
law applicable to cyber warfare is quite simply indispensable�
THE APPLICABLE LAW (PART I) 
The threshold question in every targeting operation is whether the international 
humanitarian law rules even apply� IHL comes into play only when there is a 
war—an “armed conflict,” in technical legal parlance� There are two forms of 
armed conflict, international and noninternational�6 The former exists when 
hostilities break out between two or more countries, whereas the latter involves 
hostilities at a fairly high level between an organized armed group and a state 
or between two or more organized armed groups� For example, the use of force 
against Ukraine by Russia clearly created an international armed conflict, where-
as the hostilities between Bashar al-Assad’s forces and those opposing his regime 
in Syria are noninternational in character� Unless one of these two forms of 
armed conflict exists, IHL is inapplicable, in which case human rights norms and 
domestic law serve as the core constraints on the targeting operation in question�
Whenever there is an armed conflict of either sort, IHL governs those cyber 
operations having a nexus with the conflict�7 To take a simple example, it is no less 
a violation of IHL, and no less a war crime, to conduct cyber operations intended 
to kill members of the civilian population than it is to bomb or shell them; the 
same law prohibiting direct attacks on civilians is breached�8 How that IHL rule 
applies is discussed below, but it is incontestable that it applies in its entirety to 
conflict-related cyber operations� 
The somewhat more challenging legal question is whether cyber operations 
alone may qualify as armed conflicts to which IHL applies� In other words, if 
there is no armed conflict in the first place, can one begin as a result of cyber 
operations? The question is essential, because once an armed conflict breaks out, 
it becomes lawful to direct cyber and kinetic strikes against the armed forces and 
military objectives� This is so irrespective of blame for starting the conflict� To 
address this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between international and non-
international armed conflict�
If there are two or more states involved, the first criterion for an international 
armed conflict is met� The second, that “hostilities” have taken place, is somewhat 
ambiguous�9 Two questions present themselves in this regard—one qualitative, 
the other quantitative� First, can cyber exchanges qualify as hostilities, or are they 
of such a unique nature that it is inappropriate to deem them such? It would seem 
logical that cyber operations that are qualitatively “attacks,” as the term is used in 
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IHL, qualify as hostilities in the same way as kinetic attacks� Attacks, as explained 
further below, are operations causing damage or injury� There is no normative or 
practical logic for distinguishing between a cyber operation that damages objects 
or injures people and a kinetic operation with precisely the same effects� 
However, whether cyber operations not qualifying as attacks under IHL 
may initiate an armed conflict remains unsettled� For instance, would cyber 
operations that result in a 
major loss of confidence in 
the stock market—a conse-
quence far more serious than 
minor property damage or 
injury—qualify? As noted by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “it would appear that the 
answer to these questions will probably be determined in a definite manner only 
through future State practice�”10
Second, is there any minimum severity below which an attack, whether kinetic 
or cyber, cannot be considered as having started an international armed conflict? 
The quantitative threshold is unclear in law� It is sometimes argued that, for in-
stance, minor exchanges of fire between the forces of two states do not rise to the 
level of armed conflict� However, a better view is that which has been asserted 
by the ICRC for many years: “It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, 
how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces�”11 
This approach is, as lawyers say, more consistent with the “object and purpose” 
of IHL, since a state will want its civilians and civilian objects protected, and at 
the same time it will wish to be able to use lethal or destructive force against the 
other side if hostilities break out� 
Accordingly, an international armed conflict could begin solely on the basis of 
cyber exchanges if two or more states were involved and the nature of the opera-
tions qualified them as attacks� To cite a well-known example, consider the 2010 
Stuxnet operation against Iran� Assuming, solely for the sake of illustration, that 
it was states that conducted the operation, the damage arguably meant that the 
states involved were in an international armed conflict, at least for the period 
during which the damaging acts were under way�12 
Cyber exchanges alone are far less likely to meet the two criteria for nonin-
ternational armed conflict�13 First, the state must be facing an “organized armed 
group�” Although the legal preconditions for qualification as such are rather com-
plicated, in the cyber context the pressing question is whether they are met by a 
group organized entirely online� Organized armed groups have to be in some way 
“commanded,” and some degree of structure must exist that allows their mem-
bers to operate as a unit�14 It is also often suggested that “organization” requires a 
The harsh reality of . . . military cyber activity 
is that the heavy reliance on civilian products 
and infrastructure dramatically expands the 
universe of targetable objects.
Book 1.indb   14 2/4/15   10:24 AM
19
Naval War College: Spring 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 S C H M I T T  1 5
means to enforce IHL within the group�15 It is difficult to see how a virtual group 
whose members may not even know each other’s names or physical locations 
could meet this condition�
Additionally, the group in question must be armed� The logic underlying 
the discussion of international armed conflict would appear useful by analogy� 
“Armed” can be interpreted as a requirement for “hostilities,” which are acts that 
qualify as “attacks�” In this context, therefore, an organized armed group is one 
that conducts kinetic or cyber attacks� Thus, a group that merely conducted non-
destructive denial-of-service operations, for example, would not qualify� This is 
one reason why the operations against Estonia did not rise to the level of a nonin-
ternational armed conflict� Those involved were acting in concert, but they were 
not organized into one or more particular armed groups�
Second, and unlike international armed conflict, the violence associated with 
a noninternational armed conflict must be protracted and must reach a high level 
of severity� It does not include “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature�”16 Even cyber operations causing death or destruction will sometimes not 
suffice� Neither would a single dramatic cyber operation, such as a cyber terrorist 
attack, qualify, even if causing harm far above the level just characterized, because 
that harm would not be protracted� In the simplest terms, the cyber conflict must 
start looking like a war� To turn again to the Estonian case, the hacktivist opera-
tions did not rise to this level because, despite widespread disruption of societal 
functions, there was no physical damage or injury� 
Nonstate-actor cyber operations meeting these demanding criteria are cur-
rently unlikely� A more probable scenario is one in which cyber operations ac-
company kinetic ones and are governed by IHL on that basis� Therefore, when 
nonstate-actor cyber operations occur in isolation from kinetic attacks, they will 
typically be governed by the domestic law of states exercising jurisdiction over 
the persons and particular subject matter involved, as well as by human rights 
law, but not by the IHL norms described below�
THE APPLICABLE LAW (PART II)
Once it is determined that an armed conflict to which IHL applies is under way, 
the next step is to determine whether the law of targeting applies to the cyber 
operation in question�17 Doing so is more difficult than might appear at first 
glance� Indeed, the Tallinn Manual experts struggled with the subject for three 
years without reaching full consensus�
Any discussion of targeting begins with the principle of “distinction,” which is 
codified in Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: “The Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
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the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military objec-
tives�”18 The United States, though not a party to that instrument, recognizes 
Article 48 as reflective of customary international law, which binds all states�19 
Indeed, the principle is arguably the most important in IHL, one that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has labeled as one of the two “cardinal” principles of IHL�20 
In international law circles, a major debate with particular resonance in the cyber 
context is ongoing regarding whether the principle of distinction rules out all 
operations against objects and persons that do not qualify as military objectives, 
especially civilians and civilian objects� Textually, the article certainly appears to 
say as much, but such a conclusion would be both counterintuitive and ahistori-
cal� After all, military operations, such as psychological operations, have been 
directed against civilian populations for centuries�
A closer look into Additional Protocol I reveals a series of prohibitions and 
restrictions on “attack” that operationalize the principle: attacks against civilians 
and civilian objects are prohibited, indiscriminate attacks are forbidden, parties 
to a conflict must take precautions to minimize civilian harm when planning 
and conducting attacks, a defender must take precautions to protect the civilian 
population against the effects of attacks, and so forth�21 Helpfully, “attacks” are 
defined in the protocol as “acts of violence against the enemy, whether in of-
fence or defence�”22 The characterization of an attack as a violent act is repeated 
throughout the treaty and in ICRC and other commentaries thereon�23 
It would seem, however, that the protocol is inaptly worded� Violent acts are 
of less concern in IHL than are violent consequences� This has been obvious for 
decades, the paradigmatic examples being the prohibitions on chemical, biologi-
cal, and radiological attacks, which are not violent in the sense of releasing kinetic 
force but have violent consequences, notably death� By the same logic, a cyber 
operation causing injury to persons or damage to objects is an attack subject to 
all the relevant IHL rules on attacks�24
But controversy surrounds the issue of whether the notion of attacks should be 
interpreted more broadly� A cyber operation targeting civilian cyber infrastruc-
ture (“communications, storage, and computing resources upon which informa-
tion systems operate”) without physical effects could be far more detrimental 
than one causing limited damage�25 Consider an attack during an armed conflict 
on the enemy’s banking, taxation, government pension, or airline reservations 
systems� Critics of a restrictive interpretation argue that it seems incongruent to 
prohibit only operations having physical effects�
Two methods have surfaced that take account of this reality without the neces-
sity of either successfully negotiating new treaty terms (an unlikely eventuality) 
or interpreting the current law in a fashion that renders it unrecognizable� First, 
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there are those who would interpret data as an object, such that an operation that 
manipulated, altered, or deleted civilian data would be prohibited�26 The concep-
tual problem is that the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I describes 
an object as something “tangible,” and data certainly is not that�27 Goal-oriented 
legal academics have proposed creative interpretation as a means of hurdling this 
particular obstacle but fail to offer a viable practical alternative� If data is treated 
as an object, any operation that manipulates civilian data would qualify as “dam-
age” to (alteration of data) or “destruction” of (deletion of data) a “civilian object” 
and would thus be unlawful� As an example, deletion of a civilian’s forum or blog 
post would be a violation of IHL, as would nondestructive psychological cyber 
operations directed at the civilian population� Moreover, such an interpretation 
would dramatically affect application of the rule of proportionality and the re-
quirement to take precautions in attack� Both, as discussed below, extend further 
protection to civilian objects, the former by prohibiting attacks likely to cause 
“excessive” collateral damage to civilian objects, the latter by requiring an at-
tacker to take feasible measures to limit damage to civilian objects�28 International 
humanitarian law is a careful balancing of humanitarian concerns with military 
necessity; simply styling data as an object would throw this balance out of kilter, 
by barring operations that today are considered lawful in both their cyber and 
traditional guises� 
The second approach, and the one adopted by a majority of the experts in-
volved in the Tallinn Manual project, is to include “loss of functionality” in the 
concept of damage�29 On this view, a cyber operation that affects the functional-
ity of cyber infrastructure (from a laptop computer to a SCADA system*) in a 
manner that necessitates repair qualifies as an attack even if no physical damage 
results� This approach makes sense, for it is fair to describe an item as damaged 
when it does not work; it is broken, even though it may not be physically dam-
aged� Among the experts taking this position during the Tallinn Manual project 
there were various shades of opinion� Some were of the view that necessity to 
reload an operating system satisfied the damage criterion� Others went so far as 
to say that cyber operations affecting data stored on the computer’s drives would 
suffice, although this was a minority view� 
The implications of the majority positions set out above are significant� Un-
less a cyber operation has consequences that at least affect the functionality of an 
object, it is not damaged in the IHL sense and the operation does not qualify as an 
attack� Therefore, the operation is not subject to the prohibition on conducting 
* Supervisory control and data acquisition—referring to “computer systems and instrumentation that 
provide for monitoring and controlling industrial, infrastructure, and facility-based processes, such 
as the operation of power plants, water treatment facilities, electrical distribution systems, oil and 
gas pipelines, airports, and factories” (Tallinn Manual, p� 262)�
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attacks against civilian objects� As a result, it is generally legal during an armed 
conflict to conduct cyber operations directed against civilian objects, so long as 
these objects are not physically damaged or do not lose functionality (or some-
how result in injury to civilians)� To illustrate, it would be lawful to conduct 
denial-of-service attacks that blocked civilian e-services such as tax collection 
or the payment of pension benefits but did not harm or affect the functionality 
of the associated cyber infrastructure, at least until the economic consequences 
became so severe that they began to have physical effects, such as starvation or 
illness� Similarly, by the majority approach it would be lawful to alter or destroy 
data so long as no consequences amounting to injury, physical damage, or loss of 
functionality are manifest; examples could include government archives, birth or 
citizenship records, business records, and market returns� Although such opera-
tions might raise serious moral, political, and social issues, they appear lawful 
today�
THE TARGET
Assuming that a cyber operation occurs during an armed conflict and qualifies 
as an attack, the next hurdle is determining whether the target is a lawful one� 
Cyber operations most frequently implicate the prohibition on attacking civilian 
objects� In IHL, civilian objects are defined negatively as “all objects which are 
not military objectives�”30 Military objectives are “objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage�”31 
The equipment and facilities of the armed forces are military objectives by 
nature; a command-and-control facility and cyber infrastructure developed for 
specific military tasks both qualify, for example, on this basis� A particular loca-
tion can also be a military objective, as when cyber means are used to open a 
dam’s gates to flood an area and deny its use to the enemy� Aside from military 
equipment, the most likely military objective in the cyber context is an object 
that qualifies by the “use” criterion—that is, one that was formerly or is still being 
used for civilian purposes but is now being employed, at least in part, for military 
ends� It should be cautioned that a rule of reason holds when applying this crite-
rion to cyber activities� For instance, the mere fact that the military sends e-mail 
over the Internet does not render the entire Internet a lawful target� Finally, a 
civilian object can become a military objective through “purpose,” which refers to 
the intended future use of an object� For example, if there is reliable intelligence 
that a civilian server farm will soon begin to store military data, the farm is a 
military objective that may be attacked even before data storage begins�
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These definitions do not present any particular problems in the cyber setting� 
However, it must be acknowledged that the pervasive use of civilian cyber infra-
structure for military purposes has transformed much of it into the character of 
valid military objectives� When an object is used for both civilian and military 
purposes, it is labeled “dual 
use�” In targeting terms, the 
term applies whether some-
thing is exclusively used for 
military purposes, is shared 
by civilian and military users, 
or is only used to a limited degree by the military—it qualifies as a targetable mili-
tary objective� The civilian aspects of the target are relevant to the requirements 
for proportionality and precautions in attack as described below, but civilian use 
does not diminish its qualification as a military objective�
To take a simple example, many air-traffic-control and airspace-management 
systems serve both civilian and military aircraft� When this is the case, they are 
military objectives irrespective of the extent of civilian reliance on them� The 
communications lines to which the systems are connected are also dual-use and 
so too qualify as military objectives, as do any routers involved and any servers 
on which their data is stored� The harsh reality of twenty-first-century military 
cyber activity is that the heavy reliance on civilian products and infrastructure 
dramatically expands the universe of targetable objects, including systems on 
which important civilian functions rely�
The introduction of cyber capabilities into contemporary combat has also 
exacerbated a long-standing debate over the very notion of military objectives� 
All states and legal commentators agree that the term encompasses “war fight-
ing” and “war supporting” objects� The former are those used to conduct military 
operations, whereas the latter include objects on which military operations rely 
in some relatively direct sense, such as factories that make munitions, weapons, 
or equipment (including computer equipment) used by the military, even when 
they also produce civilian products� They may not necessarily be attacked, be-
cause of the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions, but 
they unquestionably qualify as military objectives� What is especially significant 
with regard to the war-supporting category in the cyber context is the extent to 
which the dependence of the armed forces on civilian products and infrastruc-
ture makes not only the objects in question legally targetable but also the facilities 
that produce them� 
However, a third category, “war sustaining” objects, has generated wide-
spread controversy� The U�S� Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
There is now widespread agreement that 
international humanitarian law applies in its 
entirety to cyber operations conducted during 
an armed conflict.
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Operations, the most current U�S� manual addressing international humanitarian 
law, labels enemy war-sustaining objects as military objectives susceptible to 
lawful attack�32 An annotated version of the previous edition of the handbook 
offers the example of cotton during the American Civil War�33 But for the export 
of cotton, the Confederacy would have been unable to finance its war effort� Cot-
ton exports, then, sustained the war; therefore, according to this approach, that 
industry was lawfully targetable� The contemporary analogue would be those as-
pects of an economy or governmental financial system on which the enemy relies 
to fund participation in the conflict� Obvious examples are the oil industries of 
countries that depend heavily on oil exports for funds; although the United States 
has never developed the concept with any granularity, other examples might also 
include the tax systems, financial systems, transport networks, and the like�
The significance of this approach in its application to the cyber environment 
cannot be overstated� Many war-sustaining targets cannot be struck kinetically 
in a fashion that would generate the same effects as cyber attacks� Consider the 
banking system� While kinetic attacks against banks would be highly disruptive, 
they would be unlikely, given the limitations of kinetic weaponry and the num-
ber of potential targets falling into this category, to create strategic effects on the 
order of undermining the sustainability of the war effort� However, cyber attacks 
that would, for instance, render dysfunctional the cyber infrastructure on which 
the banking system relies could bring the entire system down� The war-sustaining 
debate once loomed large; the ability of cyber operations to make war-sustaining 
attacks possible and effective at the operational and strategic levels will probably 
reinvigorate it� This is especially so in light of the fact that very few states have 
openly embraced the U�S� approach, thereby rendering the world’s most cyber-
empowered military an outlier on the matter� Ironically, the United States is itself 
highly vulnerable to attacks on its own “war sustaining” infrastructure, thereby 
raising the question whether its interpretation is ill-advised when applied to the 
cyber context�
In addition to objects, “persons” may qualify as lawful targets� It is, of course, 
possible to attack people by cyber means—for instance, by starting fires in facili-
ties in which they are located, interfering with air-traffic control relied on by the 
aircraft transporting them, causing train collisions, and so forth� Additionally, 
individuals involved in cyber operations may be targeted kinetically once they 
have been identified and located� The issues are which people are targetable, as a 
matter of law, and when they may be targeted�
Obviously, members of the armed forces who conduct cyber operations are 
always targetable (unless hors de combat); they are combatants�34 The rules re-
garding when civilians may be targeted are far more complex� To address this, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a five-year (between 
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2003 and 2008) research study involving a group of forty international experts�35 
The experts agreed that members of an organized armed group, as defined above, 
are targetable while they are members of the group�36 They disagreed, however, 
over precisely which members of the group were targetable� The ICRC was of the 
position that only those with a “continuous combat function” could be attacked� 
Such functions encompass roles in the group that involve activities likely to affect 
the enemy adversely�37 Some individual participants in the project, including the 
author, countered that all members of a group formed to conduct hostilities (or 
the members of the armed wing of a group that includes other functions, such 
as Hamas) could be attacked, a position that appears to be favored by the United 
States, Israel, and other countries with significant combat experience�38
Applied to cyber, the approaches taken to direct participation lead in different 
directions� Take an organized armed group that conducts kinetic hostilities but 
also has “cyber operators�” All those who conduct cyber operations against the 
enemy or who defend against the enemy’s operations have continuous combat 
functions and therefore would be targetable by either approach� Other members 
may have such cyber-related duties as maintaining propaganda websites or re-
cruiting members� By the ICRC approach, they do not have continuous combat 
functions and therefore would not be targetable unless they assumed such func-
tions within the group� By the alternative approach, they could be attacked at any 
time, on the basis of their membership in the group�
Individuals unaffiliated with organized armed groups or, in the ICRC ap-
proach, who do not have continuous combat functions in such groups are tar-
getable only “for such time” as they “take a direct part in hostilities�”39 An act 
amounts to direct participation when it meets three criteria�40 First, it must either 
adversely affect the military operations or military capability of one of the parties 
to the conflict or injure or damage persons or objects protected by IHL, such as 
civilians and civilian objects�41 It is important to understand that this criterion 
does not require that the activity qualify as an attack� As an example, gathering 
and disseminating tactical- and operational-level intelligence by cyber means 
suffices, as would probing enemy systems to identify vulnerabilities� 
Second, the qualifying activity must directly cause the harm or be an integral 
component of the operation that does so�42 There has been some controversy over 
this requirement with respect to the production of improvised explosive devices 
and services as voluntary human shields� Although both activities are sometimes 
characterized as indirect, the better position is that causal nexus between such 
activities and harm to the enemy is sufficiently direct�43 The cyber analogue 
would be developing software specific to an attack on the enemy system or al-
lowing cyber operations to be launched from one’s home or business by others� 
One thing on which all parties agree is that factory workers do not qualify as 
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direct participants in hostilities� This being so, individuals involved in the general 
production of cyber infrastructure and equipment or in its general (as distinct 
from operational) maintenance are not targetable direct participants, although 
the facilities in which they operate qualify as military targets by virtue of their use�
The third requirement is that there be a nexus between the activity and the 
conflict�44 In other words, the activity must be related to the ongoing conflict, as 
distinct from being an act of criminality or mere maliciousness� Although the 
facts of particular cases are sometimes difficult to discern, experts are in accord 
on this criterion�
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the direct-participation rules in 
the cyber context� The Georgia-Russia armed conflict, as well as subsequent ones, 
demonstrates that the civilian 
population is highly likely to 
become involved in the cyber 
aspects of the conflict� For 
instance, in the Georgia case a 
website (StopGeorgia�ru) containing cyber targets and downloadable “malware” 
(malicious software) necessary to conduct cyber operations appeared online 
soon after the launch of kinetic operations�45 The site proved effective in enabling 
cyber operations by civilians against Georgian military and civilian cyber targets� 
As this example illustrates, it is far easier to “cyber arm” a civilian population 
than to arm it with traditional weaponry� Additionally, many individuals have 
the know-how to conduct harmful cyber operations; all they require to begin 
participating in the hostilities is connectivity� 
To compound matters, the scope of activities constituting direct participation 
in hostilities is broad� Conducting a simple denial-of-service operation, building 
a botnet* for use against the enemy, or texting to report visual sightings of enemy 
forces would all qualify as direct participation that justifies lethally attacking the 
civilian involved� As should be apparent, the direct-participation rule could make 
the pool of targetable individuals extremely large in future conflicts, far more 
than is the case in classic conflict� 
That said, one possible obstacle to far-reaching application of the rule is that 
a direct participant is targetable only “for such time” as he or she is so participat-
ing�46 The ICRC has suggested that this period includes measures preparatory 
to specific acts of direct participation, as well as deployment to and return from 
the activity concerned�47 This is a rather impractical standard in the cyber con-
text� Except for close-access operations (those involving in-person manipula-
tion of cyber infrastructure), there is usually no deployment to and from cyber 
* “A network of compromised computers, the ‘bots,’ remotely controlled by the intruder, ‘the 
botherder,’ used to conduct coordinated [malicious] cyber operations” (Tallinn Manual, p� 257)�
To borrow a sports analogy, a team that takes 
the field without knowing the rules is usually 
going to lose, even if it is the better team.
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operations; they are conducted remotely� Thus, by the ICRC approach, the direct 
participant would have to be caught in the act, a standard that dramatically nar-
rows the window of targetability� Further rendering this position impracticable 
is the fact that cyber operations can be very brief, sometimes so brief that an 
attacker cannot be identified to a level of reasonable confidence before the opera-
tion is over� Therefore, the better approach is to characterize an individual who 
engages in multiple cyber operations that are part of an ongoing cyber campaign 
as a direct participant targetable throughout the period of activity� Once indi-
viduals definitively withdraw from participation, they regain their protection 
from attack, but not before�48 
THE WEAPON 
While certain uses of cyber weapons (destructive or injurious malware), such as 
“attacking” civilians, violate IHL, cyber weapons may also be unlawful per se—
that is, irrespective of actual use� The prohibition most relevant in this regard is 
that on indiscriminate means (weapons)�49 Weapons are prohibited when they ei-
ther cannot be directed at a specific military objective or generate uncontrollable 
effects� In both cases, the weapons are indiscriminate in the sense that they are 
incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or between civilian 
objects and military objectives� The paradigmatic example of the former is the 
V-2 rocket used during World War II, which had a guidance system so rudimen-
tary that the rocket could not be reliably aimed at individual military objectives� 
Biological contagions illustrate the latter, because an attacker employing them 
cannot control their spread from human to human� 
Cyber weapons may at times run afoul of these prohibitions� For example, 
consider malware intended for use against military cyber infrastructure linked to 
civilian networks� If the malware is designed to spread randomly throughout the 
system into which it is introduced, it is indiscriminate by nature and prohibited 
per se� Similarly, malware developed for placement on a website that is open to 
civilians and combatants alike would qualify as indiscriminate irrespective of 
any desire on the part of its user to affect only military systems� Perhaps the best-
known indiscriminate cyber weapon is a malicious but seemingly innocuous e-
mail attachment sent to a combatant’s private e-mail account� Since the attacker 
has no control over to whom it might be forwarded, the e-mail, depending on 
its apparent nature (e�g�, a humorous e-mail likely to be forwarded), would be 
indiscriminate� 
It must be cautioned that the restrictions on indiscriminate weapons apply 
only when the cyber weapon in question is designed to conduct attacks� They do 
not bear on malware that does not cause injury, damage, or loss of system func-
tionality� For instance, an e-mail attachment that when opened simply enables 
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future access by the sender would not be unlawful under IHL, even though the 
sender might not be able to control its further spread into civilian systems�
Because of this, as well as the fact that advanced cyber weapons likely to be 
used by states in armed conflict are by their nature designed to exploit particular 
vulnerabilities in specific systems, few cyber weapons violate the prohibition on 
indiscriminate weapons� For example, bespoke cyber weapons can be employed 
against closed military systems in which the risk of bleed-over into civilian 
networks is low� Of course, there is always some risk of unintentional or unan-
ticipated migration into civilian systems, as illustrated by the Stuxnet malware, 
which, contrary to the intent of its designers, escaped the nuclear enrichment 
plant that had been targeted� Yet the risk of malfunction or unanticipated effects 
is a pervasive feature of weaponry writ large; only when the weapon is incapable 
of being aimed or controlled is it prohibited as indiscriminate�
PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID CIVILIAN HARM
Even when employing a lawful cyber weapon against a lawful target, an attacker 
must take “constant care” to “spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian 
objects�”50 To this end the law specifies a number of precautionary measures� The 
attacker must do everything feasible to verify that the target is not protected by 
IHL;51 must select the weapon, tactic, and target that will minimize civilian harm 
without forfeiting military advantage;52 must cancel or suspend an attack when 
reason to believe that the attack may be unlawful comes to light;53 and must warn 
the civilian population of any attack that may affect it, unless doing so would not 
be feasible in the circumstances�54
Cyber capabilities raise a number of issues in this regard� They can, for exam-
ple, be used to gather target information� If doing so would improve knowledge 
of the target’s legal status (and if it is militarily feasible in the circumstances, given 
such factors as attack timing and competing demands on the cyber asset), the 
attacker must undertake the effort� Cyber operations may also provide a means 
of issuing warnings to the civilian population of both cyber and kinetic attack� 
For instance, general warnings of attack could be transmitted through civilian 
systems networked to military cyber infrastructure urging measures to be taken 
to safeguard them from the effects of attack on the military objectives�
However, the most significant impact of the precautions-in-attack rules lies in 
the requirement to consider alternative weapons, tactics, and targets to minimize 
civilian incidental harm� To illustrate, it may be possible to neutralize an integrat-
ed air-defense system by cyber means instead of by conducting kinetic attacks 
against its assorted components� Since cyber operations would in most cases be 
less likely to cause collateral damage, they would be required by law in lieu of 
kinetic alternatives, if their employment is feasible and militarily sensible� Cyber 
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operations may also open the possibility of striking different targets to achieve a 
desired effect� As an example, to disrupt enemy operations it may be possible to 
use cyber assets against communications infrastructure serving a command-and-
control facility located near civilians, rather than attacking the facility itself, and 
achieve precisely the desired effect� Indeed, it could prove useful to preserve the 
facility to exploit it subsequently by using cyber means to transmit false instruc-
tions and other information to the enemy forces�
It must be emphasized that the precautions-in-attack rule regarding selection 
of weapons, tactics, and targets is obligatory� If cyber means are reasonably avail-
able, their use makes military sense in the circumstances, and their employment 
would not diminish the likelihood of operational success, the attacking force 
must use them� Failure to do so will violate the law� It is accordingly prudent for 
those who plan, approve, and execute military operations to have ready access to 
cyber expertise that can apprise them of cyber options� Ignorance is not an excuse 
for failure to comply with the rule in situations where the individual concerned 
should have known that a cyber operation was feasible in the circumstances and 
would likely have resulted in less collateral damage�
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Once the attacker has surveyed the range of possible operations to achieve the 
desired effects and selected that viable alternative that best minimizes collateral 
damage, the operation is assessed against the rule of proportionality� This rule 
provides that “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated” is prohibited�55 
Two mistakes have proved common in application of the rule of proportional-
ity� First, the rule is often mischaracterized as a balancing test in which military 
advantage and collateral damage are somehow accorded values that presumably 
can be compared� Not only is it difficult to imagine how this could be done in 
practice, but portraying proportionality as a balancing test runs counter to the 
plain text of the rule, which precludes an attack only when the collateral damage 
is “excessive�” “Excessive” refers to a “significant imbalance,” one in which it is rea-
sonably clear that causing the expected degree of collateral damage is not justified 
by the military advantage the attacker hopes to attain�56 Since cyber operations 
can generate effects that are not typically present in warfare and are therefore 
somewhat unfamiliar, fidelity to the “excessive” standard is essential, as it affords 
the attacker the correct degree of discretion�
Second, the rule is unfortunately often applied post factum� However, as is 
clear from its text, the proportionality assessment is made ex ante (i�e�, at the 
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outset)� Expected collateral damage is assessed against the anticipated military 
advantage� The actual collateral damage caused and the military advantage that 
actually results are relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the attacker’s pre-
attack proportionality assessment but are not dispositive of whether the attacker 
has satisfied the rule of proportionality� This is again an important point in the 
cyber context, because of the widespread linkage of civilian and military systems 
and the difficulty an attacker may face in evaluating potential effects at the time 
the cyber mission is planned, 
approved, or executed� 
With respect to the sub-
stantive aspects of propor-
tionality, cyber operations can 
serve to minimize collateral 
damage and therefore make compliance with the rule more likely� The networked 
nature of cyber infrastructure, however, heightens the risk of indirect effects on 
civilian systems� This is particularly true in light of the wide-ranging reliance of 
some militaries on dual-use cyber systems� To the extent to which indirect effects 
are foreseeable, they must be considered when making proportionality calcula-
tions� That said, the proportionality rule, like the prohibition on weapons gen-
erating uncontrollable effects, requires the consideration only of “loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians,” and “damage to civilian objects�” Other, indirect effects 
of a cyber operation on civilians, civilian objects, and other persons and objects 
protected by IHL are not factored into the equation�
Cyber operations appeared on the battlefield in a dangerous interpretive void� 
As so often happens, technology has outpaced the law, or at least in this case 
full understanding of how extant law governs emerging cyber capabilities� Such 
a state of affairs is always strategically perilous� On the one hand, options that 
are in fact lawful are sometimes needlessly taken off the table out of misguided 
concern about their legality� On the other, unlawful options are at times seriously 
considered, thereby risking public and international condemnation should they 
be selected�
The normative fog of cyber war is beginning to clear, albeit slowly� This ar-
ticle has surveyed those aspects of international humanitarian law relevant to 
targeting, the activity during an armed conflict that poses the greatest risk to the 
defender and the civilian population� But targeting equally poses the greatest 
risk to the attacker, not only from an operational perspective, but also in terms 
of mission accomplishment� Characterization of a cyber operation as unlawful 
can quickly wipe away any gains that the operation has attained� It is accordingly 
essential that those occupying roles having responsibility for overseeing and 
Cyber activities have become an indelible 
facet of contemporary warfare, not just for 
cyber-empowered militaries such as that of the 
United States, but also for low-tech forces.
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executing cyber operations develop a degree of understanding of their normative 
boundaries. 
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 Naval warfare in the littorals has much in common with war conducted on the open ocean. However, there are also some significant differences, due 
to the extremely complex, dynamic, and challenging physical environment of 
the former. The peculiarities of the physical environment in the littorals offer 
many challenges—but also opportunities—in the employment of naval forces 
and aircraft. Distinctions between characteristics 
of war on the open ocean and in the littorals must 
be thoroughly understood; otherwise, command-
ers and their staffs simply cannot plan or employ 
their forces properly. 
Perhaps the most important prerequisite of 
success in littoral warfare is a solid theory devel-
oped ahead of time; otherwise it is not possible to 
organize and train forces properly. Littoral warfare 
requires the closest cooperation among the ser-
vices, or “jointness.” It also often requires close 
cooperation with forces of other nations. 
The objectives of warfare in the littorals are 
generally similar or identical to those of war on 
the open ocean. Yet there are substantial differ-
ences in how these objectives are accomplished. 
In contrast to war on the open ocean, the most 
prevalent method of employment of combat forces 
in the littorals is tactical action; opportunities to 
plan and execute major naval/joint operations are 
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ON LITTORAL WARFARE
relatively rare� Because of the rapidity and possibly drastic changes in the tactical 
and operational situations, warfare in the littorals requires a highly decentralized 
command and control (C2)� This means a true application of German-style “mis-
sion command”—otherwise, success will be wanting� 
IMPORTANCE 
The political, military, demographic, and economic importance of the littorals 
has steadily increased over the past two decades� In 1991, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact brought an end to the Cold War� This in turn 
had a major impact on the international political and security environment� 
Animosities between various nation-states that had been held in check during 
the Cold War came into the open� An era of global certainty and predictability 
was replaced by one marked by uncertainty, turmoil, and chaos�1 The threat of 
war between major powers has been reduced, but lesser threats to international 
order have proliferated, in growing scope, diversity, and frequency�2 During the 
past decade Southwest Asia, the Greater Middle East, North Africa, the western 
Pacific, and most recently Eastern Europe have emerged as the new areas of ten-
sions, conflict, and potentially even major regional wars� It appears that in case of 
a high-intensity conventional war, combat actions at sea would be predominantly 
conducted in the littoral waters� 
About 80 percent of all countries border the sea, and approximately 95 percent 
of the world’s population lives within six hundred miles of the coast� Some 60 
percent of the world’s politically significant urban areas are located within sixty 
miles of the coast, and 70 percent within three hundred miles�3 About 80 per-
cent of the world’s capitals are in the littorals�4 The littorals account for about 16 
percent of the world’s oceanic expanse�5 Yet they are critically important because 
all seaborne trade originates and ends there� The sea remains the primary, and 
by far the most cost-effective, means for the movement of international trade� 
In 2013, about 80 percent of the global trade by volume was carried by ships�6 
The importance of the world’s oceans and seas to the economic well-being and 
security of nations and to the projection of power has perhaps never been greater 
than it is today� 
A blue-water navy now faces much greater and more-diverse threats in the 
littorals than in the past� This is especially the case in enclosed and semienclosed 
seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf� The threat is especially acute within 
and near the world’s international straits, such as Hormuz and Malacca� The 
threat to one’s forces steadily increases as one approaches an enemy coast� The 
weaker, defending side can have integrated a widely distributed reconnaissance/ 
surveillance system with seagoing platforms, land-based aircraft, air and 
coastal defenses, ground troops, and special operations forces into an effective 
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multilayered defense� The defender can reach out much farther and more strong-
ly than might be expected, catching the attacking force off guard�7
The primary antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the littorals are 
land-based aircraft, diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs) fitted with air-
independent propulsion (AIP), multipurpose corvettes, fast attack craft (FACs), 
coastal missile/gun batteries, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), midget sub-
marines, sophisticated mines, and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles 
(MRBMs/SRBMs)� In addition, stealthy surface craft armed with small-caliber 
guns, short-range rockets, or even suicide boats can threaten not only one’s com-
mercial shipping but in some cases even larger surface combatants� One of the 
most serious threats to survivability of large surface ships and merchant shipping, 
however, is posed by long-range antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs)� The most 
advanced ASCMs can be used against either ships or targets on land� They can 
be fired by submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and concealed coastal missile sites� 
For example, the People’s Republic of China is currently developing sophis-
ticated A2/AD multilayered defenses extending several hundred miles from the 
coast� These defenses consist of space-, air-, and ground-based radars, and over-
the-horizon radars, bombers, fighter-bombers, and multipurpose attack aircraft 
carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and ASCMs�8 The Chinese navy is also 
introducing into service large numbers of modern surface combatants armed 
with ASCMs, as well as AIP SSKs armed with ASCMs, torpedoes, and mines� 
Approaches to the Chinese coast are defended by numerous coastal missile 
and gun batteries� The Chinese have very large inventories of highly advanced 
mines� They also have at their disposal several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs 
for use against targets on land� They have developed antiship ballistic missiles 
with ranges of a thousand miles plus, as well as a highly integrated air-defense 
system (IADS) with sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and fourth- and 
fifth-generation fighter aircraft� The Chinese A2/AD assets also include highly 
advanced and hardened C2 networks, antisatellite weapons, and cyberattack 
capabilities�9 
Likewise, Iran is also trying to create multilayered defenses within the Strait of 
Hormuz and its approaches� Currently, the Iranian navy has in its inventory large 
numbers of ASCM-armed missile craft, several thousands of mines (both old and 
very advanced), and several quiet SSKs and midget submarines� ASCM batteries 
are deployed on the coast and islands within the strait� The Iranian A2/AD capa-
bilities also include a number of land-based attack aircraft armed with ASCMs, 
UAVs, and several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs� They also have an increasingly 
sophisticated IADS�10 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy operates a 
small number of ASM-armed boats, as well as stealthy torpedo boats; hundreds of 
small speedboats armed with machine guns, multiple rocket launchers, or ASMs; 
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remotely controlled radar decoy and explosive-filled boats; and a small number 
of semisubmersible attack craft�11 
DEFINING THE TERM 
The term “littoral” (from the Latin litus, “shore”) is often used but is not always 
properly defined or understood� In its simplest definition, “littoral” means a 
“coastal region” or “refers to a shore�”12 In geographic terms, the term pertains to a 
coastline zone between extreme high and low tides� The U�S� military defines the 
littoral as consisting of two segments of the “operational” environment: seaward 
(the area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support 
operations ashore) and landward (the area inland from the shore that can be sup-
ported and defended directly from the sea)�13 Yet this usage is on one hand too 
broad and imprecise, and on the other, it overlooks a fairly wide range of relevant 
geographical conditions� 
Littorals, properly speaking, encompass areas bordering the waters of open pe-
ripheral seas, large archipelagoes, and enclosed and semienclosed seas� Littorals 
bordering open oceans, such as the coasts of North and South America, Africa, 
and India, extend outward to the farthest extent of the continental shelf� The 
width of the continental shelf varies from less than a hundred miles off the west 
coast of North and South America to nearly eight hundred miles from the Arctic 
coast of North America and Eurasia� The average width of the continental shelf, 
however, is between two hundred and five hundred miles� The depth of water on 
the continental shelf averages 250 feet�14 
“Peripheral” (or marginal) seas are parts of an ocean bordering the continental 
landmass and partially enclosed by peninsulas, island chains, or archipelagoes, 
such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea� They lie on downward-
sloping portions of the continental shelf and are uniformly deep� Littorals also 
include large archipelagoes completely or partially surrounded by open ocean, 
such as the Malay (or Indonesian) and Solomons Archipelagoes� 
The most complex physical environments for employment of naval forces 
are those of “enclosed” and “semienclosed” seas� An enclosed sea, such as the 
Baltic or the Adriatic, lies wholly within the continental shelf and is surrounded 
by a landmass except for a strait connecting it to an ocean or another enclosed 
or semienclosed sea� Because of their restricted communication with the open 
ocean, enclosed seas have small tidal ranges or are tideless�15 Enclosed seas are 
also called “continental seas” if they rest on shallow depressions, as do the Sea of 
Azov and the Baltic� In contrast, a semienclosed, or partly enclosed, sea is con-
tiguous to a continent and is linked by two or more straits/narrows to the open 
ocean; an example is the North Sea� Semienclosed seas are characterized by large 
tidal ranges�16 
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Enclosed and semienclosed seas are popularly called “narrow seas�”17 In the 
military meaning of the term, a narrow sea is a body of water that can be con-
trolled from either side� Hence, this term can be properly applied to all enclosed 
and semienclosed seas, as well as to their long and narrow entrances (such as the 
English Channel, or La Manche), or certain restricted areas within a narrow sea 
(such as the Sicilian Narrows)� It is in a narrow sea that a blue-water navy, like the 
U�S� Navy, would likely have the most difficulty in projecting its power ashore� 
OPERATING AREA 
The operating areas in the littorals differ considerably in terms of their sizes, 
distances, hydrography, oceanography, and the proximity of the landmass to the 
open ocean� The oceans themselves are characterized by huge size and distances 
measured in thousands of miles; the Atlantic Ocean covers an area of some 41�0 
million square miles and varies in width from 1,770 miles (between Brazil and 
Liberia) to three thousand miles (between the east coast of the United States and 
North Africa)� They are uniformly deep, except for the waters off the continents� 
In contrast, a typical narrow sea presents a much smaller area to be controlled or 
defended� For example, the Baltic Sea covers 163,000 square miles, extends along 
its north–south axis for about 920 nautical miles (nm), and has an average width 
a little over 105 nm� The Persian (Arabian) Gulf is about 615 miles long and be-
tween forty and 220 miles wide, with an area of about 92,600 square miles�18 With 
its 950,000 square miles, the Mediterranean Sea is the largest of all narrow seas� 
It extends west to east more than 2,400 miles, and its maximum width is about 
a thousand miles� The Mediterranean encompasses several smaller narrow seas 
(the Tyrrhenian, Ionian, Adriatic, and Aegean)�
In an enclosed or semienclosed sea, the distances separating various points on 
the opposing shores are fairly short� For example, in the Baltic Sea, the distance 
between Kiel and Helsinki is about 625 nm; the port of Tallinn (formerly Reval) 
is only about 220 nm from Stockholm; some 230 nm separate Copenhagen and 
Rostock� For the North Sea, the British port of Hull is only about 280 nm from 
the German port of Emden and some 210 nm from Ostend� The German port 
of Cuxhaven lies about 475 nm from Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys� Such short 
distances considerably affect the employment of surface ships, submarines, and 
aircraft: transit times are short, and high sustained speeds are less critical than 
in transiting oceans� Small areas combined with short distances allow employ-
ment of not only large but also small surface ships and submarines� Units can 
be deployed and redeployed at short notice and within hours� Submarines, by 
conducting attacks in various parts of a narrow sea, can create an impression that 
a larger number of them are present than is the case�19 
Book 1.indb   34 2/4/15   10:24 AM
39
Naval War College: Spring 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 V E G O  3 5
The short distances in a typical narrow sea also allow the use of all types of 
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters� Short flying times allow more sorties and 
longer time over target areas� Aircraft can be quickly deployed and redeployed 
between various points� The probability of achieving surprise is also greatly 
enhanced, especially if aircraft approach targets at low altitudes or over land� In 
addition, a damaged aircraft has a much better chance of reaching the safety of 
its base than if operating over the open ocean� Finally, short distances allow the 
side that is stronger in the air to dominate a theater to a far greater degree than 
on the open ocean� 
Lines of operation and lines of communications in enclosed-sea theaters are 
fewer in number and much shorter than on the open ocean� If a coast is fronted 
by islands or an archipelago, these lines are predictable to the enemy because they 
are few in number� Few, if any, alternatives are available� But in a typical narrow 
sea, shipping routes assume very different patterns: they run along the coast (i�e�, 
longitudinally), from one shore to the opposite one (laterally), or again longitu-
dinally between sea exit(s) and ports of destination within a given narrow sea� 
They usually have the largest traffic volume and require, of the three categories 
of routes, the greatest effort to control fully� Longitudinal sea routes, from one 
port to another along one’s own coastline within the effective range of coastal 
defenses, are generally easier to protect� Where coastal waters are deep, as off 
Norway, longitudinal sea routes can run very close to shore� It is even easier to 
protect longitudinal sea routes if the coast is fronted by several island rows, as is 
the case along the Dalmatian coast� However, longitudinal sea routes are long and 
few in number; hence, they offer many opportunities for the enemy attack� At-
tackers can choose parts of the route that are exposed or poorly defended, as well 
as the time� They have much greater diversity of targets, because coastal routes 
would be used by many types of commercial and military shipping�20
Lateral routes are shorter and more numerous than are coastal routes� How-
ever, they are also much more vulnerable to an enemy attack because they run 
across the high seas, where their defense is difficult; they can be secured usually 
only near the ports of origin and destination� Friendly ships using lateral routes 
would be unable to maneuver and seek protection closer to their own coast�21 
Narrow seas are characterized by the presence of large numbers of friendly, 
enemy, and neutral commercial vessels, warships, and auxiliaries� In peacetime, 
waters near coasts are typically crowded with fishing, resource-exploitation, and 
scientific vessels plus numerous recreational craft� For example, some ninety-
three thousand ships passed through the Skaw and the Kiel Canal in 2009�22 In 
the Mediterranean, some two hundred thousand merchant vessels larger than a 
hundred tons, or about 30 percent of the world’s maritime shipping, transit every 
year� Most of that traffic is bound for areas outside the Mediterranean�23 
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The straits connecting narrow seas to the open ocean or other narrow seas are 
also called “choke points�”24 Density of shipping at the approaches to and within 
the international straits is higher than on the open ocean� There are several 
thousand straits in the world, but only between 95 and 121 have international 
importance�25 International straits are both the hubs and the most vulnerable 
segments of sea communications� Several of these—including, notably, those of 
Hormuz, Malacca, and Singapore—are considered global choke points of world 
trade, with extremely large economic, political, and military importance� For 
example, in 2011 seventeen million barrels per day (bb/d), about 35 percent of 
all crude-oil traffic worldwide, passed through the Strait of Hormuz�26 In 2011, 
about 15�2 million bb/d of crude oil passed through the Strait of Malacca�27 Some 
sixty thousand ships pass through it each year�28 If that strait were closed for any 
reason, almost half of the world’s merchant shipping would have to use alterna-
tive choke points—specifically, the Lombok Strait (between Bali and Lombok) 
and the Sunda Strait (between Java and Sumatra)�29 About 3�4 million bb/d of 
oil was transported through the eighteen-mile-wide Bab el Mandeb in 2011�30 In 
2010, some 2�9 million bb/d passed through the Turkish Straits, seventeen miles 
long and only half a mile wide; each year some fifty thousand ships, including five 
thousand tankers, transit this navigationally very difficult waterway�31
Straits/narrows are the keys to controlling naval and commercial shipping 
movements from and to enclosed- or semienclosed-sea theaters� A belligerent 
that controls both sides of a strait can employ naval forces and establish coastal 
defenses to prevent an attacker from entering a given enclosed-sea theater� The 
location, length, width, and depth of a choke point largely determine its eco-
nomic and military importance� A strait that, like the Strait of Hormuz or the 
Danish straits, is the only access to an enclosed sea has particular significance� 
The length of important straits varies greatly, from the thousand-mile-long 
Mozambique Channel to the only three-mile-long Strait of Tiran (the entry to 
the Gulf of Aqaba)� The Persian Gulf is linked to the Arabian Sea by the Strait of 
Hormuz, 120 miles long and twenty-four to sixty miles wide�32 The 550-mile-long 
strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea� 
Some international straits are very narrow, which greatly affects a ship’s speed 
and maneuverability� For example, the Strait of Malacca is only about 1�5 nm 
wide at its narrowest point, as is the Phillip Channel in the Singapore Strait� Shal-
low depth adds to the navigational hazards of some straits; for example, the Strait 
of Malacca is only seventy to 120 feet deep, while the Bosporus and Dardanelles 
are 110 and 160 feet deep, respectively�33 Some straits, however, are very deep, like 
Gibraltar (1,100 feet) and Lombok (one thousand feet)� Navigation through some 
important straits is made difficult by strong currents� For example, the current in 
the Shimonoseki Strait (between Honshu and Kyushu) runs at up to eight knots� 
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The San Bernardino Strait (between Bicol Island, Luzon, and Samar) has tidal 
currents of four to eight knots�
The configuration and physical features of the coast affect in important ways 
the length and directional orientation of bases of operations, the organization of 
surveillance, and coastal defense� The employment of naval forces and aircraft in 
a narrow sea is greatly affected by length of the coastline, the number and size 
of natural harbors, the terrain, the presence of offshore islands, the abundance 
or scarcity of natural resources, and inland communications� When a coast 
is backed by high mountain ridges and washed by deep water, as is Norway’s 
coast, naval and commercial vessels can sail close to shore, where detection by 
shipborne radar is more difficult� On elevated or mountainous coasts, commu-
nications are often scarce or entirely lacking� If a mountain chain runs close and 
parallel to the coast, the roads and railroads usually run in the same direction� 
A steep, rocky, and highly indented coast, or one with fjords separated by rocky 
headlands and numerous rivers, makes longitudinal communications difficult, 
while rocky beaches make it difficult to carry out conventional, large-scale am-
phibious landings�
Generally, a low-lying coast is favorable for the development of the road/
railroad network, which can in turn greatly reduce the need for coastal shipping� 
Conversely, a coast with poor land communications means greater reliance on 
coastal shipping to transport military and commercial cargo� Land traffic in the 
littorals can easily be interrupted for long periods, especially if the principal roads 
or railways run close and parallel to a coast backed by steep, high mountains� 
A flat coast with few or no offshore islands is generally favorable to landings 
by sizable forces� It also facilitates the movement of forces into the interior� Gen-
erally, coral reefs and very shallow water extending far from shore favor defense 
against conventional amphibious assaults� Swamps and marshes in the coastal 
area can considerably impede or canalize vehicular traffic, especially heavy armor 
and mechanized forces�
A highly indented coast backed by high ground allows the construction of 
underground shelters for submarines and small surface combatants� Shelters, 
usually built of concrete and fitted with heavy steel doors, provide protection 
against air attack, even with nuclear weapons� They also can offer a range of re-
pair facilities and crew accommodation for several weeks� For example, Sweden 
has built along its coast what is probably the world’s most extensive and sophis-
ticated underground facility at Muskö, near Stockholm� Until much of it was 
closed in 2004, when the Swedish navy decided to use only its two major naval 
bases, at Karlskrona and Berga, Muskö had three docks and was able to handle 
fast attack craft, submarines, and destroyers� China is reportedly building a secret 
underground naval base at Sanya, on the southern tip of Hainan� There massive 
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sixty-foot-high tunnel entrances are being built into hillsides� The base would 
reportedly accommodate up to twenty nuclear-powered submarines�34 
Offshore islands are potentially a great obstacle to any attacker� At the same 
time, however, they require larger forces for defense� For example, Finland’s coast 
is fronted by some 790 islands larger than 0�4 square miles, plus some 178,500 
islets; along Sweden’s coast are about 98,370 islands/islets� The Stockholm Archi-
pelago alone consists of about thirty thousand islands/islets� Sweden’s coastline, 
including islands, stretches for some 37,755 miles� Large archipelagoes, as in the 
Aegean, include many uninhabited islands, which greatly complicate the problem 
of defense� In contrast, a long coast without offshore islands, such as the Iranian 
coast in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, is highly vulnerable to attack from the sea� 
Narrow passages between islands can be blocked by mines and coastal missile 
or gun batteries� Numerous islands canalize the movements of the enemy forces� 
Several island chains running parallel with the mainland coast extend the defen-
sive depth of the coastal area� A multitude of offshore islands offers the possibil-
ity of dispersing bases and thereby making them less vulnerable; small surface 
combatants can change bases or anchorages in hours� Protected bays or channels 
offer refuges for ships, and islands conceal the movements of surface ships and 
troop transports�35
If islands extend transversely from the coast, as off Dalmatia’s coast, the chan-
nels separating them are usually wide and deep, allowing quick, concealed, and 
relatively easy deployment and redeployment of naval forces� An archipelago, 
such as the Aegean (1,415 islands) or the Malay (twenty-five thousand, between 
the Indian and the Pacific Oceans), allows great flexibility in the selection of 
lines of operation and easy and secure “castling” (leapfrogging) of naval forces� 
It also provides excellent opportunities for mines in the defense of naval bases, 
commercial ports, and sea traffic� In general, the more numerous the islands, the 
more difficult the detection of small surface combatants�
Most narrow seas are characterized by shallow water (less than two hundred 
fathoms deep)� For example, about 60 percent of the Baltic Sea is less than 150 
feet deep� The depth of water in the Gulf of Finland varies from 110 to just over 
three hundred feet� The average depth of the Adriatic Sea is about 650 feet�36 In 
the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, the mean depth is about eighty feet, and the water is 
rarely deeper than three hundred feet; the deepest water is found off the Iranian 
coast, while depths off Saudi Arabia’s coast average 110 feet� Maximum depth in 
the Yellow Sea is 460 feet, and the mean depth is only 150 feet�37 
Shallow water restricts, and can even preclude, the employment of major sur-
face combatants� The speed of large surface ships must be considerably reduced 
when transiting very shallow waters (ten-to-forty-foot depths)� In confined 
waters, such as channels, a ship’s speed can be reduced up to 60 percent� The 
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effects of water depth are rather significant for surface ships at speeds higher 
than twenty-five knots� For example, at thirty knots in eighty-foot depths, wave 
resistance is almost three times greater than in 115-foot water and five times 
more than in deep water (more than 1,200 feet)�38 A surface ship proceeding at 
five, ten, fifteen, or twenty knots requires minimum depths of thirteen, fifty-six, 
125, and 220 feet, respectively�39 
Safe operations by a submarine require certain clearances above the mast and 
under the keel� Normally, a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) should have 
a minimum of fifty feet of water under its keel; an SSK needs from thirty-five to 
forty feet� This figure does not include the much greater depth required for a 
submarine to maneuver in evading attack� Depending on the water transparency, 
a submarine may need to operate several dozen feet farther down to prevent de-
tection from the air� At periscope a submarine’s keel depth is from fifty to sixty-
five feet, depending on sea state and periscope/mast extension� For example, the 
periscope depth for the German Type 212A is about forty feet� Reportedly, the 
periscope depth for an American SSN is less than a hundred feet (from the keel)� 
The character of the seabed can either facilitate submarine operations or make 
them very difficult� In general, a smooth seafloor allows submarines to lie on 
the bottom during a pursuit� The presence of shipwrecks can provide a hiding 
place� An SSK can use bathymetry, bottom composition, topography, and nearby 
wrecks to hide from pursuers�40 It would be difficult to detect if it settled on the 
seabed in less than a hundred feet of water, switched off its engines, and shut all 
seawater inlets� A bottom-lying SSK looks to sensors like a sunken ship; only a 
human operator can tell the difference� An SSN, however, cannot sit on the sea 
bottom, for fear of clogging vital inlets to condensers�41
Shallow water considerably complicates the use of less advanced torpedoes 
by surface combatants and submarines� For example, most advanced lightweight 
torpedoes, such as the U�S� Mark 46 Mod5A (SW), specially designed for use in 
shallow water, require a minimum depth of about 148 feet when fired by a surface 
ship� In contrast, advanced heavyweight torpedoes, such as the U�S� Mark 48 Mod 
6 AT, require much greater minimum depth for launching because of their initial 
negative buoyancy� Yet some heavyweight torpedoes—for example, the German 
WASS Black Shark—can be reportedly fired even from a bottom-sitting boat�42
Shallow water facilitates the use of all types of mines� For example, bottom 
mines for use against enemy submarines can be laid to a depth of about 660 feet, 
yet their effectiveness diminishes significantly below 230 feet� Rocket-propelled 
rising mines can be used down to 650 feet� Antisubmarine rising mines fitted 
with rocket-propelled torpedoes may be laid in water depths exceeding 3,300 
feet� Modern moored mines could be laid at depths from fifteen feet to, depend-
ing on their size, five thousand feet or even more� Pressure influence mines 
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cannot be laid at depths greater than a hundred to 165 feet; otherwise they would 
be ineffective against enemy surface ships�43 
In general, electronic sensors when used close to a coast are prone to degrada-
tion due to a variety of climatic, electromagnetic (EM), and atmospheric anoma-
lies, the presence of a large landmass, human-made clutter, and the proximity of 
multiple EM sources�44 The performance of radar, electronic support measures 
(ESM), and communications systems varies with temperature, pressure, humidity, 
cloud formation, and storm activity� Another problem is presence of a large num-
ber of cellular telephone networks and such commercial land-based emitters as 
television, commercial aircraft, and ships� This, in turn, creates substantial diffi-
culties in using ESM sensors to sort out and identify emitters or signals of interest�
The combined effect in the littorals of a considerable difference between the 
temperature of the air and that of the sea and the proximity of landmass often 
causes nonstandard propagation of EM waves� “Subrefraction” occurs when air 
temperature decreases or humidity increases rapidly with height, causing EM 
waves to bend upward or away from the earth’s surface� “Super-refraction” takes 
place when the relative humidity of the air steadily decreases with altitude instead 
of remaining constant or when the air temperature decreases at a rate less than 
standard� EM waves can then bend down much more sharply, striking the sea 
surface, reflecting upward again, curving back down to the sea surface, and so 
on continuously� Both of these phenomena significantly affect the range of radar 
and radio communications, and electro-optical (EO) sensors� Subrefraction 
causes shorter ranges for radars operating within such a layer; super-refraction 
would extend the range of radars, but targets would appear closer and at higher 
altitudes than actual�45 Subrefractive EO propagation causes reduced detection 
ranges against low-elevation air threats, while super-refractive propagation can 
present the threat against a background of strong solar glint or infrared clutter�46
The extreme case of super-refraction, known as “ducting,” or trapping, occurs 
in conditions of temperature inversion—that is, when a warmer layer of air lies 
above a cooler layer and EM waves are trapped near the surface� If a trapping 
layer exists, a duct may form, and it may extend above the trapping layer�47 Under 
some conditions ducts significantly extend the propagation of EM waves, but 
they can also create blind zones where radar cannot detect targets� For example, 
radar might detect an aircraft flying at five thousand feet at ninety nautical miles 
but not one at six thousand feet at the same range�48
Large land/sea temperature differences often occur in the littorals� This 
phenomenon is caused by heating over land surfaces during the day while the 
temperature over water remains fairly constant, generating diurnal lateral move-
ments of air—sea breezes during the day and land breezes at night�49 Near-shore 
breezes can cause surface ducts and thereby degrade radar performance�
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The performance of the shipboard radars against low-flying aerial targets close 
to the coast is also adversely affected by land clutter�50 Doppler radars are able 
to detect larger targets in the presence of land clutter� In contrast, pulsed radars 
(which lack perfect waveform stability because the clutter signal is often much 
stronger than the target signal) have great difficulty in detecting small targets 
even after the effect of clutter is greatly minimized�51 Very often false targets are 
created and actual targets masked� The Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 illus-
trates the great problems of using shipborne radars for detection and identifica-
tion of low-flying targets in the presence of land clutter�52
The irregular distribution of shapes and sizes of waves, wind speed and direc-
tion, swell height and direction, and biologics can greatly affect radar returns 
from the sea surface, causing sea clutter� Radar return from the sea surface de-
pends on operating frequency, polarization, and grazing angle� Sea clutter causes 
difficulties in discriminating small targets, such as submarine periscopes, from 
background noise� Also, multiple false targets would make detection of targets 
with low radar cross section (RCS) extremely difficult�53
CHARACTERISTICS 
Warfare in the littorals has certain characteristics not found on the open ocean� 
These distinctions are especially pronounced in narrow seas, owing to their small 
size, short distances, the presence (often) of many offshore islands, and shallow-
ness of water� The operating areas of both enemy and friendly forces encompass 
not only littoral waters but also coasts, offshore islands, and parts in the interior 
within the range of shipborne weapons� 
Littorals are not isolated theaters of war; they lie on the flanks of troops oper-
ating along the coast� In the Italian campaign in 1943–45, for example, the flanks 
of the Allied armies were on Italy’s western and eastern coasts� In the German- 
Soviet war, the strategic flanks of both sides were the Baltic and Black Seas�54 Like-
wise, during the Korean War, 1950–53, the coasts of the Korean Peninsula bor-
dering the Sea of Japan (East Sea, for the Koreans) and the Yellow Sea (Western 
Sea) represented the flanks of both the United Nations and the North Korean / 
Chinese ground forces�
In contrast to war on the open ocean, combat action in the littorals can encom-
pass a major part, or even the whole of, a theater, as the North Sea in 1914–18 and 
the Solomons campaign of 1942–44 illustrate� Numerous actions between small 
surface combatants took place in the English Channel in 1940–44, the Sicilian 
Narrows in 1940–43, the Black Sea in 1941–44, and the Adriatic in 1943–45� As 
noted above, lines of operation in a typical narrow sea and, hence, deployment 
and redeployment times are rather short� In the struggle for control of the English 
Channel in 1940–44, lines of operation for the German forces varied from about 
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eighty-four nautical miles at the latitude of Brest to only eighteen at the narrowest 
part of the Channel�55 
The restricted maneuvering space in a typical narrow sea, especially with 
shoals and reefs, is even more confined if one or both opponents lay mines� For 
example, in the English Channel the operational areas for both the Germans and 
Allied forces were much reduced by, aside from the many navigational hazards, 
extensive mined areas� Most of the mine barriers laid by both sides were in the 
middle of the English Channel�56 The opposing naval forces were forced to con-
centrate rather than disperse, facilitating mutual support but making them more 
vulnerable to attack� 
The small size of the typical narrow sea allows both the attacker and the de-
fender to keep a large part of the theater under constant observation� Even the 
weaker side can conduct continuous reconnaissance throughout the theater� 
Hence, large surface ships would have difficulty remaining undetected�57 Smaller 
hostile ships, however, can take advantage of the high density of shipping traffic 
combined with the presence of offshore islands and islets to conceal their pres-
ence�58 The presence of noncombatants also makes identification of targets much 
more complicated than on the open ocean� Shipborne radars would detect low-
flying aircraft or ASCMs at much shorter distances than their nominal maximum 
effective ranges because of the presence of land clutter� Likewise, airborne radars 
have problems detecting aerial targets flying either very low or over terrain with 
highly reflective properties� 
Detection of the enemy submarines and mines in the littorals is also much 
more complex and uncertain than on the open ocean� This is largely the result 
of the prevalent shallowness of water, peculiarities of hydrographic and oceano-
graphic conditions, and high ambient noise� In shallow water, sound propagation 
is generally difficult to predict, because of great seasonal and daily variations of 
sea temperature, salinity, waves, tides and currents, any influx of freshwater, and 
the reflection and absorption due to variations of the seabed� In addition, natural 
and man-made ambient noise compounds the problem of hunting for subma-
rines in shallow waters� 
One of the major problems in using acoustic sensors in shallow water for clas-
sification of contacts is a high false-alarm rate� An indented coast fronted by nu-
merous islands and islets makes classifying sonar contacts extremely difficult� In 
general, the longer a sonar’s detection range, notably for passive sonar, the greater 
the problem; the number of contacts increases approximately as the square of de-
tection range�59 Many false sonar contacts result from the high irregularity of the 
sea bottom; underwater cliffs and slopes may resemble submarines lying close to 
or on the bottom�60 False contacts result in not only wasted time but unnecessary 
expenditure of fuel, sonobuoys, and weapons�61 If the sea bottom is composed of 
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metalliferous rock, magnetic anomaly detectors often produce false alarms�62 As 
a result of all the above, detection range of submarines by surface ships is much 
shorter in shallow water than on the open ocean, especially against quiet SSKs� 
An SSK that is motionless or moving at less than five knots and is positioned near 
wrecks or rocky pinnacles is almost impossible to detect with acoustic sensors�63 
Also, submarine-versus-submarine detection ranges are very short because of 
their improved stealth features, meaning, again, much shorter reaction times�64 
In comparison to war on the open ocean, warning and reaction time in the 
littorals is much reduced by short distances and the high speed of modern plat-
forms and weapons� This is especially the case in narrow seas with islands where 
small surface combatants can hide and attack suddenly at short range� ASCMs 
can be launched from concealed positions behind islands, the terrain being used 
to mask their trajectories, leaving very little time for targets to react� The problem 
of early detection is compounded by land clutter, plus, in some cases, heavy seas� 
In the littorals, surface ships are especially vulnerable to the attacks by ASCMs 
and torpedoes� Supersonic ASCMs fly at very low altitude and can conduct com-
plicated evasive maneuvers in the terminal phase of their flight� For example, 
an ASCM flying at Mach 2�5 and at low altitude would be detected at a range of 
fifteen miles; it would take only thirty-three seconds to reach its intended target� 
Advanced ASCMs can be programmed to escape detection by abruptly chang-
ing direction and attacking a different target in the same general area� A target 
would have great difficulty countering ASCMs fired simultaneously or in a short 
interval by a combination of aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and coastal sites� 
The same challenge of short reaction time applies to heavyweight torpedoes� 
A typical distance for launching a heavyweight torpedo from a submarine is 
between 5�0 and 8�0 nm� However, this distance is considerably shorter when 
torpedoes are launched by a small surface combatant or a submarine in an am-
bush position�
Missions of small surface combatants in littorals are typically short, because of 
their short range and low endurance� For example, a combat mission for a missile 
craft could vary from several to about a dozen hours� The duration of a mission 
by a small surface combatant would depend not only on its endurance but also on 
the length of the period of darkness� The latter depends on the time of year and 
geographic latitude of the operating area� For example, because of Allied air supe-
riority after the summer of 1942, German S-boats (Schnellbooten, torpedo boats) 
based on the occupied coasts of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands were able 
to operate only at night� During short summer nights the S-boats concentrated 
their attacks against convoys in the Strait of Dover and the approaches to Plym-
outh, while in the long winter nights, S-boats based in the Netherlands extended 
their missions up to the estuary of the River Humber, in England�65
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The situation on the surface greatly depends on those in the air and on land� 
Control of a given part of the theater will be directly related to the size of forces 
present, and the duration of their stay�66 The high speeds of modern surface 
combatants and their ability to combine maneuver and “fires,” together with 
the features of the physical environment, potentially allow one side to achieve 
surprise� The weaker side may not operate in the way one thinks it would, us-
ing asymmetric responses to neutralize or even nullify the advantages normally 
enjoyed by a blue-water navy� The weaker side would try to inflict large losses on 
the stronger� Its FACs and SSKs can attack from an ambushing position close to 
the coast or within a group of islands� 
One of the main features of naval combat in the littorals generally is frequent 
and radical change in the tactical and operational situations� In general in the lit-
torals, frequency of contact between opposing forces would be much higher than 
on the open ocean�67 Combat there—thanks to long-range, highly precise, and 
ever more lethal weapons, such as ASCMs, land-attack cruise missiles, advanced 
torpedoes, and other smart weapons—would be most likely decisive� Most sur-
face combat would be fought at close range; encounters would be sudden, short, 
and violent� In a war between two strong opponents, the intensity of surface and 
air combat, and with it consumption of fuel and ammunition, would be very high� 
As a result, logistical sustainment would be critically important to success�
Because of the ever-present and serious threat from the air, most surface ac-
tions in the littorals would take place at night or in bad weather� For example, 
prior to 1942 British coastal forces operating in the English Channel and the 
North Sea were highly vulnerable to attack by the Luftwaffe aircraft during the 
day unless provided effective fighter cover�68 Hence, most of their missions were 
conducted during the night� By the summer of 1942, the Luftwaffe’s superiority 
over the Channel had ended� From August 1942 to July 1943, when the major-
ity of German shipping moved along the coast from the Scheldt River estuary 
southward through the Channel toward southern France, all actions by German 
surface forces were conducted during the night� This required a high degree 
of navigational skill because most navigational lights had been shut down� Yet 
despite all defensive measures, there were frequent attacks by the British coastal 
forces, mostly motor gunboats and motor launches� The British had a fairly good 
knowledge of the German routes and used radar to select ambush positions�69 
The British coastal forces too had to operate mostly at night, because a great 
threat from Luftwaffe aircraft remained�70 
During the struggle for Crete in May 1941, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, 
Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Mediterranean Fleet, informed the Ad-
miralty in London that the scale of enemy air attacks prevented his ships from 
operating during daylight hours in the Aegean or off the coasts of Crete� Hence, 
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he warned, the British navy could no longer guarantee that it could prevent sea-
borne landings without incurring losses that might lead to sacrificing command 
of the eastern Mediterranean�71 During the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War of Oc-
tober 1973 the threat from the air forced the Israeli navy to carry out most of its 
missions during the night hours, as naval battles off Latakia on 7/8 October and 
Damietta–Baltim on 8/9 October (discussed below) illustrate� 
PREREQUISITES 
The main prerequisites for success in littoral warfare are suitable and diverse 
platforms, weapons, and sensors; robust command organization; close coop-
eration among friendly forces; air superiority; well developed theory; and sound 
doctrine�
The physical environment in the littorals, in typical narrow seas particularly, 
requires a naval force differently composed from that employed on the open 
ocean� Obviously, large surface combatants, such as aircraft carriers, cruisers, and 
SSNs, could if necessary operate in a typical narrow sea in a time of high-intensity 
conventional war� However, as noted, their speed and maneuverability would be 
drastically reduced� They would be also very vulnerable to ASCMs launched by 
aircraft, small surface combatants, SSKs, and coastal batteries, as well as to small-
boat swarms and advanced mines� The risks of operating highly capable but also 
very expensive platforms outweigh potential benefits� A surface combatant op-
erating in narrow seas should perhaps not exceed 1,200 to 1,500 tons� Common 
to all ships optimally designed for operations in the littorals are small size, mod-
erately high speed, shallow draft, high maneuverability, moderate range and en-
durance, and low signatures (radar, infrared, acoustic, and magnetic)� Advanced 
SSKs, light frigates (FFLs), multipurpose corvettes, and FACs are much better 
suited for combat in littoral waters� Small surface combatants can be employed 
effectively in shallow waters where large surface ships cannot operate or where 
risks for them are too high� They are generally more suitable for conducting ASW, 
defense and protection of friendly shipping, and anti-combat-craft defense� They 
are also much less expensive and can be built or acquired in larger numbers� Yet 
for all their advantages, small surface combatants also have a number of deficien-
cies� They have little space, small buoyancy reserve, and inadequate structural 
integrity� They are extremely vulnerable to the attacks from the air and by larger 
counterparts� In case of a hit by a missile or bomb, a small surface combatant 
has little chance to survive� Because of their small size, enclosed-sea theaters are 
almost ideal for the employment of land-based attack aircraft, fighters, patrol 
aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs� Plainly, strategic mobility plays no role for a small 
coastal navy in the littorals� Because of the shorter distances involved, tactical 
mobility is almost entirely dependent on the capability to move at maximum 
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speed� In general, high speed for a surface combatant incurs much higher 
construction costs, greater power requirements, exorbitant fuel consumption, 
reduced range and payload, increased maintenance, and lower stealth� But for 
small surface combatants, such as multipurpose corvettes and FACs, high speed 
is critical not only for mobility but for survivability; they lack staying power and 
have to avoid pursuit after launching their missiles or torpedoes� Major surface 
combatants, in contrast, would rarely use speeds higher than, say, thirty knots in 
a typical narrow sea, because of the shallowness of the water� For them, sustained 
transit speed, range, and endurance are far more important, because they often 
have to transit long distances before reaching their operating areas� 
Hence, the U�S� Navy did not make a good decision in specifying a speed of 
more than forty-five knots for its new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); the result is a 
platform optimized neither as a small nor as a large combatant� Reportedly the 
LCS can sail about 1,250 nm at its sprint speed�72 However, its range at maximum 
speed is likely to be much shorter� At its sustained speed of eighteen knots, the 
three-thousand-ton LCS 1 (first of the USS Freedom class) can sail 3,500 nm, 
while the 3,100-ton LCS 2 (the Independence class) has a range of about 4,500 nm� 
In the operating area, according to some reports, the LCS has to be refueled every 
three days�73 Further, it cannot operate at its maximum speed in water less than 
twenty feet deep or in traffic or bad weather (sea state 4 and higher)� 
As on the open ocean, success in littoral warfare requires employment of 
diverse combat arms, the deficiencies of each compensated by the strengths of 
others� This means that not only the weaker but the stronger side as well should 
possess small surface combatants, advanced SSKs, land-based attack aircraft 
and helicopters, and UAVs� Yet no single type of surface combatant, however 
advanced, is a panacea, nor can it offset the absence of forces optimally suited for 
operations in the littorals� In fact, combat elements of other services and branches 
—air, army, marines, and special operations forces—should be employed in the 
littorals as well� 
For successful combat in the littorals, a simple and streamlined littoral 
command structure, with the fewest possible intermediate levels, should be 
established� For a blue-water navy, like the U�S� Navy, such a command should 
be composed of multiservice forces under a joint force commander (JFC) and 
directly subordinate to the theater commander� At the tactical level, the optimal 
solution is to subordinate directly several joint or combined task forces to the 
littoral command� Each of these should be composed of two types of elements, 
arbitrarily called a distant cover and support forces and the littoral combat 
groups (LCGs)� The distant cover and support forces would consist, depend-
ing on the mission and the situation, of carrier strike groups, expeditionary 
strike groups, surface action groups, SSNs, and marine expeditionary units, 
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plus air force attack aircraft and heavy bombers� In some cases, army combat 
teams can be part of an LCG as well� An LCG would include surface, subsurface, 
and airborne platforms optimally suited for operations in littoral waters, ide-
ally (though the U�S� Navy currently lacks several of these) FFLs, multipurpose 
corvettes, FACs, SSKs fitted with AIP, shipborne/land-based multipurpose 
helicopters, surface mine-countermeasures ships, unmanned vehicles (UAVs / 
unmanned surface vehicles [USVs] / unmanned underwater vehicles [UUVs]), 
and special operations force (SOF) teams� Each LCG should be tailored for a 
particular mission, such as for obtaining/maintaining sea control, denying sea 
control, or attacking the enemy’s or defending friendly shipping� This means that 
the composition of LCGs should be tailored depending on the mission and the 
situation� 
For a small or medium country, all services of the armed forces deployed in 
the littorals should be subordinate to a single command commander� Directly 
subordinate to such a commander should be several maritime or naval district 
commands, each of them consisting of several maritime or naval combat sec-
tors (zones)� At the tactical level, forces for littoral combat might consist of a 
number of AIP SSKs, multipurpose corvettes, diverse FACs, small amphibious 
ships and craft, mine-countermeasures ships and craft, land-based helicopters, 
UAVs/UUVs/USVs, coastal missile/gun batteries, special forces teams, and re-
motely controlled minefields� These forces should be organized in combat groups 
depending on a particular mission� They should be supported by land-based 
fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft and larger army units� The emphasis 
of smaller and medium navies would be primarily on sea denial� 
In World War II, the British and the Germans established command organi-
zations for their respective coastal forces struggling for control of the North Sea 
and the English Channel� The Royal Navy established main bases for its coastal 
forces in East Anglia, at Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft, and Felixstowe� They were 
responsible for administration and maintenance of light forces operating from 
them� However, operationally these forces were controlled by CINC, the Nore, 
at Chatham� In February 1943, an intermediate level of command was created 
with the establishment of Coastal Forces (Nore), under a navy captain� The main 
responsibility of this new command was to unify training of all coastal forces ac-
cording to a common doctrine�74 
The German organization was in some ways similar to the one established by 
the British� After reorganization in February 1941, Commander of Security, West 
(Befehlshaber der Sicherung West), with headquarters in Paris, was responsible 
for defense of the French Channel and Atlantic coasts� He was directly subordi-
nate to Naval Group Command West (Marinegruppenkommando West) (after 
September 1942 also Commanding Admiral, France), in Paris� Commander, 
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Naval Group Command West was subordinate not to the CINC of the western 
theater but directly to the High Command of the Navy in Berlin� He had under 
him three security divisions: the 2nd (responsible for the zone from the Scheldt 
estuary to Cherbourg), the 3rd (Cherbourg to Saint-Nazaire), and the 4th (Saint- 
Nazaire to the Spanish border)� In November 1942, the 6th Security Division was 
established and was responsible for defense of southern France’s coast� Each secu-
rity division consisted of flotillas of picketboats, submarine chasers, minelayers, 
and minesweepers� The principal mission of Commander of Security, West was 
defense and protection of cargo vessels carrying important raw materials (e�g�, 
iron ore from Spain)�75
The S-boats, which played a principal role, were subordinate to Naval Group 
Command West, but via Commander of Scouting Forces (Befehlshaber der 
Aufklaerungsstreitkraefte) and the Leader, Torpedo Boats (Fuehrer der Torpe-
doboote)� This rather rigid command structure soon proved inadequate; in the 
spring of 1942, Leader of Torpedo Boats was renamed Leader, S-Boats (Fuehrer 
der Schnellboote)� This new organization provided more flexibility in command 
and control of the S-boats� The Germans established their S-boat bases in Rotter-
dam, Ostend, Boulogne, and Cherbourg� In addition, the bunkers at Le Havre for 
R-boats (Raümboote, minesweepers), were used by S-boats, as were the smaller 
ports of Vlissingen (the Netherlands), Saint-Malo (Brittany), and Saint Peter Port 
(Guernsey)�76
Today, smaller navies operating in the littorals are organized in either naval 
districts or naval flotillas� For example, the Iranian naval forces in the Persian 
Gulf are subordinate to three naval districts: the 1st Naval District, at Bandar Ab-
bas, for the Strait of Hormuz; the 2nd Naval District, at Bushehr, for the central 
Persian Gulf; and the 3rd Naval District, at Mahshahr, for the northern Persian 
Gulf� Each naval district includes several naval bases; the independent naval base 
at Chabahar is responsible for operations in the Gulf of Oman�77 In contrast, the 
Royal Swedish Navy’s seagoing forces are organized into three flotillas: the 1st 
Submarine Flotilla, at Karlskrona (submarines, a submarine rescue unit, a marine 
transport unit); the 3rd Naval Flotilla, at Karlskrona (33 Mine Clearance Divi-
sion, 34 Maintenance Division); and the 4th Naval Flotilla, at Berga (41 Corvette 
Division, 42 Mine Clearance Division, 43 Maintenance Division, 44 Navy Diver 
Division)� In addition, there is an amphibious regiment and a naval base, both 
at Karlskrona�
Littoral warfare is inherently joint (multiservice) and often combined (multi-
national)� In the modern era, no single combat arm or service can reach its full 
potential unless it is employed in combination with other combat arms, branches, 
and services� Among other things, shortcomings in the capabilities of one service 
can be balanced by the complementary capabilities of others� A JFC has more 
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options than a single-service component commander in employing his forces, 
because sea, land, air, and special-operations elements offer a wider range of pos-
sibilities� At the same time, the enemy is put at a great disadvantage against a mul-
tidimensional threat for which he might not have an effective counter� Multiser-
vice forces allow a creative operational commander to combine their diverse but 
complementary capabilities in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways and gen-
erate greater impact than the sum of the individual parts�78 For example, missile- 
armed surface combatants can attack a variety of targets on the enemy coast, 
while land-based aircraft can strike enemy warships and merchant ships at sea 
or in their bases and ports� Friendly ground forces can seize enemy naval bases, 
ports, and airfields and thereby greatly facilitate the task of obtaining sea control�
Joint employment of two or more services also has some disadvantages� One 
is that command organization / C2 is more complex than in the employment of 
single-service forces� The different service cultures and doctrines might lead to 
misunderstanding and make cooperation difficult� Other potential challenges 
include parochialism of services, personal incompatibility (or even animosity) 
among high commanders, poor operations security, and insufficient interoper-
ability� Communications arrangements are more cumbersome because of dif-
fering systems and procedures used by various services� (This is an especially 
difficult problem to resolve in employing multinational forces�) Deployment of 
combat forces and logistical support and sustainment also pose much greater 
challenges than for single-service forces� Information flow within a multiservice 
or multinational force is also generally much slower than in a single-service force� 
Perhaps the most critical prerequisite for success in littorals is air superior-
ity over the major part of the theater� The struggle for the control of the air in 
the littorals cannot be separated from that in the airspace over adjacent coastal 
areas� Because of the short distances, the effectiveness of aircraft against ships 
and targets on the coast is much higher in a typical narrow sea than on the open 
ocean� Aircraft represent a constant threat to the survivability of all vessels, but 
especially to surface ships� The ever-present threat from land-based aircraft can 
even preclude the employment of large surface combatants in a narrow sea� Their 
survivability and that of merchant vessels while operating within the effective 
range of enemy land-based aircraft can be ensured only by reliable and effective 
air cover� The effectiveness of land-based aircraft against surface ships was dem-
onstrated for the first time in European waters in World War II� The Luftwaffe 
was instrumental for the successful German invasion of Norway in April–June 
1940� The Royal Navy’s failure to deny the use of the sea to the Germans in the 
first days of the campaign was a result of the intensity and effectiveness of the 
Luftwaffe attacks when protection was not provided by Allied fighters based 
ashore�79 
Book 1.indb   49 2/4/15   10:24 AM
54
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 5 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The Luftwaffe’s effectiveness in attacking the surface combatants was on full 
display during the final phase of the struggle for Crete in late May 1941. The 
Royal Navy was extensively committed to evacuating troops to Alexandria, 
Egypt. During this effort Allied ships were subjected to massive attacks from the 
Luftwaffe’s VIII Air Corps. One effect of these attacks was to force the Allies to 
abandon attempts to evacuate troops from Crete’s northern coast.80 Luftwaffe 
bombers and dive-bombers sank three Allied cruisers, six destroyers, five mo-
tor torpedo boats, and several smaller ships.81 In addition, two battleships, one 
aircraft carrier, six cruisers, and seven destroyers were damaged. Some thirty-two 
Allied transports, supply ships, and fleet auxiliaries with about 128,500 tons were 
sunk or had to be abandoned, and twelve ships with 94,500 tons were lost at sea.82 
Admiral Cunningham pointed out that in three days he had lost two cruisers and 
four destroyers, as well as a battleship, two more cruisers, and four destroyers se-
verely damaged.83 The struggle for Crete shows that in the modern era sea control 
cannot be obtained without the control of the air. The answer to enemy airpower 
can only be superior airpower.84
Success in littoral warfare is hardly possible without sound theory. The theory 
of littoral warfare should be a separately developed but at the same time an in-
tegral part of the theory of naval warfare as a whole. One of the main purposes 
of naval theory is to provide a broad and deep framework for understanding the 
entire spectrum of warfare at sea. However, a major problem is the lack of a co-
herent theory of littoral warfare. Classical naval thinkers—notably Rear Admiral 
Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914), Vice Admiral Philip H. Colomb (1831–99), Sir 
Julian S. Corbett (1854–1922), Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956), 
and Vice Admiral Raoul Castex (1878–1968)—generally drew no distinction 
between warfare conducted on the open ocean and in the littorals. Yet all of them 
discussed from a historical perspective many naval encounters that occurred in 
the littorals. Mahan, in his Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the 
Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911), explained in some 
detail many aspects of what would be considered today operational-level war-
fare in the littorals. Colomb, in Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice 
Historically Treated (1891), provided numerous historical examples of war in the 
littorals in his analysis of what he called “the struggle for the command of the 
sea” and “attacks on the territory from the sea.”85 Corbett, in Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy, made many references to the role of naval forces during the 
Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–54, 1665–67, and 1672–74) in the English Channel 
and North Sea, the British blockade of the French fleet in Atlantic ports and the 
Mediterranean during the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy’s support of the 
army of General Arthur Wellesley (later Field Marshal, First Duke of Wellington) 
(1769–1852) during the Peninsular War (1808–14), and the naval actions in the 
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Yellow Sea during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)� Wegener’s main focus, 
in his Naval Strategy of the World War (1929), was on explaining the Imperial 
German Navy’s failure to obtain freedom of action outside the confines of the 
North Sea; he explained in some detail the strategic situation in the North Sea 
during World War I�86 Castex wrote the five-volume Strategic Theories (1929–35), 
where he paid a great deal of attention to historical analysis of warfare in the 
littorals� Among other things, Castex analyzed the German operations in the 
North Sea and the influence of geography in naval warfare�87 Colonel Charles E� 
Callwell of the British Army, though not widely known, was perhaps one of the 
first influential proponents of joint warfare in the littorals� In his classic work 
Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance he described and analyzed 
in great detail naval bases and fortresses and their capture by fleet forces, land 
operations against enemy fleets and merchant shipping, and the benefits of hav-
ing “maritime command” against an enemy stronger on land� He also compared 
maritime and land lines of operations� Callwell explored influence of “maritime 
command” on military lines of operation in the coastal area� A major part of his 
work was focused on amphibious landings and siege of “maritime fortresses�” He 
also devoted a long chapter to the influence of inland waters and waterways on 
military operations�88 
Optimally, foundations of a theory of littoral warfare should be historical ex-
perience and the vision of the future war at sea� The latter is based primarily on 
the influence of the current and anticipated new technologies on the character of 
war at sea� Overemphasis on either historical experiences or technology would 
invariably result in an unsound naval theory� It is an especially grave error to 
develop naval theory and then doctrine based on exaggerated belief in the value 
of new technologies� Also, a naval theory should not be developed on the basis of 
fiscal difficulties of the moment or political ideology� In all these cases, the result 
will be a naval theory disconnected from the operational realities� Examples of 
naval theories that made both kinds of errors are the “Young Schools” of France 
(the Jeune École) of the mid-1870s to the early 1900s and of the Soviet Union, in 
the late 1920s and mid-1930s� 
The French Young School was based almost entirely on an exaggerated view of 
the benefits of the new technologies and on mislearned lessons from the Austro-
Italian War of 1866, reinforced by France’s dismal economic situation in the after-
math of the war with Prussia in 1870–71�89 Its leading proponent, Vice Admiral 
Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile Aube (1826–90), contended that command of the 
sea, obtained through a naval battle or blockade, had become highly problematic 
because of the new technological advances� Aube’s ideas were widely accepted 
by young French naval officers, who believed that they had found a new naval 
warfare concept for attack on and defense of the coast—a network of “sleeping” 
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torpedoes and coastal fortifications, combined with ram ships, floating batteries, 
and high-speed, seventy-ton, twenty-knot gunboats, and torpedo boats, as well as 
fifty-ton “defensive” boats supported by armored ships�90 These views also found 
a receptive audience in Austria-Hungary, for reasons that were political, military, 
and fiscal� 
The Soviet “Young School,” which emerged in the 1920s (in opposition to an 
“Old School” of Mahanian former tsarist officers), was based on the poor state 
of the Soviet Union’s economy and fleet, its Marxist-Leninist ideology, and prin-
ciples of partisan (guerrilla) warfare� Its proponents advocated a navy composed 
of light surface combatants, submarines, mines, and land-based naval aircraft; 
they also advocated employing submarines jointly with air forces against large 
surface ships�91 
Despite the shared name, however, the Soviet Young School’s ideas were not 
identical to those of the French Young School of the 1880s; arguably the Soviet 
strategy was defensive, not offensive, as the French strategy was�92 Both, however, 
produced theories potentially applicable to littoral warfare—but only, as it were, 
accidentally, on the basis of unrelated and transient national factors, not a true 
understanding of naval warfare� Neither school produced forces or concepts 
viable for naval operations in the littorals, though both were preeminent for a 
number of years in their respective countries (and, for the Jeune École, in Austria-
Hungary as well)� Both were abandoned when national situations changed�93
A sound doctrine, regardless of its scale, should revolve around several 
“operating concepts�” An operating concept can be tactical or operational; in a 
naval context, a “tactical concept” describes in broad terms the employment of 
single-type platforms or groups� An “operational concept” aims at operational-
level objectives through major naval or joint operations� An operational concept 
specifically for littoral combat should be based on a proper assessment of the 
operating area and a realistic vision of future warfare in it� It should describe in 
broad and simple terms how forces should be employed� It should not directly or 
implicitly refer to a specific operating area or the potential enemy� 
An operational concept should be flexible to allow creative ways to employ 
one’s forces in case of sudden changes in the situation� It should ensure speed of 
action and surprise� It should pose a threat from multiple physical mediums (sea, 
air, and land) and thereby considerably limit the enemy’s options� It should also 
provide for operational deception and surprise� It should integrate both offensive 
and defensive information operations (IO) capabilities� Finally, an operational 
concept should be articulated clearly and succinctly� 
In U�S� practice, an operational concept encompasses a number of “functional 
concepts” to ensure its effective application in combat� The principal types of 
functional concepts are notional force composition, command organization, 
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command and control, maneuver, fires, sequencing and synchronization of 
combat forces, logistical support and sustainment, and force protection� Each 
functional concept in turn comprises a number of “enabling concepts,” describing 
tactics and procedures�94
A sound doctrine for littoral warfare should encompass several different op-
erational concepts� For the stronger side the key operational concept should be 
sea control, while for the weaker side the focus should be sea denial� However, 
prudence also dictates that a stronger side should develop an operational concept 
for sea denial as well� Doctrine for littoral warfare at the operational level of war 
should include operational concepts for amphibious landings, antiamphibious 
defense, attack on enemy trade, and defense and protection of friendly maritime 
trade� Littoral warfare doctrine should also include tenets of operational com-
mand organization, C2, and leadership; operational decision making and plan-
ning; and operational (supporting) functions (intelligence, IO, fires, logistics, 
and protection)� Doctrine for littoral warfare cannot be written as a stand-alone 
document; it should be developed as an integral part of a navy’s doctrine for the 
operational level of war� Warfare on the open ocean and warfare in littorals are 
inseparable parts of warfare at sea as a whole�
OBJECTIVES 
In general, the principal objectives of naval warfare are sea control, sea denial, 
choke-point control or denial, basing/deployment-area control (or denial), and 
destruction or weakening of the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, and 
preservation of one’s own� Although there are many similarities among the main 
methods used on the open ocean and in the littorals for accomplishing these 
objectives, there are also considerable differences� Normally, the principal objec-
tive of a stronger side at the very beginning of hostilities would be to obtain and 
then maintain sea control—the ability to use a given part of the sea or ocean and 
associated airspace for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to 
the enemy during open hostilities� 
Sea control exists in various degrees and states (spatial extents)� These varia-
tions are the product of a complex interplay among the factors of space, time, 
and force� Generally, the degree of sea control depends on the size of the ocean/
sea area; distances to the operating area from one’s basing/deployment area; and 
relative numerical/qualitative naval strength (plus in some cases nonnaval forces) 
compared with the enemy forces� 
Control of the surface is relatively easier to obtain in a narrow sea with a 
few or no offshore islands� Narrow seas with large numbers of offshore islands 
or archipelagoes pose the greater challenges because of the numerous hiding 
places, especially for small surface combatants� The presence of advanced SSKs 
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and sophisticated mines would make it extremely difficult to obtain the desired 
degree of control of the subsurface in the littorals� Control of the air is perhaps 
even more elusive, especially in the littorals, with a multitude of offshore islands 
or archipelagoes� 
The spatial extent of sea control can be general or local or a combination of 
these two� General control means a loose control, mainly sea surface, of a larger 
part of a given maritime theater� Local sea control is intended to obtain and 
maintain a high degree of control in all physical dimensions but in a smaller part 
of the theater where an operational objective is located� It depends on the general 
situation in a given maritime theater�95 Sometimes a stronger side possesses a 
general control of a maritime theater but local control is in the hands of a weaker 
opponent� For example, in the aftermath of the landing at Leyte on 20 October 
1944, the Allies controlled Leyte Gulf and the approaches to the Philippine Archi-
pelago generally� However, they did not control the western approaches to Leyte 
Island, especially during the night hours and in bad weather� This situation, in 
turn, allowed the Japanese to bring in fresh troops and matériel to Leyte from 
nearby islands in the Visayas and near Mindanao;96 they used mostly barges but 
also transports, submarine chasers, and destroyers, until 9 December� The main 
reason for the Allied failure in the western approaches to Leyte was a lack of 
ships larger than PT boats but smaller than destroyers and capable of operating 
in confined waters, and also of sufficient aircraft fitted with radar for operating 
at night�97
Sea control on the open ocean cannot be isolated from control in the littorals� 
At the same time, the influence of land is far more pronounced in a typical nar-
row sea than it is on the open ocean� There is no real sea control unless a stronger 
side controls both the sea and adjacent land area�98 In a narrow sea, control of 
the high seas does not necessarily mean control of waters within the groups of 
islands or archipelagoes� Success in the struggle for sea control requires the clos-
est cooperation among all services�99
On the open ocean, sea control is obtained primarily by destroying or at least 
neutralizing a major part of the enemy’s forces at sea or their basing areas� In 
contrast, in a typical narrow sea, a side weaker at sea but having stronger ground 
forces and air superiority could obtain sea control largely by capturing the sea’s 
exit(s), the enemy’s main naval bases and airfields, and key islands� For example, 
and despite the inferiority of the Kriegsmarine, the German army, with the sup-
port of the Luftwaffe, essentially obtained sea control over the eastern part of the 
Baltic and the Gulf of Finland in the initial phase of the invasion of the Soviet 
Union on 22 June 1941� Army Group North advanced quickly along the Baltic 
coast in the first few weeks and by September 1941 had seized the entire coast 
(except the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland), including the large Soviet naval 
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bases at Leningrad and Kronshtadt� Hence the Germans and the Finns could 
operate in the Bay of Kronshtadt to destroy the remainder of the Soviet Baltic 
Fleet�100 
In June 1941, the Germans relied on their army’s rapid advance along the coast 
of the Black Sea coast to obtain control of that sea� Army Group South advanced 
through southern Ukraine to seize the Crimean Peninsula, with its large naval 
base at Sevastopol, and other, Ukrainian ports� Despite bitter Soviet resistance, 
by October the Germans occupied most of the Crimea, including the Kerch Pen-
insula� Yet the Sevastopol fortress did not fall into German hands until early July 
1942� The German offensive in southern Russia in that summer led to the capture 
of almost all the remaining Soviet naval bases and ports in the Black Sea� How-
ever, Tuapse, Poti, and other smaller bases along the southern Caucasian coast 
of the Black Sea were never captured by the Germans; having failed to eliminate 
the Soviet naval forces completely, the Germans never obtained full control of the 
Black Sea� Soviet naval forces remained a constant nuisance for German supply 
traffic on the Black Sea�101 
For the weaker side in the littorals, the principal objective would be to deny 
control of the sea to the opponent—that is, frustrate partially or completely the 
enemy’s use of the sea for military and commercial purposes� Alternatively, a state 
of disputed or contested sea control might exist, in which the opposing sides pos-
sess roughly equal strength, there is no significant change in the ratio of forces, 
and the initiative does not shift to either side�102 Such a situation is characterized 
by an almost continuous struggle for control, which when achieved is usually 
maintained for only a short time and then lost and then obtained again� Disputed 
sea control is characterized by large losses on both sides�
A stronger side can have a high degree of control on the open ocean but much 
less closer to the continental landmass� Complete control of a narrow sea cannot 
be obtained as long as the opponent, however weak, exists and is active� For exam-
ple, during World War I, the British Grand Fleet never had control of the eastern 
and southeastern part of the North Sea� Likewise, control of the Adriatic was es-
sentially in the hands of the Austro-Hungarian navy throughout the entire war�103
In the past, weaker navies achieved results by attacking enemy coasts or mari-
time trade while avoiding fleet-on-fleet encounters� For example, in World War 
I, the German navy harassed the British and conducted minor actions to reduce 
the British margin of superiority to such an extent that eventually the High Seas 
Fleet (Hochseeflotte) took the offensive�104 The Germans also hoped that success-
ful attacks on the Entente’s trade routes might force the British to divert some of 
their naval strength and thereby make the Grand Fleet more vulnerable to am-
bushes by light surface forces� Containment of the High Seas Fleet required the 
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presence of British ships that otherwise could have been doing something else� 
Also, decisive actions against U-boats, such as laying an effective mine barrier off 
the German coast, could not be undertaken during the entire war, because of the 
presence of the German battle fleet in the area�105
The struggle for control of straits/narrows or “choke points” is a unique fea-
ture of the control of enclosed or semienclosed seas� To control a narrow sea a 
blue-water navy must first control the sea’s exits� This could be limited to control 
of the airspace above it, but obviously full control of the exit in all three physi-
cal dimensions (surface, subsurface, air) is far preferable� For a blue-water navy, 
general control of the open ocean is hardly possible without establishing not only 
general control of waters adjacent to a narrow sea but also control of its exits/ 
entrances� Conversely, for a riparian state it is absolutely critical to have free 
access to open waters beyond the confines of the narrow sea on which it lies� 
Choke-point control, then, is an offensive objective for a stronger side, and deny-
ing that control—an easier task —is a defensive objective for the weaker� Not only 
naval forces but other services as well would be employed, either way�
A great advantage for a weaker opponent in such a case is that its forces would 
operate along multiple and much shorter lines of operation and retreat� The 
blue-water opponent can use only a single line of operation and a single line of 
retreat� Another advantage of the weaker force is that sometimes it may be able 
to seize and maintain sea control of a strait and its approaches with nonnaval 
forces alone�
Experience shows that control of a sea’s only exit is usually insufficient to deny 
the weaker fleet freedom of action within a given narrow sea; full or partial con-
trol of operationally significant positions must be obtained as well� For example, 
in World War I, the French fleet blockaded the Strait of Otranto early in the war 
but made only occasional forays farther north into the southern Adriatic� This 
left the much weaker Austro-Hungarian fleet almost undisputed control of the 
Adriatic throughout the war� Had the Entente navies made a strong effort to 
destroy the Austro-Hungarian fleet, they could have prevented the German and 
Austro-Hungarian U-boats from carrying out their deadly attacks on Entente 
shipping in the Mediterranean�106
In another example, during World War II the Allies had strategic control of 
the Mediterranean because they controlled the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez 
Canal� (Turkey being formally neutral, neither the Allies nor the Axis controlled 
the Turkish Straits�) Within the Mediterranean, the Allies controlled in 1940–43 
only a single operationally significant position, the island of Malta; the Bonifacio 
Strait, the Strait of Messina, and the Strait of Otranto were in the hands of the 
Axis, while control of the Sicilian Narrows was disputed� 
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Choke-point control can also cut off an enemy’s links overseas� Conversely, 
blocking a choke point from within the enclosed sea to prevent any outside force 
from entering is a form of self-blockade, usable only if no further offensive ac-
tions are planned�107 
Another objective of naval warfare in the littorals is to ensure the security of 
basing and deployment areas; otherwise it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain, maintain, or deny sea control� At the beginning of hostilities the stronger 
side would try to expand its own basing and deployment areas and prevent the 
weaker side from doing the same� Basing/deployment-area control is one of the 
primary responsibilities of the operational commander� It is an integral part of 
theater-wide or operational protection� Not only naval forces but those of other 
services would be employed� 
Basing/deployment-area control is an operational objective accomplished by 
a series of tactical actions and protection measures conducted during the entire 
war at sea� The principal defensive tactical actions include reconnaissance and 
surveillance; patrolling of the approaches of one’s naval bases, ports, and selected 
parts of the coast; air, antisubmarine, and anti-combat-craft defense; defensive 
mining and mine countermeasures; and defense against commando raids and 
combat swimmers� Offensive tactical actions include destruction of enemy sur-
face combatants potentially threatening one’s naval bases/ports, attacks on the 
enemy’s naval/air bases and ports and installations/facilities on the coast, and lay-
ing of mines in the enemy’s coastal waters� Protection of basing and deployment 
areas is significantly enhanced by a variety of passive and active measures, such 
as the countering of enemy reconnaissance or surveillance, electronic warfare, 
and cover and concealment� Additionally, a number of protective measures can 
improve the survivability of forces, coastal installations, and facilities� Once ob-
tained, basing/deployment control must be maintained, and everything possible 
done to deny the same to the opponent� 
“Trade warfare” or “economic warfare”—attack on the enemy’s maritime trade 
and defense and protection of friendly shipping—is an integral part of a much 
broader task of weakening or destroying the enemy’s military-economic poten-
tial and protecting one’s own� In the littorals, the priority is shipping at sea / in 
ports, ports, shipyards and ship-repair facilities, installations critical for supply 
and sustainment of forces on the land front, the needs of war industry, and the 
population�108 This task is much more difficult for a weaker side because of its 
inability to ensure an adequate degree of sea control� But it can still protect sea 
routes close to its coast and within island chains, if it establishes multilayered 
defenses� In general, maritime traffic is much easier to defend if friendly troops 
control the coastal area, including naval bases, ports, and airfields� 
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METHODS 
The principal methods of combat employment of naval forces generally are tacti-
cal actions, major naval operations, and maritime campaigns� Naval warfare in 
the littorals would be characterized by numerous and diverse tactical actions 
fought on the surface, beneath the surface, and in the air� Minor tactical objec-
tives would be primarily accomplished by attacks and strikes, while major tactical 
objectives would normally require naval raids, engagements, or battles� Naval 
tactical actions are normally an integral part of major naval/joint operations but 
they could be, as the example of the Solomons campaign of 1942–44 illustrates, 
also conducted independently� Yet they should be invariably part of a given oper-
ational framework—that is, contributing directly or indirectly to the accomplish-
ment of a given operational or strategic objective� For example, between 9 August 
1942 and 25 November 1943 fifteen major surface actions were fought in the 
waters around the islands of Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Bougainville� All of 
them were a part of the struggle for sea control in the Solomons Archipelago and 
its approaches� All but three of these actions were fought at night� The Japanese 
(who were much better than the Allies in night fighting and the use of gunnery 
and torpedoes in combination) won or achieved draws in ten of them� No fewer 
than seven naval battles and engagements were fought for Guadalcanal alone� 
The Japanese losses (including the fighting off New Guinea and the Bismarck 
Archipelago) amounted to two battleships, one small aircraft carrier, three heavy 
and three light cruisers, and thirty-six destroyers� In addition, Japanese naval air 
strength was so severely depleted that the air wings of fast aircraft carriers could 
thereafter no longer be properly manned� An even more serious problem for the 
Japanese was that new construction was unable to make up for the losses� No 
more battleships or heavy cruisers were built by the Japanese, and only half of the 
lost destroyers were ever replaced�109 
During the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War of October 1973 the Israelis fought 
two naval battles, one each with the Egyptians and the Syrians� In the night of 
6/7 October, a force of five Israeli missile boats patrolled off Syria’s coast, some 
two hundred miles from their home base� The Israeli boats identified and then 
sank with gunfire one Syrian torpedo boat at about 2230� The same force then 
swept the Syrian coast off the port of Latakia and sank one Syrian minesweeper 
with gunfire, before detecting three Syrian missile boats and one minesweeper 
at about 2335� In the subsequent missile exchange, all three Syrian missile boats 
were sunk within twenty-five minutes�110 In the night of 8/9 October, six Israeli 
missile boats approached the Egyptian coast to shell the military installations and 
coastal defenses in the area of Damietta� Around midnight, four Egyptian missile 
boats engaged them� Three of the Israeli missile boats launched their missiles, 
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and within forty minutes three Egyptian boats were sunk; the fourth was out of 
range and escaped to safety�111
The principal method of combat employment to accomplish a single op-
erational objective in littorals is a major naval operation—a series of major and 
minor naval tactical actions fought on the surface, under the surface, and in the 
air� A major naval operation in the littoral should be planned and conducted by a 
single commander and in accordance with a common operational idea (scheme)� 
Many major naval operations were conducted during World War II in the litto-
rals� The best-known examples are the battle of Matapan on 27–29 March 1941; 
escape of the German battle cruisers from Brest through the English Channel, 
11–13 February 1942 (Operation CERBERUS); convoys to Malta on 12–15 June 
1942 (Operation HARPOON/VIGOROUS) and on 10–15 August 1942 (PEDESTAL); 
and amphibious landings on Sicily on 10 July 1943 (HUSKY), and at Salerno on 9 
September 1943 (AVALANCHE)� The most recent example of a major naval/joint 
operation in the littorals was the British recapture of the Falklands/Malvinas on 
2 April–14 June 1982 (Operation CORPORATE)� 
Because of the overlap of the physical mediums in which services operate, 
major operations in the littorals conducted predominantly by a single service 
would be very rare� All major amphibious landing operations are inherently 
joint/combined (multinational), regardless of the physical environment; also, 
attacks on major naval bases and ports, support of the coastal flank of friendly 
troops, and attacks on and defense of maritime trade in narrow seas require the 
closest cooperation among the services� Naval forces will have the principal roles, 
nevertheless, in major operations designed to destroy or neutralize enemy fleets 
at sea or their bases� The weaker side will have few if any opportunities to plan 
and execute major naval/joint operations to deny sea control, but it would often 
conduct major operations in antiamphibious defense and the defense of major 
naval bases and ports� It might also plan major operations in defense of shipping�
Major naval/joint operations should be planned, prepared, and conducted 
by a naval/maritime component commander� In U�S� terms, joint/combined 
maritime force component commanders designated at theater-level commands 
have sufficient forces for obtaining and maintaining sea control in the littorals� 
That responsibility should not be shared by the air component commander; sea 
control means control of not only the surface and subsurface but the air as well� 
Divided command not only would invariably complicate the accomplishment of 
objectives in major naval/joint operations but also might prove quite detrimental� 
The planning, preparation, and execution of naval/joint operations in the litto-
rals are highly dependent on uninterrupted, fast, and secure communications to 
participating forces� Speed of communications is perhaps one of the most critical 
factors for success in combat in the littorals�
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A weaker side at sea can use unconventional and asymmetric tactical methods 
to inflict losses on its stronger opponent� One relatively new method involves 
so-called swarming attacks, in which a large number of small, fast boats, hidden 
in coves on the coast or among islands, would launch massive missile strikes 
against large surface combatants or commercial vessels� Success would primar-
ily depend on synchronization of the delivery of almost simultaneous attacks by 
many small boats from different directions, to overwhelm missile defenses� For 
example, the Iranians reportedly intend to use swarming attacks against the U�S�/ 
coalition naval forces operating in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and especially 
when transiting the Strait of Hormuz� Swarming attacks would be conducted at 
short ranges, perhaps not greater than 6,500 feet�112 Another swarming tactic that 
could possibly be effective against large surface combatants would use UAVs, ei-
ther independently or in combination with massive attacks by small, fast, missile- 
armed craft� The danger that swarming attacks might pose to major surface 
combatants, especially in confined waters like the Strait of Hormuz, should not 
be underestimated by a blue-water navy, including the U�S� Navy� 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
C2 of naval forces operating in the littoral waters is generally more challenging 
than in warfare on the open ocean� Because the small size of the operating area 
and high intensity of combat would cause sudden and often drastic changes in the 
situation, the main prerequisites for success would be the largest possible degree 
of local initiative� This means that true German-style “mission command” should 
be applied� The commander’s intent should afford sufficient freedom of action by 
subordinates at all levels of command� Unnecessary interference with the respon-
sibilities of subordinate commanders cannot but negatively affect the morale and 
combat motivation, resulting in passivity and unwillingness to take the initiative� 
Short warning and reaction times and rapid changes in the situation require full 
exercise of the initiative at all levels and high tactical skill�113 However, mission 
command is not absolute—the higher commander is duty bound to intervene, 
either reversing decisions or replacing subordinate commanders, when subordi-
nates’ actions endanger the success of the mission or jeopardize the missions of 
neighboring commanders� 
Mission command requires highly educated and well trained subordinates; 
otherwise directive orders must be used� The higher commanders and their sub-
ordinates must share in mission accomplishment� This implies complete trust 
in each other’s professional and personal qualities� In littoral warfare, personal 
relationships between commanders and their subordinates are especially critical, 
given the small crews involved and immediate personal danger� Hence, great 
attention must be given to unit cohesion on board individual ships and forces�
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Networking of surface ships, aircraft, and submarines is potentially beneficial 
in the open waters off a continental landmass, such as off the coast of Africa or 
in the Indian Ocean� Yet the weaker side at sea could obtain even greater benefits 
by knitting together its seagoing and shore-based forces and thereby obtaining 
a real- or near-real-time picture of the situation in the initial phases� It can also 
effectively integrate employment of all naval and other forces in denying access 
to its littorals� 
In a war between two strong opponents, tactical commanders would have 
much less time than in open waters to estimate situations and make sound deci-
sions� Advanced information technologies allow commanders to share informa-
tion obtained from the common operational picture (COP) and cooperative 
engagement capability (CEC)� A COP provides to all commanders an integrated, 
graphical depiction of the battle space based on a single, shareable set of data� It 
presents the current locations, statuses, and often planned movements of friend-
ly, neutral, and enemy ground, maritime, and air forces� It can also display other 
information, such as the weather and battle-damage assessments�114 Depending 
on the level of command, it is possible to choose what information to display� A 
potential problem is that commanders looking at the same data might interpret 
them differently and therefore form different pictures of the situation�115 
A COP is developed by correlating and fusing data from multiple, dissimilar 
data sources, such as tactical data links, reconnaissance/surveillance, and sensor 
networks� Currently, tactical data links provide the bulk of the data that constitute 
the COP� These data inputs are often huge, originating from overlapping sensor 
systems and passing through links that are unable to segregate redundant and 
erroneous data before they are all fused into a COP�116 To eliminate false and 
redundant data across subnetworks and prevent them from entering the COP 
requires extensive cross-checking and filtering� This would require effort and 
time that might not be available when operating in the littorals�117
At the tactical level, a common tactical picture (CTP) is created� Various CTPs 
are correlated and fused to create a new database that is then used to build the 
COP� However, data used to build a COP or CTP mean little without a context 
—that is, personal understanding of how data were developed and what their 
sources were� Not all available data are allowed onto the CTP, and not all data 
from various CTPs are allowed into the COP�118 
One of the potentially greatest problems here for littoral combat is that opera-
tional commanders might interfere in the responsibilities of tactical command-
ers� It is a dangerous illusion to believe that a COP provides sufficient fidelity to 
allow operational commanders to make tactical decisions� They and their staffs 
are too far away to understand the situation better than the tactical commander 
on the scene of action� Moreover, even if operational commanders had precise 
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information, they would not know the context in which information had been 
collected and processed� Hence, operational commanders inserting themselves 
into a situation would find themselves reacting to events instead of exercising 
proper control�119
CEC fuses high-quality tracking data from participating sensors and distrib-
utes the result to all other participants in a filtered and combined state using 
algorithms to create a single, common, air-defense tactical display�120 The advent 
of CEC resulted in great improvement in the accuracy of air-contact tracking, 
continuity of tracks, and identification consistency�121 CEC provides a superior 
air picture, based on all sensor data available, that allows considerably earlier 
detection and more consistent tracking of air contacts than previously possible� 
CEC was designed especially against the air threat in littoral waters�122 It extracts 
data from sensors aboard surface ships and aircraft in a group and displays fire-
control-quality data in a matter of microseconds to all so that they can engage 
incoming targets at maximum intercept ranges�123 Cues based on composite 
tracks allow downrange ships to detect targets earlier and maintain track longer� 
They also allow the maximum battle space in which to engage theater ballistic 
missiles�124
Yet the networking of platforms, weapons, and sensors has a number of tech-
nical and human limitations that could adversely affect commanders and staffs 
in high-intensity combat in the littorals� All too often, collecting information 
becomes an end in itself� Too much information might be collected by higher 
headquarters, producing backlogs that cannot be processed or transmitted in a 
timely fashion to subordinate tactical commanders� At the tactical level, veritable 
floods of information overload users and may desensitize them�125 The most 
extensively networked sensors, decision makers, and shooters can only see what 
an individual sensor can see� A limitation is the ever-growing communications 
bandwidth required to transmit the increased amount of data to decision mak-
ers and shooters as sensors are added to the network�126 Another issue is that 
different decision makers at different levels may need to see different amounts 
and types of information� For example, air, ground, and naval component com-
manders would require different tactical pictures� This last is perhaps the single 
biggest flaw in today’s network-centric environment today, and it is especially 
critical for littoral warfare� 
A GROWING THREAT
Warfare in the littorals, particularly in narrow seas, differs in important respects 
from the war on the open ocean� No maritime theater is more directly affected by 
the geomorphologic, hydrographic, and oceanographic features of the environ-
ment than a narrow sea� Generally, the small size of the theater, short distances, 
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the presence of a large number of islands, proximity of a landmass, the shal-
lowness of water, and great variability and unpredictability of oceanographic 
conditions considerably affect the employment of surface ships, submarines, and 
aircraft� Although all littorals represent challenges in the employment of naval 
forces and aircraft, the most complex and unpredictable environment is that of 
the typical narrow sea�
Sea-denial capabilities of the weaker side in the littorals have been signifi-
cantly increased over the past several decades� A blue-water navy, such as the 
U�S� Navy, underestimates or, worse, dismisses the growing threat to large surface 
combatants in the littorals, within global choke points, and in their approaches 
only at its peril� These threats are bound to increase in scope, range, diversity, and 
lethality in the years to come�
Among the principal prerequisites for the successful conduct of war in the 
littorals, perhaps the most critical is a force optimally designed for operations 
in confined and shallow waters� However, no single-type force, no matter how 
capable, can ensure success in the littorals� Forces for littoral combat should be 
organized differently from those for war on the ocean; specialized littoral as-
sets should not be considered either as replacements for blue-water forces or 
as expendable� The lack of adequate capabilities for littoral warfare could cost 
a blue-water navy, such as the U�S� Navy, dearly in the case of a high-intensity 
conventional war� So might lack of a sound theory of littoral warfare, operational 
concepts, and doctrine; these require much effort and time and cannot be devel-
oped in a hurry after hostilities start� Key among the doctrinal tenets for littoral 
warfare is that command and control should be centralized at the operational 
level� However, the operational commander should apply the true spirit of the 
German-style mission command� Subordinate tactical commanders must be 
given sufficient freedom to act; they in turn must be ready to take high but pru-
dent risks in executing their assigned missions� 
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 This article examines the Bulgarian government’s struggle to modernize its navy since the end of the Cold War� Although the Bulgarian navy is small, 
it is an important navy and an interesting case study, for two reasons: it plays an 
important role in protecting and advancing Bulgaria’s interests in the maritime 
domain, and it operates in an increasingly challenging maritime environment�1 
Situated in the southeastern part of the Balkan Peninsula on the Black Sea, on 
which it has a long coastline, Bulgaria has important economic and security 
interests in the maritime domain, and its navy has a significant part to play in 
protecting these interests� Bulgaria’s Black Sea ports of Varna and Bourgas are the 
gateways of 60 percent of the nation’s foreign trade and are vital to its economy�2 
Bulgaria has also become one of the leading tourist destinations in Europe; tour-
ism is one of the fastest-growing sectors of the economy�3 Bulgaria’s tourist indus-
try is heavily concentrated in the Black Sea coastal resorts, and the government 
sees a threat to this industry from pollution at sea as a threat to national security�4 
The Black Sea—specifically, Bulgaria’s ability to use it—also provides Sofia with 
the opportunity to diversify its energy resources, 
something that it recognizes as of vital security 
importance�5 The Bulgarian navy also plays an 
important role in addressing the rise in the use 
of the Black Sea by organized crime groups�6 Bul-
garia, at the crossroads between the Balkans and 
Europe, lies on several maritime smuggling routes; 
according to Europol, the European Union (EU) 
law-enforcement agency, “Bulgaria now serves as 
a transit point for maritime shipment from Latin 
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America, trafficking from West Africa via Turkey and the Balkan routes, and 
cocaine destined for Italian criminal groups�”7 
The ability of the Bulgarian navy to protect its own security interests and 
NATO’s southern flanks and borders in the Black Sea also matters, and increas-
ingly so in light of recent events in the area� The Russian annexation of Crimea 
and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine have created a more challenging 
maritime security environment than in recent years for Bulgaria and NATO 
members� Bulgaria’s relations with the Russian Federation, a traditional ally, have 
become increasingly strained since the Bulgarian government criticized the Rus-
sian annexation and decided in June to suspend the construction of Bulgaria’s 
section of South Stream, a new Russian gas pipeline that would bypass Ukraine�8 
In an additional clear sign of Bulgaria’s concern about the security challenges in 
the Black Sea, the Bulgarian president has called for an increase in NATO’s focus 
in the southeast, more joint exercises, and more active use of Bulgaria’s military 
facilities by both NATO and the United States�9 
In light of these concerns and the changed geostrategic environment, the 
United States and NATO allies have demonstrated commitments to Bulgaria 
and to the future development of the Bulgarian navy by engaging in a number 
of ship visits and naval exercises�10 In June 2014 the American defense secretary, 
Chuck Hagel, visiting the Black Sea, made it clear that the United States would 
continue to sustain a strong naval presence in the region� He also outlined how 
the United States was stepping up cooperation with partners and allies surround-
ing the Black Sea, including Bulgaria�11 In September, NATO, demonstrating its 
commitment to Bulgaria, opened a crisis-management center in Sofia to enhance 
capacity building, boost interoperability, and promote the training in local con-
ditions for commanders and leaders from NATO member states�12 But given 
Bulgaria’s important security interests in the Black Sea and the growing concern 
among NATO allies about security there, it must be asked: Is the Bulgarian navy 
up to the task? 
This article, in three sections, addresses this question and argues that although 
Bulgaria, a resource-constrained formerly communist state, has had some success 
in building a navy that can protect its interests in the Black Sea and work along-
side its NATO allies, the results have been mixed� The Bulgarian government 
faces many difficulties in supporting and developing its navy over the long term� 
The first section examines the pernicious effect on the Bulgarian navy of the 
absence of defense reform in the decade after 1989, of political instability, and of 
declining defense budgets� The second section looks at how a decision by the Bul-
garian government in 1997 to seek NATO membership created the impetus and 
political commitment necessary to implement a radical process of naval reform, a 
program that included the purchase of a number of secondhand naval platforms 
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and the introduction of a new personnel-management system that increasingly 
professionalized the navy. The last section, however, notes the failure of recent 
defense reforms, particularly in developing coherent and well-funded reform 
objectives. That failure, along with the continuing devastating effect of the global 
economic crisis on the Bulgarian economy, is seriously delaying and hampering 
the development of an effective and efficient Bulgarian navy. 
THE EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE: FAILURE TO BUILD A 
PROFESSIONAL NAVY
Bulgaria’s ability to build a navy after the fall of the Soviet Union (USSR) was 
adversely shaped by its Cold War legacy, the lack of defense reform for almost a 
decade after the communist leadership was replaced in 1989, and declining de-
fense budgets. During the Cold War Bulgaria’s defense posture was based on the 
assumption that the Warsaw Pact would provide unconditional assistance in the 
event of a military conflict. Bulgaria’s role was to defend the alliance’s southern 
flank; it had clearly defined enemies and tasks. The Cold War Bulgarian navy 
was to provide naval units to supplement those of the Soviet navy at Sevastopol 
to achieve maritime dominance in the Black Sea.13 The Bulgarian navy was made 
up of four components: the Black Sea Fleet, the Danube Flotilla, a coastal-defense 
force, and a shore establishment. Its main force consisted of four Pobeda-class 
submarines, two Drazki-class frigates, five Poti-class corvettes, six Osa-class 
missile patrol boats, six Shershen-class torpedo boats, and ten patrol craft, with a 
total of ten thousand personnel.14 In addition, the Bulgarian navy operated thirty 
mine-countermeasures ships, including four then-modern, Soviet-built, Sonya-
class oceangoing minesweepers acquired in the early 1980s, two Polish-built 
medium landing ships, nineteen medium landing craft, and a squadron of three 
armed and nine unarmed search-and-rescue helicopters.15 
As one of Moscow’s most loyal allies, Bulgaria received not only military but 
economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Between 1946 and 1990 Bulgaria 
received almost U.S.$16.7 billion worth of military and defense industrial assis-
tance.16 The loss of military assistance from the USSR and the lack of subsequent 
investment in naval assets and capabilities by successive Bulgarian governments 
impacted negatively on the nation’s maritime power. The loss of access to Soviet 
spares and upgrades resulted in serious deterioration in maritime equipment and 
capabilities. The delivery in 1990 of three Soviet Poti-class corvettes was to be the 
last addition to Bulgaria’s maritime assets for fifteen years. 
In light of the collapse of the USSR and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, 
Bulgaria could no longer rely on either for security, defense, maritime assistance, 
equipment, or aid. In the early 1990s Bulgaria was faced with developing a new 
defense policy, setting new strategic goals and priorities, and restructuring its 
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military forces� The Bulgarian government moved quickly to assume democratic 
control over the military� Legislation in 1990 depoliticized the military, and a 
new constitution a year later established executive control and parliamentary 
oversight of the Bulgarian armed forces�17 The government appointed a civilian 
defense minister and changed the organizational structure of the Ministry of De-
fense� Despite this early progress in assuming democratic control over the mili-
tary, however, defense reform over the next decade would be little more than cos-
metic�18 Between 1989 and 1997 not only did successive Bulgarian governments 
fail to prioritize defense reform but political instability and the poor state of the 
economy led to a rapid decline in the navy and the professionalism of personnel� 
In fact, after the adoption of the law depoliticizing the military, the political 
parties in Bulgaria paid little attention to the problems of modernizing the navy� 
The absence of a political consensus on how to reform the state itself hampered 
agreement on defense� In the first eight years of independence (that is, of the 
communist bloc, the sense in which the term is used hereafter) Bulgaria had four 
parliamentary elections and eight changes of government, in which the two main 
parties, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces 
(UDF), alternated in power�19 Neither the BSP nor the UDF secured enough seats 
in the parliament to push through much-needed legislation, resulting in endless 
bickering and parliamentary deadlock�20 Due to the adversarial nature of the 
political system, Bulgarian politics during this period was stagnant, dominated 
by destructive “zero-sum games” in which decisions were driven by ideology or 
private and partisan interests�21 As a result of the polarization between the two 
main political parties, hard political decisions, in particular how to reform and 
restructure the navy, were delayed� 
The modernization of the Bulgarian navy was also hampered by the failure in 
the 1990s of the two main parties to agree on the direction of Bulgaria’s foreign 
and security policy� In 1995 the government, headed by Zhan Videnov of the 
Socialist Party, finally published Bulgaria’s first “National Security Concept�” 
This document reflected deep division between the two parties over how best 
to address Bulgaria’s security challenges� The Socialist Party viewed security in 
largely traditional ways, emphasizing accumulation of military power and the 
maintenance of ties with traditional allies; the UDF, for its part, sought integra-
tion with both NATO and the EU�22 The failure of the two parties to agree meant 
that between 1989 and 1997 the navy was given no strategic guidance on how 
to redefine its roles, doctrine, and missions� As a result of this lack of strategic 
direction—in essence the failure of successive Bulgarian governments to engage 
in effective strategy and defense planning—the navy, like the remainder of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF), was not reduced in size and retained its old, 
Cold War–era functions, tasks, and structures until the late 1990s�23 One of the 
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pernicious effects of the lack of agreement on grand strategic goals and the failure 
to conduct a rational threat assessment was that the BAF remained at their 1991 
level of 107,000 personnel almost eight years after independence�24 
The poor state of the Bulgarian economy and the failure of successive Bulgar-
ian governments to reform and restructure it systematically also had a negative 
effect on the post–Cold War navy� By 1990, the inefficient, centrally planned 
Bulgarian economy was close to collapse� The new government faced a decline in 
production, growing inflation and unemployment, a large budget deficit, a huge 
foreign debt, and the collapse of trade with traditional partners� In this economic 
crisis the defense budget was reduced by 38 percent, from $550 million in 1990 
to $340 million in 1991�25 A high rate of inflation in 1990 and through Febru-
ary 1991 further eroded the defense budget�26 This decline continued, reaching 
an all-time low of $230 million in 1994�27 In 1995 the defense minister not only 
asked for a quadrupling of the budget but also expressed concern that military 
reform and attempts to improve the social conditions of service personnel were 
being jeopardized�28 
In an attempt to address the growing economic crisis, in the early 1990s the 
UDF government introduced an ambitious program of shock therapy, under 
which the Bulgarian economy showed tentative signs of recovery� In 1994 it 
recorded its first positive growth in real gross domestic product (GDP); a year 
later, inflation dropped to 33 percent�29 However, failure by the Socialist Party, 
in power again from 1994 to 1997, to implement consistent structural reform, 
combined with lax fiscal and monetary policy, erased almost all of these achieve-
ments, and the Bulgarian economy once again declined rapidly� By the end of 
1996 Bulgaria had become the “worst managed country in Europe�”30 Inflation 
was over 300 percent, GDP growth had fallen by more than 10 percent, and the 
currency had collapsed; the nation was plunged into deep recession�31 
This economic crisis caused not only a significant decrease in defense expen-
diture but inflationary pressure that shrank the defense budget in real terms� 
Because of the failure of successive preceding governments to downsize the 
military, almost 90 percent of the declining defense budget was needed to cover 
personnel costs, leaving little scope for investment in new naval equipment, in-
frastructure, or support� After lengthy budgetary negotiations each year within 
the fractious Bulgarian parliament, the military received only a portion of what 
it requested—50 percent of it in 1995 and 46�4 percent in 1996�32 The Bulgarian 
navy was forced to exist on a subsistence budget, with insufficient resources for 
training, spare parts, or procurement�33 
By 1997 the navy, like the other two services, had become little more than 
a hollow structure, with “a totally distorted officer pyramid, lack of competent 
NCO’s [noncommissioned officers], untrained conscripts [and] low readiness of 
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equipment�”34 The Bulgarian navy faced poor service conditions, a lack of clearly 
defined missions, and low morale� In 1995 the defense minister, Boyko Noev, had 
argued that the government’s emphasis should shift from equipment to people�35 
In particular, he declared, defense reform needed to improve the living condi-
tions of officers and stem corruption� This concern about service conditions was 
echoed by Noev’s successor, Dimitur Pavlov, who stated that military pay scales 
remained low and housing was woefully inadequate, both owing to the lack of 
funds�36 
As a result of such conditions the Bulgarian military struggled to retain and 
recruit officers� Many young officers cited poor service conditions as their main 
reason for leaving the military�37 In mid-1998 new legislation cutting military 
severance pay from twenty months to six drove a high number of officers to 
apply for discharge�38 Early attempts to move toward a semiprofessional—that 
is, only partly formed of conscripts—force were hampered by low pay� In 1997, 
the services failed to reach a target of recruiting up to 120 military professionals; 
interest in the new positions was extremely low�39 At a monthly salary of between 
$73 and $110, only forty-eight military professionals joined�40 
The Bulgarian military has also had problems with crime, corruption, alcohol, 
and drug abuse� In 1997 a dozen generals and other senior officers were pun-
ished for serious violations in misuse of state funds, theft from military stores, 
and other offenses�41 In 1998 officials revealed that approximately U�S�$456,334 
worth of items were missing from the 1997 army inventory and that forty-three 
personnel were being investigated�42 Social problems including bullying, alcohol-
ism, and drug abuse were other reflections of low morale in the 1990s and failure 
to develop a professional ethos� A report published in 1998 revealed that while 
reported cases of bullying had decreased, the numbers of drug addicts, alcoholics, 
and suicides among military personnel had increased�43 Professionalism in the 
Bulgarian navy was compromised also by the lack of training� By 1997 the failure 
to fund or prioritize defense reform had resulted in a dramatic decline in the level 
of training across all three services, land, sea, and air�44 
BUILDING A BULGARIAN NAVY: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO 
STEPS BACK
In April 1997 a new majority government formed by the UDF and its allies was 
elected� It launched an ambitious economic reform package and provided clear 
foreign-policy direction that was to constitute the strategic guidance and political 
commitment that began the process of building a navy� To stabilize the economy 
the government established a currency board that pegged the Bulgarian unit of 
currency, the lev, to the German mark� The banking sector was reformed, and 
legislation was introduced to tackle crime� As a result of the new government’s 
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policies, annual inflation, consumer prices, and unemployment fell�45 The fixed 
exchange rate restored international confidence in the Bulgarian currency, and 
GDP increased by 4 percent in 1998�46 
The UDF government also announced an intention to seek both NATO and 
EU membership� The decision to join NATO, in particular, created the impetus 
for and the framework of far-reaching defense reform� Over the next few years 
the government approved a series of documents that laid down the strategic 
guidance necessary to reform the military and build a navy� A National Security 
Concept was approved in April 1998, and a year later a new military doctrine 
and a defense-reform strategy, Plan 2001 (in October)� Plan 2001 restructured, 
reduced, and, in its final phase, modernized the BAF� Under these proposals the 
BAF would become a smaller, more mobile, NATO-interoperable, and profes-
sional military with high operational effectiveness� The BAF would be reduced 
initially to seventy-five thousand and restructured into the Rapid Reaction Force 
and the First and Third Army Corps, the latter two at reduced manning levels�47 
The Rapid Reaction Force would consist of fully equipped and manned land, air, 
and naval components�48 The final stage of defense reform involved reducing 
the BAF to sixty-five thousand personnel, later revised to forty-five thousand; 
the savings in personnel costs would be applied to modernization and NATO 
compatibility�49 For the Bulgarian navy, rearmament and modernization would 
include the upgrading of command and control and of auxiliary ships and the 
introduction of mine-clearing capabilities�50 
However, in the five years before Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004, the govern-
ment struggled to make any real progress� In 2004 the majority of Bulgaria’s 
maritime assets were still outdated and not interoperable with NATO forces�51 
The navy, which took on new responsibilities with NATO membership, had not 
received any new platforms since independence and was forced to carry on with 
outdated and rapidly decaying Soviet-era ships and equipment� It was clear that 
while the government had finally provided the strategic guidance necessary to 
build a small, professional navy, translating these goals into a coherent and well-
funded plan was more difficult� In 2004, after the decommissioning and sale of 
old platforms, the Bulgarian navy was made up of two submarines, one frigate, 
and a number of fast patrol craft, corvettes, and minesweepers; as a whole, the 
navy was barely operational�52 
Writing in 2004, the Naval Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Emil Lyutzkanov, 
acknowledged that the navy was in urgent need of modernization to meet the 
expanded demands of NATO membership�53 In that year the Bulgarian navy had 
three clear missions: first, guaranteeing Bulgaria’s national sovereignty, security, 
and independence and protecting its territorial integrity, as well as fulfilling its 
commitments under article 5 of the NATO treaty; second, supporting international 
Book 1.indb   75 2/4/15   10:24 AM
80
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 7 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
peace and security; and third, contributing to national security in peacetime� 
To fulfill these missions effectively, Admiral Lyutzkanov recognized, the navy 
would need new ships and modernized coastal, sea, and airborne command- 
and-control, surveillance, and weapon systems that were fully interoperable with 
those of NATO allies�54 
The new security and defense commitments led the Bulgarian government 
to conduct a Strategic Defense Review� This review led to the development of a 
long-term plan for transforming the BAF over the next decade� Under the Plan 
for Organizational Development and Modernization of the Structures of the 
Armed Forces, by 2015 the government would phase out conscription, making 
the BAF fully professional and thereby increasing its usability and effectiveness� 
To improve the operational capability of the BAF, in May 2004 the government 
approved eleven priority force-modernization projects including new equipment 
for the navy� The Bulgarian navy was substantially increased by the acquisition 
of three secondhand Belgian frigates and one minehunter� In October 2005 the 
navy took delivery of the first of its Wielingen-class frigates, Drazki; the second, 
Gordi, followed in August 2008� In 2009 the third frigate, Verni, and an ex- 
Belgian Flower-class minehunter, Tsbar, were also delivered�55 
Bulgaria also has made significant progress in creating the conditions for the 
establishment of a professional naval force� It has created a new personnel man-
agement system, improved education and training, and has realized important 
benefits from active participation in regional and international military opera-
tions� The White Paper on Defence, published in 2011, outlined a policy and sys-
tem for managing human resources so as to develop further the professionalism 
of the BAF�56 The aim is to produce well-trained and highly motivated military 
service personnel at all ranks through effective and efficient personnel manage-
ment� The new system eliminates irregularities in promotion and introduces a 
clear and strict procedure for appointments�57 Relief and dismissal of all service 
personnel will be governed by strict rules, and rotation to new appointments 
will be designed to build an experienced, talented, and professional staff� The 
Bulgarian government has also recognized the importance of education� In 2012 
it allowed officer candidates, noncommissioned officers, and privates to apply for 
and receive regular education at Bulgaria’s military schools of higher education�58 
This will not only enhance the career development of service personnel but also 
help the navy recruit and retain professional-quality personnel� 
Over the last few years successive Bulgarian governments have also acknowl-
edged the importance of international cooperation and training� The 2011 white 
paper recognizes that the “experience gained by our forces and structures through 
participation in military operations has proven to be of exceptional importance�”59 
In 2011, Drazki took part in the NATO operation that supported the arms 
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embargo against Libya, and the Bulgarian navy joined nine international and joint 
exercises�60 During Exercise BREEZE/CERTEX 2011 the navy participated in crisis-
response scenarios and developed its skills for addressing asymmetrical threats� 
The Bulgarian navy today regularly participates in the Turkish-led maritime- 
security operation BLACKSEAFOR; in August 2013 the minehunter Priboy con-
ducted several exercises and visited Turkish and Russian ports�61 
The Bulgarian navy has also introduced extensive simulation-based train-
ing and set up a NATO-dedicated Regional Centre for Training Ships’ Crews� A 
center for training sailors and soldiers and a facility for preparing ships’ crews 
for joint operations was successfully set up at the Naval Academy in Varna� In 
2001 this facility also received navigational, engine-room, and Global Maritime 
Distress and Safety System simulators; these were upgraded in 2012�62 The crew 
of the frigate Smely underwent the first course at this newly designated NATO-
dedicated Regional Centre for Training Ships’ Crews� Rear Admiral Lyutzkanov 
believes that such training has allowed the Bulgarian navy to become an impor-
tant contributor to national security and to the collective security of NATO�63 
ONGOING CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A BULGARIAN NAVY
Despite such progress, especially an increasingly professional cadre and new 
platforms that go some way toward allowing the service to perform its new roles, 
the Bulgarian navy continues to suffer from decline in its budget� As a reflection 
of the European economic crisis, Bulgaria’s defense budget was reduced by 28 
percent in 2010 and fell below 1�5 percent of GDP�64 That is especially significant 
because the defense white paper states that the optimal balance between the 
capabilities of the BAF and resources available requires a defense budget no less 
than 1�5 percent of GDP�65 The importance of the 1�5 percent threshold was reit-
erated by Defense Minister Anyu Angelov, saying it was the minimum needed to 
modernize the BAF�66 In 2010 the Ministry of Defense budget was 1�42 percent, 
in 2012 it dropped to 1�24 percent, and a year later it was a mere 1�38 percent�67 
The Ministry of Defense formally conceded in September 2014 that owing to the 
financial austerity the defense budgets of 2010–14 had fallen to a dangerously 
low level�68 
The inability to fund defense at 1�5 percent of GDP has delayed further refur-
bishment and modernization of maritime platforms, including plans to upgrade 
the frigates�69 It has also left insufficient resources for maritime services, repairs, 
and spare parts, hampering maintenance and the normal functioning of the 
navy�70 The last of Bulgaria’s operational submarines, Slava, has been retired and 
will almost certainly not be replaced� In 1954 the Soviet Union had given Bulgaria 
three submarines and in 1958 two more, one of them Slava� Claims by the general 
staff of the Bulgarian navy in 2007 that two submarines would be purchased by 
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2012 failed to be borne out� Several Soviet-era missile boats and minesweepers 
have been decommissioned as well�71 
Future naval modernization and upgrades have also been hampered by the 
requirement to prioritize future procurement in light of the shrinking budget� 
Anyu Angelov’s top three investment priorities for the next decade are new 
multirole fighter aircraft, infantry fighting vehicles, and the modernization and 
upgrading of the frigates, including a capability to operate helicopters�72 These 
objectives are, however, conditional on an average annual defense budget of 1�5 
percent of GDP and a substantial reduction in personnel costs� At this writing 
the government planned to reduce personnel costs from 75 percent of the defense 
budget to 60 percent by 2014; that would increase capital expenditure from 1 per-
cent of the budget in 2010 to 15 percent by 2014 and free as much as $1�5 billion 
by 2020 to acquire and upgrade military equipment�73 
Meanwhile, budgetary constraints have forced the government to prioritize 
force modernization even more narrowly, and this will impact on Bulgaria’s 
navy in the medium term� The top priority is now the purchase of new multirole 
fighter aircraft to replace the aging and outdated Soviet platforms�74 Although 
this accession will augment Bulgaria’s ability to protect its interests in the mari-
time domain, its cost will delay other maritime modernization (weapons and 
navigation systems for the navy, for instance) and future improvements until at 
least 2016�75 
The Bulgarian government has allocated almost half its current $1�5 billion 
procurement budget to the purchase of eight or nine new or, more likely, used 
multirole fighter jets� Tenders were delayed, however, by the decline of the de-
fense budget in 2012 and politicization of the issue� The delay is likely to delay in 
turn naval modernization� 
Attempts by both the United States (directly) and the EU (indirectly) to shape 
Bulgaria’s air procurement have further confused and impeded this pressing deci-
sion� As a result of the general economic downturn there has been fierce compe-
tition among European and American firms for the provision of Bulgaria’s new 
multirole aircraft� A leaked American diplomatic cable suggests that the United 
States actively encouraged the Bulgarian government to purchase secondhand 
F-16s rather than the more expensive Eurofighters, Swedish Gripens, or Joint 
Strike Fighters� From the U�S� viewpoint, purchase of F-16s or F/A-18s would 
not only catalyze Bulgarian operational and tactical transformation but minimize 
pressure on a squeezed defense budget�76 However, the EU has raised concerns 
about the Bulgarian government’s decision to procure jets without holding an 
open tender�77 In response to EU pressure, in late 2012 the Bulgarian government 
announced that it had held preliminary talks on the possibility of acquiring sec-
ondhand fighters from a number of European states as well as the United States� 
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The Bulgarian defense minister ruled out purchase from the European defense 
giant EADS or the U�S� firm Lockheed Martin, but there was still a possibility of 
buying Gripen fighters from Sweden�78 
The Bulgarian government has therefore been forced to make a difficult choice 
between the favored alternative of deferring to its key ally the United States and 
abiding by the legal requirement imposed by EU membership for a transparent 
and open tendering process (risking further delay)� In light of these political pres-
sures on the aircraft decision, the Bulgarian navy is unlikely to be upgraded or 
modernized before the end of this decade� 
Despite the significant improvements in training, education, and social condi-
tions outlined above, problems remain that could hamper the growth of profes-
sionalization within the Bulgarian navy� As the defense white paper acknowledges, 
much of the military housing stock is in need of major repairs; as a result of the 
lack of funding, there has been a decline in its standard and quantity� Estimates 
suggest that needed improvements could cost up to $300 million�79 In addition, 
morale is likely to be affected in the short term by downsizing of personnel and 
“transformation fatigue�” Under plans announced in 2011 the Bulgarian military 
would be reduced from just over forty-four thousand to thirty-seven thousand 
by 2014, with the navy making up only 13 percent�80 Recent estimates suggest, 
however, that the Bulgarian military has been even further downsized, to just 
below thirty thousand�81 The problem of maintaining military morale in light of 
the ongoing failure of military reform and brutal downsizing by the government 
in light of the economic austerity is explicitly recognized in the white paper�82 
It is clear that the government is keenly aware of the challenge of motivating 
service personnel for what will be an extremely difficult next round of military 
transformation� 
Further improvements in the navy are also likely to be adversely affected by 
the scale of the task of transforming the military generally� The Plan for Organi-
zational Development and Modernization of the Structures of the Armed Forces 
has been heavily criticized for failing to deliver a modern, interoperable, and 
well-equipped Bulgarian military� During the initial stages of implementation 
the Ministry of Defense conceded that its ambitious objectives could not be met 
by 2015� Four key reasons were identified� First, budgetary constraints made it 
impossible�83 Given the bloc obsolescence of BAF equipment the ministry had 
to prioritize key areas� Second, inability to reduce quickly the size of the defense 
sector restricted ability to invest in combat training or new equipment� Third, 
defense reform was hampered by lack of coordination among and integration 
of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the operating forces� Last, the 
Defense Ministry cannot assure financing for long-term projects� 
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In general, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense was not institutionally ready to 
manage the reform process, and it lacked necessary financial and political sup-
port to make difficult decisions�84 In 2009 the minister of defense, then Nikolay 
Mladenov, declared the current stage of defense reform had failed; a lack of clear 
prioritization and guaranteed funding for ambitious projects had led to many 
costly and not very wise decisions�85 To that point more than three billion Bul-
garian leva had been spent on modernizing the BAF but had produced little real 
increase in combat capabilities�86
The Bulgarian government responded in 2009 to the failure of reform with a 
“force structure review” that resulted in the new White Paper on Defence.87 The 
white paper was an attempt to address directly what defense Bulgaria needs and, 
more importantly, what it can actually afford� It begins by recognizing that the 
principal objectives of the previous white paper had not been achieved; because 
of “arbitrary self-interested decisions for purchasing new equipment,” the grad-
ual process of building up the BAF’s capabilities had to a large extent not taken 
place�88 The white paper also explicitly recognizes the costly obligations made by 
previous governments to foreign and Bulgarian companies for armaments, tech-
nology, and services� In 2010 the government had to use state reserves to pay for 
several military contracts—involving transport helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, 
armored utility vehicles, frigates, and minehunters—that had run into financial 
difficulties� The Bulgarian government has also been forced to renegotiate, can-
cel, or delay a number of major projects, with considerable effect on the navy� For 
instance, in 2009 the government canceled an agreement made four years earlier 
to buy four French Gowind corvettes, a deal estimated to cost up to U�S�$900 
million�89 In 2011 it renegotiated a contract signed in 2005 for navy helicopters�90 
The Bulgarian navy will now receive three rather than six Panther helicopters� 
The bleak prospects for the Bulgarian navy are unlikely to improve until at 
least 2020� That calls into question the extent to which the navy can advance 
Bulgaria’s interests or those of NATO allies in the Black Sea� At the recent NATO 
summit in August 2014 the Bulgarian government pledged to increase military 
spending gradually, from 1�33 percent of GDP to 1�5 percent by 2015 and sub-
sequently by 0�1 percent of GDP each year, reaching 2 percent by 2020�91 The 
Bulgarian president, Rosen Plevneliev, acknowledged his nation’s low level of 
investment in military equipment and declared, perhaps optimistically, that by 
2020 Bulgaria would set aside 15 percent of its defense budget for capital spend-
ing and new high-tech capabilities�92 
In September 2014 the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense published “Bulgaria 
in NATO and in European Defence 2020,” which stated that “given the rapidly 
evolving challenges of [the] modern strategic environment, without NATO Bul-
garia does not have the necessary military resources to effectively guarantee its 
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security�”93 This document also spelled out its future priorities for the navy but 
not firm timelines for this very modest force modernization� Future plans include 
the modernization of its frigates to enable the Bulgarian navy to participate in sea 
traffic surveillance and control operations, detection of weapons of mass effect, 
and interchange of information in real time�94 
Bulgaria has made some progress in building a navy able to advance its interests 
in the Black Sea and work alongside NATO allies� Modernizing the Bulgarian 
navy has, however, been a slow and difficult process, and future maritime up-
grading and modernization, as well as the recruitment of a sufficient number of 
professional sailors, are likely to be undermined by the scale of the task and by 
the high cost of completing Bulgaria’s broader military transformation� Initial 
delays in defense reform during the 1990s followed by, a decade later, poorly 
conceived, insufficiently funded, and overly ambitious attempts to create rapidly 
a modern NATO-interoperable navy have left a burdensome legacy� Aside from a 
core force of secondhand warships, the navy’s platforms are “old, inadequate and 
mostly non-operational leaving the Bulgarian navy struggling to establish viable 
operational capability with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel�”95 
This situation is unlikely to improve in the medium term� The requirement to 
prioritize defense spending, insufficient military funding year on year, and high 
personnel costs will delay the planned upgrade of Bulgaria’s frigates and the mod-
ernization of its auxiliary platforms until at least 2020� 
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 Since 2005, when Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway was published, there has been much discussion about its conclusions. Likewise, in 
the course of time there have appeared books like John Lundstrom’s Black Shoe 
Carrier Admiral, Dallas Isom’s Midway Inquest, Elliot Carlson’s Rochefort’s War, 
and Craig Symonds’s The Battle of Midway, and several articles of note. One of 
the most interesting interpretations of the battle is Midway Inquest, which came 
out in 2006. While we cannot accept all of Isom’s 
arguments, he does make a key point—that Admi-
ral Nagumo Chūichi and his 1st Air Fleet staff have 
been scapegoated, given too much of the blame for 
the Midway debacle. This is particularly true when 
it comes to the supposedly faulty reconnaissance 
arrangements utilized during the battle.
In Shattered Sword’s account, Jon Parshall and 
Tully distributed blame more equitably between 
Admirals Yamamoto Isoroku and Nagumo, with 
Yamaguchi Tamon (commander of Carrier Divi-
sion, or CarDiv, 2) coming in for a small share of 
criticism as well. Though the authors of this article 
believe this interpretation still basically holds true, 
we also feel that the picture can now be sharpened 
considerably regarding the degree of culpability 
of Nagumo and his staff. In a few particulars, we 
now feel that Shattered Sword’s account is still too 
critical of Nagumo.
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This revision is driven by additional publications in the Japanese literature 
on the battle appearing since 2005�1 These have been supplemented by insights 
derived from a closer study of the reconnaissance arrangements of the Japanese 
carrier fleet (Kidō Butai) during 1941–42� These both support Isom’s point that 
Nagumo’s decisions were understandable—at least to a degree—and have been 
criticized too harshly�
In the article that follows, the interpretation is offered that Nagumo and the 
1st Air Fleet staff on the whole made no egregious mistakes with respect to the 
scouting arrangements at Midway� More precisely, the conduct of Kidō Butai was 
not out of line with 1942 operations prior to Midway or even those during the 
Guadalcanal campaign, when the Japanese were operating with the advantages 
of hindsight from Midway� Nor was it worse than typical American scouting 
arrangements during the same time frame� During all of these battles, Japanese 
scouting operations were universally governed by the prevailing situation esti-
mates in the hands of the carrier commanders� Accordingly, the key to under-
standing Midway becomes discovering with greater clarity what the real mind-set 
was among the staff on board Akagi on the morning of 4 June, prior to the battle�
This article presents three items for consideration� First is a discussion of the 
newer scholarship from Japan and its implications for the study of the battle� The 
second is a review of the scouting arrangements used by both the Japanese and 
Americans during the early months of the war� Third, we present a clarified pic-
ture of the intelligence that Nagumo had in hand prior to the battle� All of these 
factors are then used to analyze why Nagumo and his staff made the decisions 
they did� 
NEW JAPANESE SCHOLARSHIP
While there has been much interesting work on the battle in Japan, our focus here 
is on the records of the 1st Air Fleet� One of the most interesting new revelations 
here is startling evidence of both deceptions and deletions in the primary source 
material regarding the 1st Air Fleet staff ’s expectations prior to battle� This was 
not entirely unsuspected� In Shattered Sword, Tully and Parshall noted instances 
suggesting selective deletions of Japanese records� Among others, these included 
message groups of Destroyer Division 4 (Kidō Butai’s escorting destroyer unit) 
that appear to obscure the scuttling of Kaga and Sōryū� The possibility of such 
omissions now appears to have received a degree of corroboration� 
These suspicions were enlarged with the publication in 2012 of Mori Shirō’s 
Middowei Kaisen (Naval Battle of Midway)� It contains important interviews, 
some posthumously released, of Midway participants� The most intriguing is of 
Air Staff Officer Yoshioka Tadakazu, who was in charge of preparing the 1st Air 
Fleet’s postbattle report (since translated into English and known as the “Nagumo 
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Report”)�2 Yoshioka admitted to Mori that there had been an omission in the 
reproduction of the message log that he compiled� In a radio message of 0220, or 
0520 local time (2:20 and 5:20 am), a significant first sentence originally stated, 
“It is calculated [projected] that enemy Kidō Butai will not sortie [be encoun-
tered] today�” This sentence was dropped from Nagumo’s report as actually sub-
mitted�3 Indeed, this omission was not even disclosed by Yoshioka to the writers 
of the official Japanese war history series, Senshi Sōsho�
Regarding the significance of his deletion, Yoshioka pulled no punches: “The 
real reason of defeat is that deleted message�”4 What Yoshioka was referring to 
was the crucial role that the mind-set on Akagi’s bridge played in the battle� 
He considered the true reason for the defeat at Midway to be what the deleted 
sentence reveals—that Nagumo and his staff did not expect, and therefore did 
not even prepare for, contact with an enemy carrier force on the morning of 4 
June� Everything that followed flows from this faulty estimate of the situation� 
Furthermore, this estimate was not necessarily unreasonable or negligent, given 
the intelligence that Nagumo had in hand prior to the battle� This intelligence, 
though, was faulty, and responsibility for that must be fairly laid at the feet of the 
Combined Fleet’s staff� 
That Yoshioka’s superiors agreed with his postwar admission is, in effect, 
strongly suggested by the deletion of that crucial sentence� Yoshioka frankly 
admitted to Mori that to protect the navy’s reputation, some inconvenient truths 
had to be concealed in the Nagumo Report�5 The omission of part of the 0520 sig-
nal was just one instance� There were other cases of misdirection and fabrication 
as well, which then passed into Midway lore� These included the delayed launch 
of the cruiser Tone’s floatplane leading to the crucial late sighting report claimed 
by Genda Minoru and the “fateful five minutes” claimed by Fuchida Mitsuo and 
Kusaka Ryūnosuke�6
The main objective of these falsehoods was apparently to make the defeat 
seem due to plain bad luck on the day of battle rather than to the frame of mind 
on Akagi’s bridge� If that is the case, it sheds fresh light on the demonstrable dis-
tortion of the record by both Fuchida’s and Kusaka’s accounts (Fuchida’s Midway: 
The Battle That Doomed Japan having been particularly important in the West)� 
In Shattered Sword, the writers wondered whether the misleading conventional 
rendition of events had been the work of just these men or whether responsibility 
was more widespread� It now appears there was an “understanding” among select 
staff officers about how the defeat was to be “spun” (to use a modern term)� The 
mental unreadiness of Kidō Butai for engaging an enemy carrier on the morning 
of 4 June was to be downplayed or even suppressed� Instead, misfortunes of tim-
ing and “fates of war” were to be emphasized, as well as how narrow the margin 
apparently had been between victory and defeat�
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Incredibly, it is entirely possible that Naval General Staff in Tokyo never heard 
otherwise, because scarcely was the 1st Air Fleet report submitted, in mid-June, 
than the Guadalcanal campaign was upon the Japanese� Postwar, senior offi-
cers who had been involved at Midway were free to reinforce this “agreed” ac-
count� We stress that it is not entirely clear how much of the above comes from 
Yoshioka’s words and how much is Mori’s judgment� But we hope to show that 
Yoshioka’s words accord with the evidence� When compared to other Japanese 
carrier operations, the nature of the scouting arrangements at Midway strongly 
implies that Nagumo and his staff had already ruled out enemy surface contact 
that morning�
If this revelation by Yoshioka is true, it means that on the morning of 4 June 
Nagumo’s force was already operating under an even more severe handicap than 
previously realized� It has been well known since the 1970s that the Japanese 
Midway plan had been disclosed to the U�S� Navy’s code breakers� The crucial 
element of surprise had been lost to the Japanese� It is not much of an exaggera-
tion to say that from that point forward the probability of the Mi plan’s succeed-
ing was seriously reduced� But in addition to this terrible burden, there was now 
added another—that Nagumo and his staff took their own intelligence estimates 
at face value� Accordingly, their preparations all but dismissed the possibility of a 
carrier battle on that first day�7 This is critical—loss of surprise could conceivably 
have been compensated to some degree by a healthy dose of caution and even 
pessimism on Akagi’s bridge that morning� Yoshioka’s revelation makes plain that 
such concerns were absent�
A reasonable objection at this point might be that however persuasive this 
revelation, it remains simply the claim of a single participant, Yoshioka� However, 
it is quite possible to demonstrate the truth of Yoshioka’s statement by looking at 
the actions taken by Nagumo and his staff before the battle and then comparing 
them to the precedent established by other operations� To this we now turn�
HOW SITUATION ESTIMATES DROVE SCOUTING ARRANGEMENTS 
Among the reasons for defeat at Midway, one of the most routinely cited is the 
“inadequate” morning search made by Kidō Butai, wherein seven aircraft were 
launched to cover most of the fleet’s eastern flank� The analysis made by the U�S� 
Naval War College’s Admiral Richard Bates in 1948 was one of the first to put 
across this idea, and in many respects it has stood the test of time� Likewise, it 
bears noticing that in attempting to fix blame for the defeat, Fuchida and Admiral 
Ugaki Matome, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet at the time, both chose to 
criticize retroactively the search methodology used at Midway� However, upon 
closer examination, it can be seen that Nagumo’s searches were on par with 
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Japanese conventions at that time� Indeed, they were also not worse than contem-
porary U�S� carrier searches, given similar prebattle intelligence�
For instance, Nagumo’s and the 1st Air Fleet staff ’s scouting decisions at Mid-
way show a striking continuity with those used in the Indian Ocean operations 
of April 1942� In each case the factor determining what search type was used on 
a given day was whether the situation estimate shaped the factor that an enemy 
fleet was expected� If no enemy was expected, searches were correspondingly less 
comprehensive�
Kidō Butai had sailed for the Indian Ocean on the basis of an operation order 
issued on 19 March� This order advised that “the British fleet apparently has three 
battleships, two carriers, four Type A cruisers and eleven Type B cruisers in the 
Indian Ocean� Apparently 500 planes are in India (including Ceylon)� A consid-
erable part of the above is deployed in Ceylon area�”8 This estimate is rather simi-
lar to that of U�S� strength prior to Midway, namely, two carriers plus a possible 
third in the Pacific area (exact whereabouts unknown) and several squadrons of 
aircraft on Midway�
On the basis of its 19 March estimate, Kidō Butai launched raids against Cey-
lon on 5 and 9 April� Despite his having been sighted by a British flying boat at 
1855 on 4 April (and intercepting that plane’s report), Nagumo’s morning search 
of 5 April prior to the Ceylon raid was even thinner than the one used at Midway 
two months later�9 His scouts were fewer, and they went out a shorter distance� 
This was because the Japanese intelligence estimate strongly counterindicated the 
presence of British carriers nearby on that day� However, after the 5 April attack 
on Colombo and the subsequent sinking of the British cruisers Dorsetshire and 
Cornwall, suspicion built among Nagumo’s staff that British carriers might be 
nearby after all� At 1600 on the 5th, two enemy carrier-type planes were sighted� 
Given their position 350 nautical miles (nm) south of Colombo, it seemed un-
likely they were land-based�10 Given this, Nagumo deployed for 6 April a search 
that was far denser than the day before� However, it found nothing, and tensions 
eased again� When the time came to strike Trincomalee on 9 April, no enemy 
carriers were expected, and Kidō Butai’s morning search was similar in density to 
that made on the 5th and to the later one at Midway (see maps 1–4)�11
This pattern applies to other battles as well� CarDiv 5’s searches at the battle of 
the Coral Sea on 7 May (six fifteen-degree sectors, 250 nm range) closely resem-
ble the search made on 6 April off Ceylon�12 In both cases, Kidō Butai expected 
the possibility of at least sighting enemy carriers and shaped its search patterns 
accordingly� This pattern can also be seen after Midway� In the battles of both the 
Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese searches were markedly better, but 
they were driven by the fact that Nagumo and his staff expected enemy carrier 
opposition�
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In cases where carri-
ers were not expected, 
searches could be scanty 
to downright nonexis-
tent. For instance, Ad-
miral Yamaguchi, despite 
his reputation for alert-
ness and aggressiveness, 
did not bother launching 
a long-range advance 
search when CarDiv 2 
arrived off Wake Island 
to deliver its attack on 
21 December 1941.13 It 
is true that the Japanese 
had four f lying boats 
from land bases con-
ducting searches; these, 
however, were not suffi-
cient to detect U.S. carriers had the carriers been approaching from the north.14 
Likewise, during the Aleutians operations coinciding with Midway, CarDiv 4 
launched on 3 June searches toward Dutch Harbor that were far less dense than 
the ones Nagumo would use the following day. In this case, aircraft from the light 
carrier Ryūjō searched 
to merely sixty miles 
on four fifteen-degree 
sectors.15 The Japanese 
rightly downplayed the 
chance of an enemy fleet 
b e ing  present  in  the 
Aleutians, though such 
cursory searches appear 
more than a little brazen 
even so.
Nor were Japanese 
searches markedly worse 
than those used by the 
Americans at this time. 
For  instance,  dur ing 
the U.S. carrier raids in 
MAP 2
SEARCHES: 6 APRIL 1942
Source note: Search tracks in maps 1–3 constructed on the basis of Kidō Butai message orders no. 73, 74, 
75, 77, and 80; Desron 1 WD, April 1942; CarDiv 5 Detailed Action Report No. 5; and Hiryu- Detailed Action 
Report No. 9. Maps © 2014 by Jon Parshall, reprinted by permission.
MAP 1
SEARCHES: 5 APRIL 1942
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Febr uar y  and March 
against Makin, Kwaja- 
lein, Jaluit, Marcus, and 
other locations, there 
were apparently no morn- 
ing searches before the 
attack launches.16 Had 
the three Japanese carri-
ers anchored at Truk in 
early February (Akagi, 
Kaga, and Zuikaku) had 
timely intelligence, they 
might have surprised 
the Americans, with dis-
astrous consequences.17 
Even as late as the land-
ings on Guadalcanal in 
early August, Allied search vectors were comparatively thin. A flank attack by 
Japanese carrier forces might have come down undetected from the north, though 
that was made less likely by the coverage of land- and tender-based search assets.18 
The bottom line is that in early 1942 U.S. carrier operations too were indifferent 
to extensive advance searches. This illustrates that in 1942 the practice of how to 
prepare for and fight a carrier battle was still very much a learning process for 
both sides.
In  sum,  Nagumo’s 
searches at Midway may 
have turned out to be 
inadequate, but they rep-
resented the norm for 
both sides at this point 
in the war. They were 
certainly not especially 
different from that norm 
or lacking in some spe-
cial way. They cannot be 
described as “mistaken,” 
unless one chooses to 
criticize the bulk of 1942 
carrier searches (which 
would be, perhaps, fair 
MAP 3
SEARCHES: 9 APRIL 1942
MAP 4
MIDWAY SEARCH TRACKS
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enough)� The flaws of Nagumo’s and Genda’s search plan at Midway were system-
ic and characteristic of everyone’s “learning curve” at the time� Thus, Nagumo’s 
search plan at Midway was not a cause of Kidō Butai’s unreadiness for a carrier 
battle but rather a symptom of it� Indeed, there is a final irony here, that the 4 
June search was actually better than almost all the other searches made by either 
the Japanese or the Americans when no enemy fleet opposition was expected� 
Had Nagumo actually expected an enemy carrier force that morning, he almost 
certainly would have sent out a denser search, in accordance with operational 
precedent� The question then becomes, why did Nagumo believe that no enemy 
carriers would be nearby that morning?
NAGUMO’S SITUATION ESTIMATE
Though some ambiguity persists, the failures of intelligence on the Japanese side 
appear to center more on Yamato and the Combined Fleet staff ’s choices than on 
those of the 1st Air Fleet staff on Akagi� Some crucial reports were not retransmit-
ted to Nagumo, and no attempts were made to confirm that he was aware of them� 
Submarine Sightings. After departure from Saipan, Tanaka Raizō, commander of 
the Transport Group of Midway Invasion Force, received various reports on en-
emy submarine activities� On 30 May he received a report that an enemy subma-
rine had been detected three hundred nautical miles north-northeast of Midway 
at 1130 by radio interception�19 The reported position was close to his planned 
route to Midway�20 To avoid this potential threat, Tanaka made a course change 
to the north on 1 June�21 Also on the 30th, a transport in Tanaka’s force sent a 
message, “At 1130 this ship’s communication unit intercepted enemy submarine’s 
urgent message to Midway with call sign NERK� Frequency 12,795 kc� The feeling 
[signal strength] is very strong so it is judged that the submarine is close�”22 Two 
planes were launched to search but found nothing�23 There were several more 
submarine sightings by planes or ships of the Transport Group, plus radio in-
terceptions by various communication units�24 Ironically, according to Ameri-
can sources it appears that there was no U�S� submarine operating near Tanaka’s 
Transport Group at that time�25
Combined Fleet headquarters, on board the battleship Yamato, received at 
least some of these reports; Admiral Ugaki noted as much in his diary on 30 
May�26 When the reported position was plotted, though, it was found to be still far 
ahead of the Transport Group� Therefore, for the sake of radio silence, the news 
was not relayed to Nagumo�27 Actually Ugaki (and probably other members of 
Combined Fleet staff) showed little concern that the U�S� forces might be alerted; 
as he later wrote, “If the dispatched message was a report of discovering our force, 
it would surely serve to alert the enemy, thus contributing to making our game 
in battle heavier�”28
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It is not clear how many, if any, of these reports reached Nagumo�29 What is 
clear is that he didn’t think Tanaka’s Transport Group might have been sighted 
by a submarine� As Yoshioka later recalled, “After the Transport Group departed 
from Saipan, we did not receive any report that they seemed to have been sighted 
by enemy submarines� Therefore, although after that we were informed of an 
increase in enemy’s urgent messages and received radio message that enemy 
movement became active, we were unable to determine what these meant�”30 
This point is crucial� If Tanaka had been definitely sighted this early, Nimitz 
could have deduced that Midway was the target and would have had time to 
deploy his carriers� Not being supplied with reports on U�S� submarines (even 
though many were mistaken in hindsight) cost Nagumo a valuable source of 
intelligence�
Carrier Signal Detected. When Nagumo’s force departed the Inland Sea on 27 
May, the Combined Fleet had a sighting report dated 15 May of Admiral William 
Halsey’s two carriers (which had been cleverly ordered by Nimitz to make sure 
they were detected) operating in the South Pacific� Accordingly, it was estimated 
that U�S� carriers would not show up in the initial stage of the Mi Operation�31 
However, this assessment grew murkier as battle approached� On the night be-
fore the battle (4 June, Japan time), Yamato’s radio interception unit picked up 
a U�S� carrier call sign near Midway� It was thought that Akagi, being closer to 
Midway, should also have intercepted it� Combined Fleet had previously ordered 
Nagumo to reserve half his planes for ship attack, to deal with such contingen-
cies�32 In the end, Combined Fleet didn’t pass this crucial interception on to 
Nagumo�33 One of Combined Fleet’s staff officers later regretted it: “This is one of 
my big failures�”34 As it turned out, Akagi did not intercept the signal, thus depriving 
Nagumo of another chance of being forewarned� Similarly, there is a postwar 
claim that the carrier Hiryū intercepted the call sign of a U�S� carrier on the same 
night, but that too was not reported to senior officers�35 
Transport Group Sighted and Attacked. One day before the planned air attack on 
Midway (3 June local), Tanaka’s Transport Group was sighted and then attacked 
by planes from Midway� Combined Fleet headquarters certainly knew this� But 
the exposure of Tanaka’s force was no surprise, for this had been expected when 
the Transport Group entered Midway’s patrol range�36
As Kusaka later wrote in his book, Nagumo knew that at least Tanaka had 
been sighted at this time�37 However, it was judged that Kidō Butai itself had not 
been sighted yet and that thus the morning attack on Midway could still achieve 
tactical surprise� Yoshioka’s words best summarize the 1st Air Fleet Headquarters 
situation estimate right before the battle: “It was thought that the vague [i�e�, still 
in the dark] enemy had not yet detected our intentions�”38
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Operation K. A plan to send long-range reconnaissance planes from the Mar-
shalls over Pearl Harbor, known as Operation K, had to be canceled owing to the 
presence of American warships at the designated refueling point at French Frig-
ate Shoals� It is generally accepted that this news was never passed on to Nagumo 
and that as a result the 1st Air Fleet staff, with no knowledge of the cancelation, 
assumed that silence on the matter meant that the reconnaissance operation had 
gone forward as planned and that the American carriers were where they had 
been assumed to be—still in port at Pearl Harbor� In the conventional view, the 
failure to pass along to Nagumo the news of Operation K’s failure was crucial� 
Ironically, however, this turns out not to have been the case� According to Senshi 
Sōsho, the Japanese were convinced at this time that the absence of American 
carriers at Pearl would mean that they were still operating in the South Pacific� 
Likewise, if carriers were found at Pearl it would mean that surprise at Midway 
had been achieved� So either way, the cancelation of K caused little concern, as 
the Japanese were already predisposed to interpret any intelligence they gathered 
in the most optimistic light�39 This, in turn, reveals a great deal about the staff 
inertia that seems to have been so prevalent during Operation Mi�
Submarine Picket Line. Finally, much has been made of the fact that by the time 
the intended line of picket submarines between Hawaii and Midway had been 
established the American carriers had already passed it on their way to Midway� 
The account in Shattered Sword, following David Bergamini’s Imperial Conspir-
acy and Zenji Orita and Joseph Harrington’s I-Boat Captain, relates how Prince 
Komatsu, commander of the 6th Fleet (submarine force), failed to inform Com-
bined Fleet that his submarine cordon would be late in taking position, thus put-
ting Yamamoto’s and Nagumo’s staffs at a disadvantage�40 However, it has since 
been discovered that Combined Fleet in fact knew as early as 19 May that the 
submarines would be late in taking up their stations�41 Nagumo almost certainly 
knew this too, as it was announced before his ships left port� It transpires that 
there was no real expectation that the submarines would provide sighting reports 
prior to the first air raid on Midway� The Japanese believed that no U�S� carriers 
would sail from Pearl until Midway was actually attacked, by which time the sub-
marines would be in position to detect them�42 
POOR INTELLIGENCE DROVE POOR ESTIMATES
The Japanese lost Midway mainly because of a disparity in intelligence� The fact 
was that prior to the battle the Americans not only had far superior intelligence 
but did a much better job of disseminating it to commanders� Conversely, it can 
be seen that the Japanese in general, and Nagumo in particular, went into battle 
with a very poor picture of what the Americans were up to� Admiral Yamamoto 
cannot be blamed for information he did not possess� However, his staff can and 
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should be blamed for poor decisions regarding disseminating the information it 
actually possessed�
Though arguably too complex, the Mi plan for bringing the U�S� Navy’s surviv-
ing carriers to battle was reasonable enough� However, very few plans can survive 
forewarning of the enemy� This is doubly true if one remains unaware of the dis-
closure and makes erroneous and optimistic projections as a result� If Mi suffered 
from errors in execution, they center largely on the behavior of Yamamoto and 
Combined Fleet� After all, it was Yamamoto who knew that Tanaka’s transports 
had encountered submarines on 30 May (making it quite possible surprise was 
forfeit)� It was Yamamoto who knew that Operation K had been canceled but 
allowed the impression on board Akagi that nothing had gone amiss to remain 
unchanged� Finally, it was Yamamoto who had detected American carrier call 
signs a day before the battle and thus knew that the situation estimate regarding 
enemy carriers had become murkier (and more dangerous)�
Nagumo’s loss of strategic surprise simply cannot be overstated, as it allowed 
the Americans to utilize their reconnaissance assets very efficiently� Under nor-
mal circumstances, an island like Midway would be unable to maintain concerted 
long-range air searches of its surroundings—such searches consumed too much 
fuel and wore out planes and men too quickly� Indeed, sustained long-range pa-
trols from Midway did not commence until 23 May, the day after the atoll had 
been positively identified by signals intelligence as the likely site of the Japanese 
attack�43 The number of patrol planes needed to cover just 180 degrees out to six 
hundred nautical miles would be anywhere between fifty and seventy in all, and 
thirty needed to take off simultaneously at dawn�44 Midway never had such num-
bers� However, because of code breaking Nimitz possessed not only the outline 
of Yamamoto’s plan but the approximate approach course of Nagumo’s carriers 
and their launch time� This allowed searches of unusual density and scope to be 
mounted from Midway as “N-day” neared� On board Akagi, though, the situation 
was almost the reverse� There was no expectation of U�S� carriers being present� 
It was assumed that any American response would take place after the attack on 
Midway began�
It has become fashionable recently to dispute or downplay the role of overcon-
fidence (or “victory disease”) in the defeat at Midway, but its impact remains quite 
discernible� Ironically, at Midway the Japanese came into battle with a degree of 
confidence that they had not actually felt earlier in the war� Indeed, in contrast 
to the sometimes pessimistic results of prewar exercises, the battle experience of 
Kidō Butai thus far had suggested that things generally went quite well—actual 
war had been easier than the war games�45 Nagumo’s force had never been hit 
before Midway, even when surprised by the British bombers off Ceylon� From 
what had been heard about Coral Sea prior to Nagumo’s sailing, Zuikaku and 
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Shōkaku, less well trained than the four carriers at Midway, had come through 
their first carrier battle fairly easily� Thus, the impression in Kidō Butai was that 
confidence was warranted�
There is another kind of overconfidence, though, one that might be termed 
“specific suppositional overconfidence” about a particular part of the battle plan� 
In this case, the Japanese considered surprise an absolute given� Whatever intel-
ligence came into Combined Fleet’s hands, this suppositional tenet was never 
overturned—it was assumed that surprise would be achieved, no matter what� 
This had the insidious effect of thwarting any steps that might have been taken 
to ascertain whether or not the Japanese plan had been disclosed to the enemy 
and to warn Nagumo accordingly� In this context, the 30 May presumed sub-
marine sighting of the Transport Group could actually have been a break for 
the Japanese� Had they just assumed from that point that surprise had been lost 
and specifically instructed Nagumo to that effect, many things might have gone 
differently�
In summation, the mind-set of 0520 on 4 June with respect to Nagumo’s scouting 
at Midway hinged on the entrenched 1st Air Fleet estimate that surprise would be 
achieved� No enemy carriers were expected to be encountered on the morning of 4 
June� Yoshioka’s postwar claims to Mori are confirmed by the nature of Nagumo’s 
scouting arrangements, which conformed to normal practice for situations in 
which the threat of enemy carriers was considered low� Though the Combined 
Fleet staff had information that might have served to revise these estimates, its 
members did not feel the need to communicate it to Nagumo� Had it been pro-
vided to the 1st Air Fleet—as it had been Kidō Butai practice up to that point 
in the war to do when opposition was expected—it seems certain that Nagumo 
would have deployed denser searches in response�46 Thus, this entrenched threat 
estimate is the true culprit of Kidō Butai’s unreadiness on 4 June� Indeed, as 
Yoshioka’s deletion showed, it was held by the Japanese themselves, soon after the 
fact, to be the most egregious error of the 1st Air Fleet, one that had to be glossed 
over more than any other, to the point of excision from the record of the battle�
Yoshioka’s admission explains many of the inconsistencies and puzzles of 
the Japanese side of the battle of Midway (many of them covered in Shattered 
Sword)� To gloss over and obscure this damning omission, as well as the debacle 
of Nagumo’s rearming orders, an alternative narrative to help explain the defeat 
was constructed� The puzzles and inconsistencies created by this alternative 
narrative—of the kind cover-ups always do create—generated further confusion 
and speculations� These range from suspicion that Nagumo ignored Yamamoto’s 
reserve-strike-force arming order from the very outset to the proposition that 
Nagumo did not receive the sighting report from Tone’s floatplane No� 4 till 0800 
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or later (suggested by Isom)�47 None of these have found much support in either 
Japanese or English primary sources, modern works, or veterans’ accounts� Once 
the purpose of the alternative narrative to obscure the true mind-set that morn-
ing of 4 June is understood, though, these speculations become unnecessary�
In retrospect, it can be seen how Nagumo’s situation estimate led to his being 
caught badly off guard when Yorktown’s task force was sighted� The estimate 
trapped Nagumo in a complicated welter of “damned if you do, damned if you 
don’t” decisions that have been well dissected� However, those decisions them-
selves were products of the bad hand that Nagumo dealt himself at the battle’s 
opening when he and his staff failed, however understandably, to account for the 
possibility that their battle plan had been disclosed to the enemy�
N O T E S 
 1� Mori Shirō, Middowei Kaisen [Naval Battle of 
Midway] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2012)�
 2� Although Yoshioka’s given name is the same 
kanji as Nagumo’s (pronounced as Chūichi), 
the pronunciation is different� Hata Ikuhiko, 
Nihon Rikukaigun Sōgō Jiten [A Compre-
hensive Dictionary of the Japanese Army 
and Navy] (Tokyo: Tokyo Univ� Shuppankai, 
1991), p� 245�
 3� Mori, Middowei Kaisen, vol� 2, pp� 53–55, 
422–25�
 4� Ibid�, p� 424�
 5� Ibid�
 6� Ibid�, pp� 423–27�
 7� Senshi Sōsho, vol� 43, Middowei Kaisen 
[Naval Battle of Midway] (Tokyo: Bōeichō 
Bōeikenshūsho Senshishitsu [hereafter BKS], 
1971), pp� 251–52�
 8� Kidō Butai Secret Operation Order No� 31, 
19 March, Hiryū Detailed Action Report No� 
9� (Japanese reports referenced in this article 
are from www�jacar�go�jp/ and are archived in 
Japanese Document Fleet Records, microfilm 
reel JD-9, Naval History and Heritage Com-
mand, Washington, D�C�) 
 9� For the sighting, Senshi Sōsho, vol� 26, Ran’in 
Bengaru-wan Hōmen Kaigun Shinkō Sakusen 
[Dutch East Indies and Bay of Bengal Naval 
Offensive Operations] (Tokyo: BKS, 1969), p� 
642� Also, Destroyer Squadron [DesRon] 
  1 War Diary [hereafter WD], April 1942; 
Battleship Division 3 WD, April 1942�
 10� Genda Minoru, Kaigun Kōkūtai Shimatsuki 
[Naval Aviation Units from Beginning to 
End] (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū, 1996), p� 102�
 11� It is worth noting that two carriers of the 
Royal Navy’s Eastern Fleet under Admiral 
Somerville came as close as 205 nm to Kidō 
Butai around 1726 local time on 5 April� 
Somerville was also planning a night torpedo 
attack� Nagumo didn’t know�
 12� The 7 May morning search was also sub-
stantially reinforced by land-, tender-, and 
cruiser-based aircraft� Shōkaku and Zuikaku 
Air Group Kōdōchōsho; Senshi Sōsho, vol� 49, 
Nantō Hōmen Kaigun Sakusen (1) [Southeast 
Area Naval Operations (1)] (Tokyo: BKS, 
1971), pp� 271–74 and plate 3� 
 13� No long-range searches by carrier aircraft 
can be found in primary sources or pub-
lished books� Cruiser Division 8 apparently 
launched floatplanes for reconnaissance on 
Wake, but no precise information is known� 
Hiryū and Sōryū Air Group Kōdōchōsho; 
Senshi Sōsho, vol� 38, Chūbu Taiheiyō Hōmen 
Kaigun Sakusen (1) [Central Pacific Area Na-
val Operations (1)] (Tokyo: BKS, 1970), pp� 
201–203; Senshi Sōsho, vol� 10, Hawai Sakusen 
[Hawaii Operation] (Tokyo: BKS, 1967), pp� 
436–38� 
 14� The Yokohama Air Group launched four 
flying boats to search between 340 and 50 
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degrees out to three hundred nautical miles 
from Roi Island on the 21st and four flying 
boats to search between 335 and 25 degrees 
to six hundred miles from Likiep Atoll on the 
22nd. Yokohama Air Group Kōdōchōsho; 
Senshi Sōsho, vol. 38, table 2.
 15. Two days before the attack, three two-plane, 
thirty-degree sectors were searched to sixty 
nautical miles by Ryūjō. One day before the 
attack, three two-plane, eighteen-degree sec-
tors were searched to 250 nm, also by Ryūjō. 
On the day of attack, the floatplanes available 
on board the two screening cruisers, instead 
of being used for search, joined the attack 
force. Weather in this area was generally bad. 
Ryūjō and Junyō Air Group Kōdōchōsho; 
Senshi Sōsho, vol. 29, Hokutō Hōmen Kaigun 
Sakusen [Northeast Area Naval Operations] 
(Tokyo: BKS, 1969), pp. 245–46.
 16. In the carrier raids of 1 and 24 February 
and 4 and 10 March, all available aircraft, 
except those reserved for combat air patrol 
or a second attack, were launched to attack. 
CINCPAC, “Report of Action, Marshall- 
Gilbert Islands Raids”; CTF-16, “Report on 
Raid on Wake Island, February 24, 1942”; 
CTF-11, “Report of Attack on Enemy Forces 
in Salamaua-Lae Area, March 10, 1942”; Of-
fice of Naval Intelligence, Combat Narratives, 
Early Raids in the Pacific; John B. Lundstrom, 
The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat 
from Pearl Harbor to Midway (Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984), chaps. 4, 6, 
7. (U.S. reports referenced in this article are 
available at www.fold3.com/.)
 17. Akagi, Kaga, and Zuikaku were anchored 
at Truk on 1 February with 170 available 
aircraft. Senshi Sōsho, vol. 38, p. 405. 
 18. Richard W. Bates, The Battle of Savo Island, 
August 9th, 1942: Strategical and Tactical 
Analysis, Part I (Newport, R.I.: Naval War 
College, 1950), pp. 25–31, diagram B.
 19. DesRon 2 WD, May 1942. Another message 
from the communication unit gave more 
details: “NERK [suspected to be submarine] 
detected at 23-30 N 169 E (12,795 kc) sent an 
urgent message to NQM [Midway] at 1130.” 
CarDiv 5 WD, May 1942.
 20. This submarine is probably USS Cuttlefish. 
It was on its way back from Saipan to the 
newly assigned position and sighted Japanese 
planes at 26°18ʹ N 169°23ʹ E on 31 May. USS 
Cuttlefish, Report of Second War Patrol. 
 21. Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43, pp. 267–68.
 22. “Last Moments of Transport Kano Maru,” 
compilation of Kano Maru WD. Given the 
time, call sign, and radio frequency, this 
radio interception is most likely the same one 
mentioned in note 19. 
 23. Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43, p. 267, puts this event on 
the 31st.
 24. For example, about 1000 on 30 May, Chitose’s 
plane sighted an enemy submarine six thou-
sand meters from the Transport Group and 
bombed it; “Last Moments of Transport Kano 
Maru.” Also see CarDiv 5 WD, May 1942; and 
Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43, pp. 244–47, 267–68.
 25. To the authors’ knowledge, there was no 
U.S. submarine near the Transport Group. 
So the sightings of submarines made by the 
Transport Group are probably mistaken. See 
Samuel E. Morison, History of United States 
Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 4, 
Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, repr. 
2010), pp. 198–214.
 26. Ugaki Matome, Fading Victory: The Diary of 
Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941, ed. Donald M. 
Goldstein (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 2008), p. 131.
 27. Mori, Middowei Kaisen, vol. 1, pp. 251–53.
 28. Ugaki, Fading Victory, p. 131.
 29. Senshi Sōsho suggests that Nagumo probably 
received the report that an enemy submarine 
had been detected north-northeast of Mid-
way, but this position is four days ahead of 
Tanaka, so it doesn’t mean Tanaka had been 
sighted. Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43, p. 245.
 30. Ibid., pp. 251–52.
 31. Ibid., p. 126.
 32. According to recollections of related officers, 
Kidō Butai’s operational plan had it that 
Nagumo should reserve half his planes for the 
enemy fleet while attacking Midway. Ibid., pp. 
164–65.
 33. Ibid., pp. 249–50; Mori, Middowei Kaisen, vol. 
1, pp. 308–10.
 34. Mori, Middowei Kaisen, vol. 1, p. 310; Senshi 
Sōsho, vol. 43, p. 249.
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 35� Mori, Middowei Kaisen, vol� 1, pp� 306–308, 
310–12�
 36� Senshi Sōsho, vol� 43, p� 249�
 37� Kusaka Ryūnosuke, Rengō Kantai Sanbōchō 
no Kaisō [Recollections of Combined Fleet 
Chief of Staff] (Tokyo: Kōwadō, 1979), p� 133�
 38� Senshi Sōsho, vol� 43, pp� 251–52�
 39� Ibid�, pp� 126–27, 254–55�
 40� See David Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Con-
spiracy (New York: William Morrow, 1971), 
and Zenji Orita, with Joseph Harrington, I-
Boat Captain: How Japan’s Submarines Almost 
Defeated the U.S. Navy in the Pacific (Canoga 
Park, Calif�: Major Books, 1976), pp� 66–71�
 41� Senshi Sōsho, vol� 43, pp� 198–99; Senshi 
Sōsho, vol� 98, Sensuikan Shi [History of Sub-
marines] (Tokyo: BKS, 1979), p� 143�
 42� Kuroshima, staff officer of the Combined 
Fleet, admitted after the battle that it was his 
negligence that the message was not relayed 
to Nagumo; Senshi Sōsho, vol� 98, pp� 143–44�
 43� Six-hundred-nautical-mile patrols from Mid-
way began on 23 May� Patrol Squadron 44 did 
not arrive until 22 and 23 May� Long-range 
daily searches and B-17 operations from 
Midway put a serious burden on the naval 
air station’s aviation fuel� Commanding Of-
ficer, MAG-22, “Report of Battle of Midway 
Islands”; Executive Officer, MAG-22, “The 
Battle of Midway”; both in Naval Air Station 
Midway WD, May and June 1942�
 44� Assuming visibility of twenty-five nautical 
miles and a range of six hundred, one patrol 
plane can cover a sector of about six degrees 
without gaps� A range of six hundred miles or 
more was needed to give warning of any fast-
approaching (twenty-five knot) enemy carrier 
force planning to launch an air strike at dawn, 
two hundred nautical miles from Midway�
 45� In its war games of the Pearl Harbor attack 
and the proposed invasion of Ceylon, Japan 
suffered at least one carrier sunk and more 
damaged� Aircraft losses were heavy in both� 
For the war game on the Pearl Harbor attack, 
see Senshi Sōsho, vol� 10, pp� 101–104� For the 
game on Ceylon, see Senshi Sōsho, vol� 80, 
Daihon’ei Kaigunbu Rengō Kantai (2) [Naval 
General Staff and Combined Fleet (2)] (To-
kyo: BKS, 1975), pp� 324–33�
 46� Japan had extensive air-search plans for after 
Midway was captured� It was then that the 
Japanese expected a “decisive battle” against 
U�S� carriers and battleships� Senshi Sōsho, vol� 
43, plate 1�
 47� For that suspicion, Sawachi Hisae, Kiroku 
Middowei Kaisen [Recording Naval Battle of 
Midway] (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū, 1986), pp� 
21–23� That Yamamoto’s order was ignored 
does remain possible�
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 The U�S� Navy continues to suffer from poor decision making among a small number of commanding officers (COs), as demonstrated by continued 
headlines: “Squadron Commander Relieved of Duty after Alleged Drunk Driving 
Incident”;1 “Amphib [amphibious force] CO Fired, Source Says Linked to Alleged 
Bribery Scheme”;2 “Sub Commander Relieved of Duty after Woman Alleges He 
Faked Death to End Affair”;3 “Navy Investigates ex–Blue Angels Commander 
after Complaint He Allowed Sexual Harassment”;4 and “Navy Skipper Abdicated 
Command�”5 Since the publication in these pages in 2012 of Captain Mark F� 
Light’s “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” individual cases of Navy commanding 
officers making poor decisions of such kinds have continued to trouble Navy 
leadership�6 Considering that more than 2,350 Navy billets are designated as 
command positions, the infrequency of such events reflects the dedication of 
most commanding officers�7 In fact, as Vice Admiral Thomas Copeman, address-
ing the specifics of a misconduct event as Commander, Naval Surface Force, U�S� 
Pacific Fleet, wrote in 2014, “In my experience [the 
violations] are beyond rare; they are � � � wholly un-
representative of the supremely talented men and 
women filling positions of leadership�”8 
While it involves overall a statistically low per-
centage of commanding officers, continued misbe-
havior reinforces Captain Light’s assessment that 
it is a potential integrity issue for the Navy� In the 
three years since the original article, substantial 
debate has occurred, and corrective actions have 
been taken by the Navy� Is it enough? Is it even 
Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?
Captain Jason A. Vogt, U.S. Navy
Nobody trusts or has confidence in leaders who believe they cannot be 
held accountable for what they do.
ADMIRAL JOHN C� HARVEY, JR�, U�S� NAVY 
Captain Vogt is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy and a career Surface Warfare Officer. An Anti-
Submarine Warfare Specialty Career Path Officer, 
he was commanding officer of Naval Ocean Pro-
cessing Facility, Whidbey Island, Washington. He 
is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, in 
Monterey, California; the Naval War College (Com-
mand and Staff), in Newport, Rhode Island; and of 
the Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He 
currently serves on the staff of the U.S. Fifth Fleet at 
the headquarters, Commander, Naval Forces Cen-
tral Command, in Bahrain.
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REVISITING THE NAVY’S MORAL COMPASS
moving in the right direction? This article reviews Captain Light’s findings and 
updates his analysis with subsequent data; explains and assesses actions taken by 
Navy leadership since 2011 to improve the quality of commanding officers; and 
explores additional variables in today’s debate on commanding officer behavior� 
Finally, the article presents recommendations to reduce future personal indiscre-
tions by commanding officers�
THE MORAL COMPASS AND INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT 2010
 “The Navy’s Moral Compass” reviewed and analyzed data provided by the Career 
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command (NPC) on CO “detach-
ments for cause” (DFCs) from 1999 through 2010�9 These data sorted firings 
into two broad categories (as resulting from professional or personal-conduct 
reasons), then broke down the latter by community (air, surface, submarine, 
etc�), rank, and duty type� Captain Light academically analyzed that material and 
concluded that the Navy had to accomplish three tasks to elevate the quality of 
the commanding officer corps and the character of naval leadership�10 
First, Navy leadership had to establish a sense of urgency, not just to deal with 
issues quickly (and publicly, to maintain transparency), but also to effect change 
that would preclude unscrupulous actions in the first place� Second, he argued, 
the Navy needed to set an ethical and moral standard (preferably in writing, as 
the Army did in Army: Profession of Arms and the Army Operating Concept of 
2010) to help create a shift in the Navy mind-set and culture as a whole�11 Finally, 
the Navy had to improve the metrics, specifically the documentation, in periodic 
evaluations under the Bureau of Personnel’s Fitness Report and Counseling Rec-
ord, of potential moral shortcomings� Captain Light concluded with three rec-
ommendations, first that Navy leadership elevate the priority of ethical behavior, 
establishing a central database of reliefs of COs owing to personal or professional 
failures to facilitate tracking and analysis� Additionally, he urged them to under-
take a campaign to set standards of integrity and honorable behavior� Lastly, he 
argued, the officer fitness report ought to be modified in format and concept to 
address character and integrity specifically�12
Concurrently with the original publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” 
the Navy Inspector General (IG) released a study on reliefs of commanding offi-
cers for cause�13 Focusing on firings between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2010, the 
report determined the Navy’s overall commanding officer DFC firing rate to be 
low—approximately 1 percent per year, with a small variance from year to year� It 
saw no correlation between CO DFCs and career paths, personality traits, acces-
sion sources, time in command, or year groups; however, it noted a preponder-
ance of Navy-wide CO reliefs for personal misconduct�14 In personal misconduct 
instances, it appears, fired COs either lacked the insight into their own motives 
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and weaknesses that might have prevented unacceptable behavior or felt they 
had the power to conceal the misconduct (the “Bathsheba Syndrome”)�15 Fur-
thermore, the study had found that implementation of four recommendations of 
a 2004 Navy Inspector General DFC study had had no discernible impact on the 
DFC rate (though the recommendations themselves were valid and represented 
a solid foundation for long-term reduction)�16 The 2010 report concluded with 
three further recommendations� The first was to establish an officer leadership 
training continuum from accession through major command, a continuum un-
der a single “owner,” to provide consistency in curriculum development and exe-
cution� Second, improved oversight by immediate superiors in command (ISICs) 
would better identify potential or ongoing issues earlier� Third, it recommended 
that the Navy enforce existing requirements for Command Climate Assessments 
and their executive summaries�17 
ACTIONS AND REACTIONS
Whether in response to the two 2010 publications or, as a matter of coincidence, 
to continued (and sometimes very public) CO failures, Navy leadership began 
taking steps in early 2011 to address the trend� Admiral John C� Harvey, Jr�, Com-
mander, Fleet Forces Command, recognized that the majority of detachments for 
cause of COs during his tenure had been for personal misconduct, a fact that he 
confronted in a memorandum to his subordinates and through his official Navy 
blog�18 This public acknowledgment was the first of several initiatives by senior 
Navy officials to instill more honor and integrity in the position of commanding 
officer�
The “Charge of Command”
By June 2011 Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
distributed a “Charge of Command”—a memorandum notifying current and 
prospective commanding officers of his expectation that each of them would 
meet the highest standards of personal and professional conduct while in com-
mand�19 Roughead’s memo addressed three essential principles he, as CNO, 
considered to constitute the heart and soul of command: authority, responsibility, 
and accountability� His document tied these principles both to the tradition of 
naval command and to Title 10 of the U�S� Code, which speaks to the standards 
of conduct by individuals in command�20 His successor, Admiral Jonathan W� 
Greenert, reissued and reinforced the Charge of Command, requiring serving 
and prospective commanding officers not only to review the memorandum but 
to sign it with their immediate superiors as a compact between Navy leadership 
and Navy commanders and commanding officers�21 This step created not only a 
counseling opportunity and mentoring tool but also a contract between the Navy 
and its commanding officers regarding personal conduct� 
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The Command Qualification Program
Admiral Greenert further codified the process of setting standards and identify-
ing future commanding officers by introducing a Command Qualification Pro-
gram�22 Released in June 2012 with an implementation deadline of 1 September 
2012, the governing instruction plainly set out policy, procedures, and basic, 
minimum standards for the qualifying and screening of naval officers for com-
mand� Until then individual communities had determined for themselves how to 
go about selecting their future commanding officers� This autonomy had resulted 
in sometimes widely varying criteria� Now, for the first time, the Navy applied 
minimum standards across all officer “designators” (e�g�, unrestricted line, Supply 
Corps) and required, among other things, that potential commanding officers 
be screened by an administrative board� In support of the Command Qualifica-
tion Program, the Command Leadership School’s Command Course, required 
for prospective commanding officers, instituted a written test covering tenets of 
leadership, duties and responsibilities of commanding officers, and authorities as 
laid down in U�S� Navy Regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice�23 
Admiral Greenert further approved a Navy Leader Development Strategy, to 
promote leader character development, emphasize ethics, and reinforce the ser-
vice’s “core values�” The strategy called for a career-long continuum to develop 
leaders and for a focus on character development to help young officers prepare 
for command�24 The strategy led to the evolution of the Command Leadership 
School into the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (NLEC)�25 Aligned with the 
Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, NLEC now develops curriculum 
and performs assessment to instill the tenets of ethical leadership throughout the 
Navy; to develop and guide leaders with a strong sense of responsibility, author-
ity, and accountability; and to impart commitment to the Navy’s core values and 
ethos to sailors�26 Vice Admiral Walter E� “Ted” Carter, Jr�, now superintendent 
of the U�S� Naval Academy but at the time a rear admiral and President of the 
Naval War College, described the establishment of NLEC as “an opportunity 
to take a more proactive approach in improving a culture of character develop-
ment in conjunction with continued command leader education” with a goal of 
“improved leader development�”27 With a consistent qualification program and a 
focus at NLEC on ethical and character expectations, clear standards and expec-
tations are now set for current and future commanding officers�
Command Climate Assessments
Recent events have brought renewed rigor to the Defense and Navy Departments’ 
Equal Opportunity programs, specifically regarding race, gender, and sexual 
orientation and addressing issues ranging from hazing to harassment, assault, 
and fraternization� One measure of the program’s effectiveness is the Command 
Climate Assessment, a survey that should occur within ninety days after a new 
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CO assumes command, with annual follow-up assessments during the command 
tour�28 The Navy’s use of the Command Climate Assessment to support its equal 
opportunity program goes back many years, with little change in responsibilities 
defined for the ISIC and commanding officer�29 Unfortunately, over the years 
many commands did not fully execute the program, typically using the results 
largely for “internal consumption” and not making a priority to forward results 
to ISICs� This resulted in inconsistent application of lessons learned� Two devel-
opments have refocused the Equal Opportunity program and renewed interest 
in the Command Climate Assessment: the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and 
increased scrutiny on the military’s Sexual Assault Prevention & Response pro-
gram� These issues have made the Command Climate Assessment a useful tool 
both within the unit and as a measure of that unit up the chain of command� 
While the Command Climate Assessment cannot alone identify CO wrong-
doing or personal misconduct, it can warn the ISIC to pay close attention to 
individual commanding officers who may need assistance, guidance, or stricter 
oversight� Such thoroughness by the ISIC would match the 2010 Navy Inspector 
General’s recommendation that existing requirements for Command Climate 
Assessments be enforced�30 Unfortunately, for a period after publication of the 
report there were no assessments at all; contractual issues with the company 
responsible for maintaining the servers involved prevented surveys for approxi-
mately six months in late 2012 and early 2013�31 With the resumption of surveys 
has come renewed Navy leadership emphasis: commands now must use a “tri-
angulation” method, utilizing multiple sources of information (e�g�, the surveys 
themselves, records reviews, and focus groups, interviews, and observations by 
command assessment teams)�32 Renewed emphasis on ISIC involvement, to in-
clude follow-up reports on actions taken in response to assessments, should make 
the Command Climate Assessment a more useful tool in the future�
Reactions and Response
A consequence of the increasing importance of social media and “viral” networks 
is nearly immediate discussion of changes or potential changes in the way busi-
ness is conducted� This was the case with the Charge of Command; feedback 
varied from strong support to outright aversion� The Association of the United 
States Navy was quick to announce support: “Admiral Gary Roughead’s legacy to 
the nation will be an inspiration to the officers and leaders that will follow him�”33 
Some blogs condemned the document, one calling the Charge of Command 
“a pathetic response to the real problem we have with COs being fired� Only a 
fonctionaire [sic] thinks that a bit of paper can substitute for solid leadership and 
a culture of honor and integrity—but that is the decision that has been made�”34 
Military-interest publications such as Navy Times were quick to note each step to 
improve leadership, with requisite editorial comment� Meanwhile, each CO firing 
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has continued to be a “front page” headline� Websites like SailorBob�com, a U�S� 
Naval Institute–sponsored professional forum for Surface Warfare Officers, now 
offer informal environments where members can discuss and argue about the 
directions taken by Navy leadership, debate the conclusions of various studies, 
and dissect each firing event�35 In this and other, similar forums hosted by naval 
warfare communities, virtual peer pressure offers an additional deterrent to mis-
conduct while individual events and issues are deliberated� However, debate and 
opinion pieces do not sufficiently measure success� Continued analysis of com-
manding officer firings will be necessary to determine whether the adjustments 
that have been made are meaningful�
2011–2013 DATA AND TREND ANALYSIS
The intention for this article was to update Captain Light’s data directly, by re-
questing DFC data for 2011 through 2013 from the source he used, the Career 
Progression Division of the Naval Personnel Command� However, owing to 
ongoing official investigations and the ever-increasing scrutiny of CO firings, 
the data were not forthcoming� But comparable statistics can be collected from 
other sources, including the Freedom of Information Act� Moreover, as the topic 
of COs being removed from command has high visibility, firing events have been 
documented by not only Navy Times but numerous websites, chat rooms, and 
blogs�36 
However, because not all firings result in formal detachments for cause, these 
data would be likely to identify more firings than are officially documented by 
the Navy, to which Captain Light’s work confined itself�37 It being understood 
that this difference in data sources leaves room for challenge, this research at-
tempted to maintain consistency by retaining previously determined definitions 
and by considering all firings as potential DFCs� A list of fired commanding 
officers published by Navy Times, the most public data for 2011–13, was used 
as the baseline�38 A known disparity exists in data sets (for example, Navy Times 
reports seventeen firings for 2010, NPC three), but to lessen its impact the analy-
sis focused less on statistical specifics than on apparent trends potentially linked 
to Navy actions�39 
Figure 1 presents the total number of firings from 2010 through 2013� Firings 
occurring in 2010 were addressed in Captain Light’s article; the 2010 data are 
provided here only as a starting point� This analysis focuses on firings occurring 
after the publication of the Charge of Command� 
Using the definition of personal misconduct in the 2010 Inspector General 
report and previously established categories, removals were sorted by cause as 
“personal,” “professional,” or “unknown�”40 To make more specific the general ca-
veats noted above, when NPC officially determines whether each removal in this 
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data set is a detachment 
for cause, several, those 
not found to be DFCs, 
may be removed� Ad-
ditionally,  when al l 
now-pending Freedom 
of  Information Act 
requests are resolved, 
a number will likely 
move from “unknown” 
to another category� 
Figure 2 breaks down 
firings for personal, 
professional, and un-
known (or unpublished) reasons� It can be seen that the number of “unknowns” 
has increased in recent years� This is the result of a lack of detail provided in 
reasons for firing, often simply “loss of confidence [i�e�, on the part of a superior] 
in ability to command�” It might be assumed that many firings categorized as 
“unknown” for lack of published circumstances were actually for professional 
reasons, for which the “sensational” personal failings that might produce detailed 
media accounts would be absent� However, for this analysis, cases without those 
details remain “unknown�” 
Concentrating only on the firings for reasons identified as personal, the data 
trend downward from a high of thirteen in 2010 to only five in 2013� Six of the 
twelve firings during 2011 occurred after Admiral Roughead’s Charge of Com-
mand memorandum was published� Three of the six firings occurred within a 
month of publication, leaving room for debate whether offending actions had 
occurred before the 
Charge of Command 
was circulated� Break-
ing the data down by 
community (figure 3) 
does not reveal any 
trends or patterns, pre-
sumably because of the 
decreasing number of 
cases� As both Captain 
Light and the IG report 
found, no trends or 
patterns are apparent 
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in occurrences after 
the Charge of Com-
mand with respect to 
rank of the individual 
or whether an opera-
tional (at-sea) or shore 
command is involved� 
In every case involving 
personal failings, the 
transgression (miscon-
duct, inappropriate be-
havior, alcohol-related 
i nc i d e nt ,  e tc � )  w as 
independent of profes-
sional requirements� 
Given the shrinking 
data set, therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate 
beyond community groups and explore individual cases for trends and linkages�
Since the Navy initiated steps to improve commanding officer accountability, 
the trend lines have appeared favorable in terms of the goal of reducing firings 
for personal misconduct� Though only a few years into the enterprise, the result 
is indicative of the effectiveness of giving prospective commanding officers the 
message regarding expectations of them while in command� Nevertheless, more 
than thirty Navy COs have been fired for personal misconduct since the Charge 
of Command was implemented� Why? This is a small number, considering the 
number of commands and commanding officers in the Navy, but the reasons why 
some individuals still do not “get it” merit further scrutiny� 
Previous reports asserted that organizational culture plays no role in CO mis-
conduct�41 Both the 2004 and 2010 Inspector General reports found no discern-
ible correlations between career paths, personality traits, accession sources, time 
in command, or year groups (i�e�, year of commissioning)�42 However, in contrast 
to the shrinking overall number of firings per year and generally even distribu-
tion of firings across communities, one peak in recent data is worth noting as 
an outlier—the aviation electronic-warfare community, comprising Electronic 
Attack (VAQ) and Fleet Air Reconnaissance (VQ) squadrons� The VAQ and VQ 
subcommunities account for approximately 10 percent of the Navy’s aviation 
squadrons�43 Since implementation of the Charge of Command this subculture 
has been responsible for half the aviation COs fired for misconduct (five of ten), 
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17 percent of all misconduct CO reliefs between 2011 and 2013, and the first 
Navy CO fired for misconduct in 2014�44 
This anomaly could exist for any number of reasons� Given the relatively short 
time and small numbers involved Navy-wide, it may simply be an unfortunate 
coincidence� Or there may be a cultural divergence that either was not present or 
went unrecognized during previous studies, some tendency that has developed 
out of the culture, training, and ethos of a group that is stationed, when not de-
ployed, at one location (the Navy’s VAQ subcommunity and the VQ squadron 
where a firing occurred during the period reviewed are both based at Naval Air 
Station Whidbey Island, in Washington)� Or possibly this is a niche that simply 
has not had enough time pass to absorb the new standards for commanding of-
ficers into its system� On the basis of standard patterns of rotations and promo-
tions, the department heads who in 2011 witnessed their commanding officers 
signing (among the first to do so) the Charge of Command have not yet returned 
to be COs themselves� To know absolutely that every year group of every com-
munity understands and executes the Charge of Command may take between 
four and seven years—a period the Navy is just now entering� 
An instance that more obviously counters previous reports that organizational 
culture plays no role is that of the Blue Angels� Although the officer recently 
investigated for misconduct had already completed his tour in the squadron 
and was in a subsequent noncommand billet when his reassignment occurred, 
the causal events, described as his promoting a hostile work environment and 
tolerating sexual harassment, had occurred during his tenure as CO�45 The in-
vestigation determined that while the CO was responsible, the organizational 
culture had devolved into something from a bygone era� Pornography, lewd 
comments, and raunchy pranks were widely condoned and tolerated, just “boys 
being boys,” all under the direct observation of the commanding officer�46 The 
inquiry resulted in not only the firing of the CO but a restructuring of the Blue 
Angels organization�47 
Nevertheless, neither organizational culture nor rationalization by individual 
members can excuse actions that are clearly and plainly labeled inappropriate by 
the Navy� With the implementation of the Charge of Command, misconduct by 
a commanding officer comes down to a conscious decision� None of those fired 
were in any doubt about what was right and wrong, not only in terms of Navy reg-
ulations but also, in the vast majority of cases, according to law, a moral code, or 
both� Mechanisms are in place—training for prospective COs by the Naval Lead-
ership and Ethics Center, the Command Qualification Program, the Charge of 
Command, clear statements of the expectations for commanding officers and their 
immediate superiors, and routine and standard Command Climate Assessments 
—to minimize commanding officer misconduct� But more can be done�
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A TRUE, LONG-TERM, AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION
To have no commanding officers relieved for cause would not be an achievable 
goal; professional mishaps will occur that warrant holding a CO accountable� 
But it is not unrealistic to strive to eliminate reliefs due to misconduct or indi-
vidual ethical failure� The positive actions described here are good first steps� But 
consistent enforcement of these topics and follow-up initiatives are necessary to 
avoid a long-term appearance that the Navy’s response was simply reactive, a 
“Band-Aid,” not a true, long-term, and sustainable solution� To continue to build 
on the gains already achieved, the following recommendations are offered�
Be Transparent and Consistent, Navy
When the Navy attempts to move forward, it often proves its own worst enemy� 
Two consecutive CNOs have placed the integrity of commanding officers high 
on their priority lists and set standards of performance� Yet the public assump-
tion is that “Big Navy” has something to hide—because commanding officers are 
relieved without official statement about whether the reasons were professional 
or personal� The ubiquitous “loss of confidence” leaves much to the imagination, 
particularly in a social-media and blog environment where the allegation of hid-
ing details results in overall loss of confidence in the broader establishment� This 
lack of transparency is compounded each time a firing is not publicly acknowl-
edged or officially tracked because it did not fit an administrative criterion (i�e�, 
the financial parameters of a formal detachment for cause)� 
The 2010 Inspector General report acknowledged several cases of command-
ing officers relieved early that it could have considered but did not because the 
DFC process had not been initiated�48 The IG investigation had no reliable way 
to determine how often COs had been detached early but quietly, as if their tours 
had been successful, when a DFC might have been more appropriate�49 Most 
conspicuously, in 2003 when a reported twenty-six commanding officers were 
relieved, only seven were listed by the Naval Personnel Command as DFCs�50 
The combination of potentially inconsistent Navy data with Navy Personnel 
Command unwillingness to release a comprehensive list makes evident a lack of 
transparency concerning CO misconduct� 
The way to rise above what does or does not constitute a DFC is to call it what 
it is—a firing is a firing� Restricting official concern to reliefs that cost the Navy 
money will, in the long run, erode trust in the service and bring its integrity 
into question� The removal of commanding officers prior to projected rotation 
dates should be addressed by ISICs whether they occur for operational reasons 
or not�51 If a “no-cost DFC” category is created, future studies will have a more 
comprehensive data set to analyze� The importance of dealing with all command-
ing officer firings was addressed in the 2004 IG report, though not in 2010� Such 
Book 1.indb   109 2/4/15   10:24 AM
114
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 1 1 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
a complete listing might challenge the analysis of this article, but thereafter there 
would be a consistent basis for future analysis, discussion, and debate�
Compounding the appearance of a lack of transparency was the Navy’s accep-
tance of the unavailability of Command Assessments for six months� Contractual 
and budget issues were allowed to disable a leadership tool� The 2010 Inspector 
General’s report had stated, “Command climate assessments would be a better 
tool for commands if there was a broader understanding throughout the fleet” of 
what assessments were and how to use them;52 not using them at all depreciated 
them in the eyes of the fleet� Additionally, the IG had found that in almost all 
the CO detachments for cause correct use of the assessments, especially accurate 
executive summaries, would have highlighted early for ISICs the behavior and 
command-climate problems�53 To have been denied the assessment process so 
soon after it had been identified as necessary was a mixed signal�
Progress toward transparency would also be achieved by a more thorough 
tracking system� In an age where baseball sabermetrics can track the actual (and 
even predict potential) performance of individual players in specific situations, 
the Navy ought to be able to track more closely the development of potential 
commanding officers and performance of current ones� Correlating data not 
only of firings but also leading to and during command tours—such as who had 
worked for whom over the years and what had been said by and about individuals 
in “360-degree” evaluations—might uncover linkages or trends not yet consid-
ered� No record now follows how subordinates of COs relieved for misconduct 
fare in future positions or suggests whether there is any correlation to their own 
future misconduct� While developing such a capability would be a herculean 
task, it would be within the mission of the Navy’s Human Resources community, 
specifically its Core Competencies of management and development�54 Until such 
analysis is established and employed, public speculation, suspicion, and scrutiny 
will continue�
Reexamine the Data
The Inspector General reports completed in 2004 and 2010 each took an objec-
tive look at the DFC process and came up with recommendations to address fu-
ture commanding officer failings� For the reasons explained above, however, the 
picture the reports presented was incomplete� While it provided enough clarity 
for the CNO to determine that the Charge of Command, Command Qualifica-
tion Program, and Command Climate Assessments were necessary, incomplete-
ness of data may have the Navy chasing symptoms rather than a cure� It is time for 
another official Navy review of not just the DFC process but any and all removals 
of COs prior to their original rotation dates� A harder look at COs will produce 
a more complete understanding of the effectiveness of current and future initia-
tives to eliminate personal misconduct that results in firings�
Book 1.indb   110 2/4/15   10:24 AM
115
Naval War College: Spring 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 VO G T  1 1 1
Establish and Enforce Dissuasive (Monetary) Measures 
Despite any amount of training, formal setting of personal and professional ex-
pectations, or examples of colleagues who are relieved for their own misconduct, 
the risks may not be high enough to deter those on the edge� When a command-
ing officer is relieved for individual failures, the topic quickly appears in articles, 
comment sections of periodicals, blogs, and chat rooms� In almost every case 
someone offers a variation on the statement “Commander X may no longer be 
the commanding officer, but he will still get to retire with his twenty years, receive 
his full pension, get a lucrative position outside the Navy, and other than some 
fleeting embarrassment he will receive no real punishment�” 
Command is the pinnacle of the military profession, and it is not a part-time 
job� It is not conducted only during business hours� As Admiral Roughead once 
said, commanders are duty bound to uphold strict behavioral standards, even 
when off duty�55 Whether a commanding officer’s misconduct is deliberate (driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol, bribery, fraternization, etc�) or results from 
failure to fulfill duties assigned or abdication of them (as occurred twice recently, 
with the Blue Angels and the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens), the com-
manding officer remains responsible�56 As in other professions, a leader must 
be held accountable when performance results in failure� In most professions 
failure often results in removal of professional position and credentials, pecuni-
ary penalties, or both� Doctors who do not perform adequately risk the loss of 
their licenses and punitive judgments for malpractice� Lawyers can be disbarred 
or sanctioned for demonstrated inability� Even midshipmen are held accountable 
for failure once midway through their training; they owe time in service or, if 
they cannot complete their training, must reimburse the Navy for the education 
received�57 So what is the cost of the inability of a commanding officer to live up 
to the commitment he or she accepted by signing the Charge of Command? The 
Navy has often removed faltering leaders from authority but has not pursued 
financial compensation for the time, training, and trust invested in them�
It is time to debate the question� The Navy should create a postcommand 
screening board, charged with reviewing the details of individual firings� This 
board would be independent of the relieved individual’s chain of command and 
unrelated to any pending action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice re-
sulting from misconduct� This board should have the power to recoup bonuses 
from or impose other financial penalties on those who have made poor personal 
decisions while in command� This does not mean that every failed commanding 
officer would or should owe a financial debt to the Navy� For a purely professional 
failure, the balance might be restored by removal of the individual from the com-
mand; an objective review by this panel might find no further action necessary� 
But a personal failure, specifically misconduct, can be viewed as a breach of 
Book 1.indb   111 2/4/15   10:24 AM
116
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 1 1 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
contract, an inability of the individual to abide by the Charge of Command� Many 
commanding officer positions are designated as meriting additional pay or bo-
nuses; the financial penalty could be simply requiring the failed commander to re-
turn them�58 Bonuses received in command (e�g�, training or specialty bonuses or 
flight, sea, nuclear, medical specialty, command-responsibility, or other critical- 
skills pay) could be considered insurance against poor decisions—refundable 
security deposits by the Navy� Each firing would have to be reviewed individu-
ally, as each commanding officer represents a different level of investment by 
the Navy in getting him or her to and through command� And just as the Navy 
holds a midshipman responsible for failing to complete the course of instruction 
leading to commission, so should the Navy hold responsible its commanding of-
ficers who fail to complete their command tours� For the more than 99 percent of 
commanding officers who live within the Charge of Command and successfully 
complete their command tours the hazard is nonexistent� Individuals considering 
accepting the risk of misconduct may find in financial penalties the necessary 
motivation to choose better—motivation that previous initiatives have not sup-
plied� And even by preventing one firing, this option would take the Navy a step 
closer to eliminating misconduct among commanding officers�
Since publication of “The Navy’s Moral Compass” the Navy has made progress 
to reduce commanding officer misconduct� Progress has been achieved not only 
by implementing new initiatives but also by ensuring that previously established 
guidelines are properly executed, resulting in a solid basis for further reducing 
commanding officer firings for misconduct in the future� Holding commanding 
officers to a consistent and higher standard is necessary if they are to achieve 
long-term success in the position, and until the number of misconduct cases is 
zero, the pressure must be sustained� The Navy must continue to strive for a high 
standard, improve transparency regarding its standards, continuously review 
data trends, and scrutinize those entrusted with command� And it must improve 
the process that identifies and tracks allegations when they arise—and then hold 
individuals accountable�
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COMMENTARY
wanted u.s. navy mine warfare champion
Scott C. Truver
Successfully implementing innovation within a bureaucracy ultimately requires a 
champion to navigate the inherently political processes of securing sponsorship 
and resourcing. This is just as important to the very small as to the very large 
programs, particularly during periods of fiscal austerity. “It’s fragmented,” com-
mented retired rear admiral Paul Ryan, former commander of the U.S. Navy’s 
Mine Warfare Command, in April 2014. “There is no single champion for mine 
warfare.”1
This lack of support presents challenges for the U.S. Navy and the nation, 
as the service struggles to articulate, and to muster the necessary backing for, 
mine warfare (MIW) strategies, programs, capabilities, and capacities. The task 
of confronting these challenges is complicated by the fact that MIW comprises 
not only mine-countermeasures (MCM—that is, minesweeping and mine hunt-
ing) systems and platforms but also mines that can be employed to defeat our 
adversaries’ naval strategies and forces. In recent decades, the counters to our 
adversaries’ mines have received increasing attention, leading to the advanced 
MCM mission package fitted on the littoral com-
bat ship (LCS). Yet at the same time, our mines and 
offensive and defensive mining capabilities have 
languished to the point of irrelevance. If MCM is 
the neglected program of “Big Navy,” then mines 
are the misbegotten offspring of the MIW com-
munity. However, that might be changing, albeit 
ever so slightly.
The post–World War II political history of U.S. 
Navy mine warfare (defining “politics” as who gets 
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COMMENTARY
what, when, where, and how) is fraught with insufficiently sustained and stable 
commitment, relatively long periods of benign neglect, indifference, uncertainty, 
and inadequate funding, punctuated by relatively short bursts of grave concern 
and avid support, usually directly related to some recently experienced MIW em-
barrassment� Political scientist Harvey Sapolski at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology explains in his book The Polaris System Development the inherently 
and necessarily political process by which a government program can achieve 
high priorities and guarantee resources for research-and-development (R&D), 
programmatic, and operational success� “The success of the [Polaris fleet- 
ballistic-missile, or FBM, submarine] program was dependent upon the great 
skill of its proponents in bureaucratic politics,” he writes� “Without their quick 
recognition of the political nature of decisions determining the procurement of 
weapons, I do not believe that sufficient resources could have been assembled to 
create the � � � FBM Fleet�”2
There is perhaps only one other U�S� Navy program that has had R&D, bureau-
cratic, programmatic, and operational success similar to that of the Polaris FBM 
project, and that is the Aegis antiair warfare system, deployed in the Ticonderoga 
and Arleigh Burke surface warships� Looking at Polaris and Aegis, some secrets 
of naval-warfare bureaucratic-political success can be gleaned for the future U�S� 
MIW community, despite the great differences in size, cost, and scope of the 
programs� 
SAPOLSKI’S SECRETS OF SUCCESS
First, Polaris and Aegis had a set of well-defined goals that stayed constant�3 The 
Special Projects Office focused on building a solid-fuel, submarine-launched bal-
listic missile and a fleet of nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-launching subma-
rines to enhance U�S� strategic deterrence� The Aegis Shipbuilding Program (PMS 
400) had the goal of building a fleet of antiair-warfare surface warships armed 
with advanced phased-array radars and surface-to-air (and space) missiles ca-
pable of defeating massed Soviet naval aviation raids� Therefore, since 2002 Aegis 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) has pushed the envelope, achieving twenty-eight 
intercepts in thirty-four flight-test attempts through 2013, a rate unprecedented 
in any element of the nation’s BMD systems�
Second, both Polaris and Aegis were born and sustained in favorable envi-
ronments� For Polaris, it was the demand pull for a survivable nuclear deterrent 
within a strategic context of mutually assured destruction and bitter U�S�-Soviet 
rivalry, as well as a budgetary context of resources that were virtually unlimited 
(particularly by today’s standards), often reallocated from less well protected pro-
grams� Aegis was conceived when the Soviet navy began to break out of its histori-
cal boundaries, challenging the U�S� Navy everywhere and holding at risk aircraft 
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carrier battle groups with increasingly capable antiship cruise missiles launched 
from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines� “Aegis � � � don’t leave home port 
without it” was the program office’s unique selling point—and it worked! This 
has continued with Aegis BMD, extending the shield well beyond forces at sea�
Third, both the Polaris and Aegis programs also depended for success on their 
proponents’ ability to promote and protect them� Competitors had to be elimi-
nated; reviewing agencies had to be outmaneuvered; defense and Navy officials, 
admirals, congressmen, defense industry, the media, and academicians had to be 
co-opted� Every opportunity to promote and protect Polaris and Aegis had to be 
seized and won, whether the challenge came from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, another service, Congress, or the Navy�
Finally, both had to have long-term champions skilled in bureaucratic politics 
and possessed of great managerial strength in dealing with technological com-
plexity� Both Polaris and Aegis were “rocket science,” and both needed leaders 
with broad and deep technical, engineering, and program-management exper-
tise� Admirals Levering Smith, William F� Raborn, and the man who is widely 
regarded as the “Father of Aegis,” Admiral Wayne E� Meyer, were all masters in 
these areas� Also, Admiral H� G� Rickover was instrumental in the development 
of nuclear power, and it did not hurt that Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), personally established the Polaris Special Projects Office�
U.S. Navy MIW Challenges
Compare the Polaris/Aegis political-culture experience with MIW since 1945� 
Instead of a single set of well-defined goals that stay constant, MIW goals and 
program elements often compete among themselves for priorities and resources, 
and they are far from stable, particularly in terms of funding for research and 
development, acquisition, and sustainment�
• Should we emphasize mine countermeasures at the expense of offensive or 
defensive mines and mining?
• Within the MCM arena, what is the best way to allocate scarce resources 
between mine hunting and minesweeping, and what element of the MCM 
“triad”—airborne, surface, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)—needs 
to be supported most urgently?
• How can Big Navy be convinced to acquire and sustain a modern offensive 
and defensive mining capability?
This situation is made more complex by the fact that, except in rare cases, 
the MIW community does not procure its own major platforms and so can be 
held hostage by the competing goals, priorities, and dynamics of other warfare 
sponsors� Witness the challenges of keeping the heavy-lift Sea Dragon MH-53E 
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airborne MCM helicopters ready for tasking, as they continue to be “sundowned,” 
replaced by the medium-lift MH-60S helicopter, particularly as the naval avia-
tion enterprise focuses on next-generation aircraft carriers and aircraft� Likewise, 
challenges to the littoral combat ship could jeopardize mine-countermeasures 
modernization as the Avenger surface MCM vessels are stricken from the Navy 
list� Indeed, the Navy surface MCM community is “betting the farm” on the 
research-and-development, bureaucratic, programmatic, and operational success 
of the LCS program, however modified as a result of the recommendations of the 
CNO’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force in 2014�
When the Navy reorganized the LCS Program Executive Office out of the pre-
vious Program Executive Officer (PEO) Littoral and Mine Warfare in 2011, the 
programs of the MIW manager (known with the Naval Sea Systems Command 
as PMS 495) and other MIW-related legacy “cats and dogs” were included in the 
new PEO’s “portfolio�” This reorganization has taken some time to sort out�
Moreover, when U�S� Navy MIW receives emphasis, it tends to be in nonfavor-
able environments and in knee-jerk reaction to embarrassment and to an urgent, 
ultimately ephemeral, perception of need� Two quotes illustrate this:4
• “When you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got 
command of the sea� And command of the sea is the rock-bottom founda-
tion for all our war plans� We’ve been plenty submarine and air conscious� 
Now we’re going to start getting mine conscious—beginning last week�”
• “I believe there are some fundamentals about MIW that we should not forget� 
Once mines are laid, they are quite difficult to get rid of� That is not likely to 
change� It is probably going to get worse, because mines are going to become 
more sophisticated�”
The first quote belongs to Admiral Forrest Sherman, speaking as CNO in late 
October 1950� He is lamenting the fact that in a four-hundred-square-mile area 
off Wonsan, North Korea, an extensive minefield, a mix of some three thousand 
Soviet 1904- and 1908-vintage moored mines and more modern magnetic- 
influence bottom mines, had been keeping a 250-ship amphibious task force at 
bay� The operational plan had allocated only ten days and insufficient MCM ves-
sels to clear several channels, intelligence on the mine threat was all but absent, 
and maps and charts of the area were inadequate� Ultimately, only 225 of the three 
thousand mines were swept, and the North Koreans (and Russians) had another 
thousand mines in reserve�
In the second quote, Admiral Frank B� Kelso, CNO, is reacting in October 1991 
(quoted in the Navy’s 1992 Mine Warfare Plan) to the more than 1,300 mines that 
had frustrated planned Marine assaults against Iraqi forces in Operation DESERT 
STORM� A few of the mines were of a 1908 vintage and a crude Iraqi design, but 
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others were modern Soviet and Italian multiple-influence weapons, including at 
least two hundred of a multiple-acoustic type that had never been seen before 
in the West� The operational plans had allocated only a few days to clear assault 
lanes, and intelligence on the mine threat was all but absent� Maps and charts 
of the northern Arabian Gulf were inadequate� Our intelligence about the Iraqi 
mine threat was so incomplete that two U�S� warships suffered mine strikes in ar-
eas that analysts had assessed to be mine-free� The helicopter assault ship Tripoli 
and the Aegis guided-missile cruiser Princeton were damaged severely; Princeton 
was taken out of the war by a single fifteen-thousand-dollar weapon�
Our adversaries’ mines and mining superiority revealed by Wonsan and 
DESERT STORM had the near-instantaneous effect of revitalizing our MCM—
though not our mines� There was not only an infusion of much-needed funding 
but also a new understanding that somehow MCM was still important to the 
Navy during a period of great change� 
But the threat of global strategic-nuclear war in the 1950s and the uncertainty 
of the post–Cold War era in the 1990s, respectively, were short-lived, and by the 
early 1960s and late 1990s “business as usual” was the unofficial MIW motto, as 
resources became increasingly tight and attention turned to other needs� Since 
the last new-design mines reached the U�S� operating forces in 1983, and despite 
interest in “littoral sea mines” since then, only an upgraded target detection de-
vice (TDD) has seen the light of day�
Two Other Factors
The two additional factors of success that Polaris and Aegis enjoyed were the 
ability of their proponents, long-term champions skilled in bureaucratic politics, 
to promote and protect their programs against all others inside and outside the 
Navy� This has been absent in the MIW community� Rarely has a CNO put MIW 
on the line and protected the program of record from those who had different 
priorities� Recently two CNOs, Admirals Vern Clark and Jonathan Greenert, 
“talked the talk” and “walked the walk” for MIW, earning them the title of “Mine 
Warfare CNO�” However, the reality is that only one CNO since 1945, Admiral 
Mike Boorda, who had been commanding officer of the minesweeper Parrott 
(1966–68), has had an actual tour in MIW� Others might point to Admiral Robert 
Carney, who had at least one MIW experience, as commanding officer of the light 
cruiser Denver� 
During his stint as Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s senior military ad-
viser in the late 1990s, General James Jones, USMC, asked me, “What do we have 
to do, to keep the Navy’s attention focused on mine warfare?” I replied, “Ships got 
to sink and people have to die, or it will be business as usual�” He replied, “Sadly, 
I agree�”
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In a way, Big Navy’s indifference, if not hostility, to investment in MCM is not 
without merit� Looking objectively at mine-hunting technology versus advanced 
mine technology, the Navy cannot have any real confidence that a quick and 
effective in-stride mine-clearing capability in a nonbenign environment will 
ever be achieved� Post–DESERT STORM, the world’s best MCM capabilities were 
for the most part pitted against relatively ancient mines� The clearance rate was 
painstakingly slow and could be achieved only in a totally benign environment� 
Following the end of DESERT STORM hostilities, an international MCM force 
needed some two years to declare Persian Gulf sea-lanes and ten mine-danger 
areas to be mine-free�
More important is the reality that if we cannot effectively and quickly detect, 
classify, localize, identify, and neutralize mines, neither can our adversaries� If 
their mines will have major antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) impacts on U�S� 
naval strategies and operations, the U�S� Navy’s offensive mines should have the 
same effect on their strategies and operations� Thus, the Navy should be investing 
heavily in a state-of-the-art mining capability for use against potential adversar-
ies that rely in a major way on the sea� 
A CASE STUDY: MINES AND MINING
Although mine hunting/sweeping and offensive/defensive minelaying are two 
sides of the same naval warfare coin, they are indeed very different functions, 
with very different prospects for success� The seemingly enduring offense/ 
defense imbalance in this warfare area, an imbalance that so heavily favors the 
mine, should stimulate U�S� Navy investment in the “winning” side: offensive 
mining� While in 2014 there are indications that Navy “weapons that wait” are 
receiving greater attention among the operating forces and Navy leaders, particu-
larly as a result of the “Pacific pivot” and the need to address potential adversaries’ 
capabilities, since the mid-1980s Navy mines and mining have represented an 
even more dismal story than MCM�5 
During the Cold War, the U�S� Navy maintained a large stock of mines for both 
offense and defense� Several types of bottom and moored antisubmarine mines 
(Mark 52/55/56/57) deployed by submarines and aircraft entered service in the 
1950s and 1960s� Mine inventories included general-purpose bombs fitted with 
mines, known as Destructors, which saw widespread employment at sea and on 
land during the Vietnam War� But with the end of the Cold War, the U�S� Navy’s 
mine capabilities began to atrophy� No conventional mines remain, and at one 
point the Navy had programmed the remaining obsolescent submarine-launched 
mobile mines (SLMMs) to be phased out in 2012� Had that been carried out, U�S� 
attack submarines would have had no mining capability at all; as it was, only 
direct intercession by the CNO, Admiral Greenert, saved a handful of SLMMs� 
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The only other mines in service are the Quickstrike series of aircraft-deployed 
weapons (essentially upgrades of the 1960s Destructor mines); the dedicated, 
thin-wall Mark 65 two-thousand-three-hundred-pound bottom mine (in service 
since 1983); and the Mark 62 five-hundred-pound and Mark 63 one-thousand-
pound bottom mines (1980)� Like the Destructor series, these last two are 
general-purpose bomb-conversion weapons, using screw-in multiple-influence 
(magnetic, pressure, and seismic sensors) TDDs in place of the bombs’ conven-
tional fuses� 
There are no surface minelaying capabilities in the U�S� Navy�6 While packages 
for mission sets beyond the baseline of MCM, surface warfare, and antisubma-
rine warfare (ASW) have been suggested for the littoral combat ship, there is no 
apparent interest in configuring LCS variants as minelayers� Likewise, in early 
winter 2014 there is little indication that the results of the 2014 Small Surface 
Combatant Task Force will include minelaying for a next-generation, “frigate-
like,” small warship�
With the eventual demise of the Mark 67 SLMM, the nation’s sole minelaying 
capabilities will reside in naval aviation and the U�S� Air Force� The U�S� Navy’s 
P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and F/A-18 Hornet / Super Hornet can drop 
Quickstrike mines, but the P-3Cs are leaving service� They are to be replaced by 
the P-8 Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, which will also have a mining 
capability, but its ability to lay mines in meaningful numbers is years away�
The Air Force B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit strategic 
bombers constitute the nation’s only high-volume mining capability� B-1s can 
carry more Quickstrike mines than the seemingly ageless B-52s (expected to 
remain active through 2040, the first B-52H having entered service in 1961), and 
B-52s and B-1s (but not B-2s) regularly train for and practice this mission� The 
seventy-seven active B-52Hs can each carry about forty-five Mark 62 Quick-
strike or eighteen Mark 63 mines or ten Mark 65s; the sixty-six B-1s can carry 
eighty-four Mark 62, or twenty-four Mark 63 (although the Mark 63s are not yet 
certified), or eight Mark 65 mines; and the twenty B-2s could carry eighty Mark 
62s each� However, the availability of bombers, airborne tankers, and defensive 
escorts for mining campaigns is uncertain� There will certainly be intense com-
petition for these scarce resources in future crises and conflicts�
In short, at the time of writing the United States lacks modern mines and the 
means to deliver them� The Navy has no surface-deployed mines� A handful of 
obsolescent SLMMs—with perhaps less-than-optimum reliability, accuracy, and 
standoff characteristics—constitute the Navy’s only clandestine mining capa-
bility� The air-launched Quickstrikes have less-than-optimal accuracy and are 
best deployed in less-than-contested environments� The 1991 Gulf War was the 
last time that the Navy deployed mines in combat� (On that occasion, four A-6 
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Intruder bombers planted a tactical minefield of Quickstrikes at the mouth of the 
Khawr az-Zubayr River to deny Iraqi access to the northern Gulf; one aircraft was 
lost to ground fire� Although there was little evidence that the minefield was suc-
cessful, the Navy used the Quickstrikes also against bridges and airport runways, 
to better effect�)7 Thus the nation’s only offensive mining capability is resident in 
a small number of SLMMs and our only defensive mines are the shallow-water 
Quickstrikes�
Of greater long-term concern, there are only a few uniformed and civilian 
mine specialists, and a dwindling mine technological/industrial base has al-
ready presented challenges� For example, the U�S� Navy has been developing the 
next-generation, multiple-influence, programmable Mark 71 Quickstrike TDD 
since 1991� Only since 2012 has the system been acquired, and work is already 
under way to develop “smarter” algorithms for a broader target set� The Navy’s 
mines/mining community has long wanted the ability to command and control 
deployed mines remotely but has not received the R&D funding to support it�
At the direction of Admiral Greenert, in 2012, the Navy conducted an “analy-
sis of alternatives” (AoA) for near- and far-term mining capabilities that would 
address shortfalls and gaps� This included assessments of foreign mines, as well 
as American weapons� As of 2014, the AoA has yet to be released, and its po-
tential impact on the mine warfare program of record is unclear� Nevertheless, 
low-level research and development for “advanced undersea weapon systems” 
has continued at the Office of Naval Research and the Naval Surface Warfare 
Command, in Panama City, Florida�8 With today’s unmanned-precision-vehicle 
and underwater communication technologies, the mining vision has significantly 
been expanded to make it more tactically responsive to changing situations, to 
provide much greater reach and utility in all phases of operations, including A2/
AD missions� 
IRONY AND PARADOX 
The great irony and paradox for the Navy lie in the fact that mines do work and 
that mines/mining and MCM will almost certainly be needed in a future crisis 
or conflict� The post–World War II operational history underscores this fact of 
naval life� Of the twenty U�S� Navy ships that have been severely damaged or sunk 
by adversary action since September 1945, fifteen were mine victims� When the 
Navy employed mines in Haiphong in 1972, they were effective operationally and 
politically� More to the point of mines and mining in Navy strategies and opera-
tions is that in various fleet exercises during the past decade, senior flag officers 
have been increasingly concerned that they could not carry out operation plans 
because of a lack of modern mines and platforms� During international MCM 
exercises in the Persian Gulf in 2012 through 2014 stimulated by Iran’s “mine 
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rattling” threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, numerous U�S� and foreign navy 
surface and airborne MCM and EOD forces tested capabilities against threats, a 
process that helped identify both weaknesses and strengths� 
Yet during the Cold War and post–Cold War periods the MIW community 
has been subjected to a near-constant roller coaster of long periods of neglect 
alternating with short but intense “get well” efforts� Only since 2003 or so has 
this sinusoidal pattern been short-circuited, generating a “minirenaissance” in 
MIW—primarily MCM, but there is also a growing optimism for mines and 
mining� Unlike the history of the previous fifty years, there was no apparent mine 
embarrassment in the early 2000s that generated sufficient support to get MIW 
funding up to levels where it started to make a difference� When asked, during 
an interview with me, to explain this relatively robust support, Admiral Clark 
replied succinctly, “Because it’s the right thing to do�”
Captain Glenn R� Allen, then the CNO’s MIW resource sponsor (N952), of-
fered this insight during an April 2014 conversation: “The program of record re-
quirements when written were visionary, but the technology has yet to advance to 
the required level to achieve them even twenty years later, largely due to funding 
uncertainties� Unfortunately, the acquisition process and limited budget do not 
allow the MIW programs to seize on those technologies that almost meet the re-
quirements and get them in the fleet along the way to full operational capability�” 
While that might be the case for MCM, the Navy’s mining programs have also 
severely atrophied� In 1993, during the first of several post–Cold War reorgani-
zations, the Navy established the office of the Director, Expeditionary Warfare 
(N85/N75/N95), headed by a Marine Corps major general with a Navy one-star 
deputy� The intent was to focus expeditionary warfare resource sponsor attention 
on several crucial “� � � from the sea” warfare areas� The reality has been “director 
churn,” with average tenures less than twenty-three months (separated at times 
by gaps), too short to have impacts that survive the next rounds of cuts once new 
people are on board� To be fair, this seems to be business as usual throughout 
Navy headquarters� But given a succession of non-MIW-experienced command-
ers and deputies at the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command 
(NMAWC) in San Diego, California, the demise of the Navy one-star deputy bil-
let, and a chronically small share of budget, it may be difficult to establish mine-
warfare focus, traction, and consistency, let alone sustain them� 
POSSIBLE FRUSTRATIONS
This situation cries out for a high-level champion who is willing to drive research 
and development, acquisition, the development of employment concepts, incor-
poration into operational plans, and fleet training and exercises� Several impedi-
ments conspire to frustrate this process�9
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First, champions cannot be lone voices in the wilderness� Rather, they must be 
catalysts who mobilize the believing masses who are looking for a leader� In other 
words, there must be bodies of believers out there who agree with the champions 
and are ready to follow and take positive action�
There does not appear to be any process or forum that exposes the vast body of 
naval officers today to the high-end challenges of mine war fighting, to produce 
either the body of true believers or the champion� There is no requirement that 
naval officers know much if anything about mine warfare� At the Naval Academy 
and in the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, the handbook introducing 
midshipmen to the Navy’s warfare communities has only a page on mine war-
fare; an informal and unscientific survey of Naval Academy midshipmen (classes 
2008–14) could not identify a summer cruise anyone had taken on an MCM ves-
sel� At the Naval War College, mine warfare is covered in a single class session at 
the junior level, but there is not even that at the senior level� (That said, in recent 
years considerable attention has been given to mine warfare by the Halsey groups, 
at a classified level, perhaps responding to Admiral Greenert’s interest in mines as 
well as MCM�) Thus, the bulk of the Navy’s officer corps not only is not exposed 
to the demands of mining and countermining but is given the clear message that 
in preparation for war, knowledge of mining is not important�
There is a single exception to the lack of mine-warfare Joint Professional 
Military Education� As an element of its response to the DESERT STORM MCM 
debacle, the Navy in 1996 stood up the Chair of Expeditionary and Mine War-
fare and an assistant directorship of the Undersea Warfare Research Center at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), in Monterey, California� The goal was to 
enhance the academic and research content and establish the NPS as a major 
center of excellence for mine and undersea warfare research, analysis, and edu-
cation� There have been some successes in these areas� During the past eighteen 
years about a thousand young officers have attended a quarter-long course on 
Navy MIW history, completed MIW projects, submitted theses, attended related 
symposia, and visited laboratories and uniformed and civilian leaders� While not 
all have subsequently gone on to MIW assignments, their solid understanding 
of the subject stands in stark contrast to the usual approach to MIW education�
SAPOLSKI’S LESSONS TO BE (RE)LEARNED
Although U�S� Navy MIW does not benefit from being either large, or, sadly, ad-
equately funded, there is a short list of Polaris and Aegis lessons learned for MIW� 
Mine countermeasures are among them, to be sure, but also greater interest in 
mines and offensive mining� 
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• Articulate clearly the Navy’s mining and MCM visions and establish a set of 
well-defined requirements, goals, and programs that stay constant for more 
than a couple of budget cycles�
• Take advantage of defense strategic reviews and the resurrection and re-
freshment of the triservice cooperative maritime strategy (and the “strategy 
after next,” after Admiral Greenert leaves office) to shape and sustain a joint 
environment that appropriately incorporates MIW contributions to joint 
operations� As Admiral Greenert has acknowledged, “It’s all about assured 
access�” Assured access is a joint concern� In that regard, the Navy’s offensive 
A2/AD mines and mining should be embraced to make adversaries think 
twice about transiting areas that might have been mined�
• Take every opportunity to promote and protect the programs of record� Work 
to eliminate competitors; outmaneuver reviewing agencies; and educate, in-
form, or co-opt influential officials, admirals, congressmen, defense industry, 
the media, and academicians� 
We must reorganize MIW so it can do all these things and more� Someone, or 
some organization, must be responsible for providing trained and ready MCM 
forces and advanced mines to the combatant commanders� However, as Rear Ad-
miral Ryan recognized, the MIW enterprise is fragmented� Perhaps this respon-
sibility should be a function of the U�S� Fleet Forces Command� Unfortunately, 
there is no MIW “czar�” For now, responsibilities are split among NMAWC, the 
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (for EOD, in Little Creek, Virginia), 
N95 (and other CNO warfare/platforms resource sponsors) in the Pentagon, and 
numerous program offices in the Office of Naval Research and in Navy systems 
commands, laboratories, and on the staffs of warfare commanders� 
In the early winter of 2014, rumor had it that the Navy was poised to disestab-
lish NMAWC and dole out MIW and ASW responsibilities to the type command-
ers (i�e�, for surface, subsurface, and aviation), perhaps further diluting the focus 
on MIW� Others have suggested that MIW’s mines/mining and MCM areas be 
split asunder, with MCM remaining within the N95 Expeditionary Warfare arena 
and mines/mining responsibility subsumed within the N97 Undersea Warfare 
community� Such a “divide and counter” plan is just the opposite of what needs 
to be done and can result only in the further decline of U�S� Navy MIW� 
The MIW community must develop its own senior leadership� As things 
stand in 2015, in all but a few exceptional cases, leaders with no or very little 
background in mines/mining and MCM requirements, capabilities, or operations 
are making decisions that will affect the program’s future� Even if they are strong 
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leaders with excellent skills in the bureaucratic process, they might not have the 
background needed to make the right decisions for mine warfare� 
Finally, we must find and nurture long-term MIW champions who are skilled 
in bureaucratic politics and who possess the managerial strengths to manage 
technological and operational complexity� After all, mines and MCM systems are 
sophisticated and complex weapons that wait—too often in vain�
N O T E S
 1� Mike Hixenbaugh, “Silent Threat: Are Sea 
Mines the Navy’s Achilles Heel?,” PilotOnline 
.com, hamptonroads�com/� 
 2� Harvey Sapolski, The Polaris System Develop-
ment: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success 
in Government (Cambridge, Mass�: Harvard 
Univ� Press, 1972), p� 15�
 3� Ibid�, pp� 41–60�
 4� U�S� Navy Dept�, U.S. Navy Mine Warfare 
Plan: Meeting the Challenges of an Uncer-
tain World (Washington, D�C�: Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface 
Warfare, OP-03, Mine Warfare / EOD Branch, 
OP-363, January 1992), p� ii� See also U�S� 
Navy Dept�, 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine 
Warfare: Ensuring Global Access and Com-
merce (Washington, D�C�: Program Executive 
Office for Littoral and Mine Warfare, and 
Expeditionary Warfare Directorate N85, April 
2009), pp� 4–7�
 5� Scott D� Burleson, David E� Everheart, Ronald 
E� Swart, and Scott C� Truver, “The Advanced 
Undersea Weapon System: On the Cusp 
of a Naval Warfare Transformation,” Naval 
Engineers Journal (March 2012), pp� 59–60; 
Joshua J� Edwards and Dennis M� Gallagher, 
“Mine and Undersea Warfare for the Future,” 
U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings (August 
2014), pp� 72–73� 
 6� That said, any ship could be a minelayer, 
often more than once� During the late sum-
mer of 1984, Libya used the commercial ferry 
Ghat to deploy at least nineteen weapons—
Soviet / East German “export” mines of a type 
never seen before in the West—in the Red Sea 
and Gulf of Suez� Reports indicate that the 
North Korean navy would deploy some of its 
fifty thousand mines from thousands of fish-
ing boats and junks�
 7� U�S� Navy Dept�, 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine 
Warfare; Edwards and Gallagher, “Mine and 
Undersea Warfare for the Future.” 
 8� Burleson, Everheart, Swart, and Truver, “Ad-
vanced Undersea Weapon System�”
 9� These impediments were suggested by peer 
reviewers of the Naval War College Review, 
who remain anonymous� Elsewhere, I have 
identified similar concerns�
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REVIEW ESSAYS
the american constitutional order
Stephen F. Knott
Griffin, Stephen M� Long Wars and the Constitution� Cam-
bridge, Mass�: Harvard Univ� Press, 2013� 362pp� $39�95
Stephen M� Griffin, who joined the Tulane law faculty in 1989, specializes in 
constitutional theory and history� He contends that the propensity of American 
presidents to engage in war without proper authorization from Congress has 
“destabilized” the American constitutional system and “deranged policy making�” 
He rightly acknowledges that the struggle to define the limits of executive power 
dates back to the American founding but insists that something unique occurred 
in the aftermath of the Second World War� 
Griffin makes a plausible case that the nation’s thirty-third president, Harry 
S� Truman, founded a new “constitutional order” when he chose to intervene in 
the Korean War without congressional authorization and rejected any serious 
effort at “interbranch deliberation�” This was the 
moment at which the American political system 
began to decline, and with it sound policy making 
regarding the use of force� The American constitu-
tional order “underwent a major transformation,” 
replaced by a flawed “jerry-built structure” that 
led to frequent “policy disasters and constitutional 
crises�” Congress abrogated its responsibilities 
regarding the most important decision any gov-
ernment can make—the decision to go to war� The 
legislative branch became, according to Griffin, a 
“junior partner whose consent was not required to 
take the nation to war�” 
Dr. Stephen Knott is currently a professor of national 
security affairs at the Naval War College. He was 
formerly co-chair of the Presidential Oral History 
Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the 
University of Virginia. His books include The Rea-
gan Years; Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence 
of Myth; Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations 
and the American Presidency; At Reagan’s Side: In-
siders’ Recollections from Sacramento to the White 
House; and Rush to Judgment: George W� Bush, the 
War on Terror, and His Critics� His forthcoming 
book Washington & Hamilton: The Alliance That 
Forged America, coauthored with Tony Williams, 
will be published by Sourcebooks in August 2015.
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REVIEW ESSAYS
Scholars who examine war powers tend to fall into one of two camps, either 
the “presidentialist” or the “congressionalist” camp, as the author puts it� One 
strength of Griffin’s book is that he does not fit neatly into either category, nor 
does he call for an increased role for the judiciary in the war-powers arena, un-
like many of his fellow law professors� Additionally, Griffin impartially presents 
the arguments of scholars and practitioners of national security affairs, a quality 
frequently absent in books dealing with war powers� (See, for instance, Rachel 
Maddow’s Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power [2012], or Andrew 
J� Bacevich’s The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War 
[2013]�) He also exercises a remarkable amount of restraint when offering rec-
ommendations for change, understanding as he does that reforms hatched in the 
academic lounge tend to disintegrate when they encounter reality�
Unfortunately, however, Griffin’s book falters at times in its questionable ac-
counts of American history, although he is to be commended for doing what 
many of his fellow law professors do not—taking history seriously� Nonetheless, it 
is important to note that American presidents have been ignoring or manipulat-
ing Congress since the early days of the Republic: for instance, James Madison’s 
covert wars in East and West Florida, or James K� Polk’s machinations prior to 
the war with Mexico� Griffin’s interpretation of the conflict over the scope of ex-
ecutive power between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson is marred by 
his claim that Hamilton’s position was “never implemented�” It was implemented 
by George Washington and arguably by Jefferson as well� The latter did not, as 
Griffin suggests, reject Hamilton’s broad interpretation of executive power during 
his war with the Barbary pirates; Jefferson in fact acted in a duplicitous manner 
toward Congress by providing it an incomplete account of his assertive executive 
actions� 
Griffin makes other doubtful historical claims as well� For instance, he sug-
gests that it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff who lobbied an apparently reluctant 
President John F� Kennedy to “finish off [Fidel] Castro�” The Kennedy brothers 
did not need any coaxing from the Joint Chiefs regarding Castro’s removal� Grif-
fin is also somewhat dismissive of Ronald Reagan’s role in ending the Cold War, 
a subject that is at least open to debate, and he recoils at Reagan’s “astonishing 
ignorance” of Cold War history and lack of interest in “matters of governance�” 
Reagan in fact drove American policy toward the Soviet Union in a direction re-
sisted by many of his closest advisers� Griffin claims that Dick Cheney was “more 
staffer than politician,” yet Cheney was a member of the House of Representatives 
for ten years, rising to the position of minority whip�
The author’s impartiality deserts him when he turns to the nation’s forty-third 
president, George W� Bush� While more measured than most, some of Griffin’s 
arguments echo those who suffer from “Bush Derangement Syndrome�” The 
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author accepts the notion that Bush and Vice President Cheney represented 
an existential threat to the constitutional order� He traces some of this back to 
Cheney’s membership on the Iran-Contra committee, where Cheney and other 
conservatives promulgated a doctrine of presidential power that was one of “the 
most extreme and dangerous in all of constitutional law�” Griffin criticizes Presi-
dent Bush’s instructions to his attorney general in the immediate aftermath of 
the 9/11 attack: “Don’t ever let this happen again�” The author considers this to 
be an “impossible and dangerous order,” yet it likely would have been given by 
any president, and it reflected the sentiment of members of Congress who ap-
proved Bush’s antiterror policies through legislative action and supported the use 
of torture and other controversial measures, sometimes even calling for harsher 
methods� That Congress failed to deliberate on these issues at greater length and 
with a depth of understanding possessed by Griffin has been the rule rather than 
the exception since 1789�
Griffin claims that the Central Intelligence Agency had “substantial doubts” 
about Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction� However, 
prior to the invasion of Iraq that agency’s director told President Bush that he had 
no doubts, that it was in fact a “slam dunk�” According to Griffin, the Bush ad-
ministration engaged in “a general failure to comply with the rule of law,” a failure 
that was accompanied by “multiple genuine threats to civil liberties�” In reality, in 
comparison to John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin 
Roosevelt, George W� Bush and Dick Cheney might as well have been charter 
members of the American Civil Liberties Union� Also, it is simply laughable to 
assert that an “executive clique” led by Bush and his Svengali-like vice president 
“disabled” the ability of the public and the press to discern “reality�” 
Nevertheless, Griffin makes a credible case that something is wrong with the 
American constitutional order and that Congress must abandon its inclination 
to see itself as a junior partner to the president� But with a membership obsessed 
with its reelection prospects instead of its constitutional responsibilities, the like-
lihood of this occurring seems quite remote� 
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is strategy an illusion?
Karl Walling
Betts, Richard K� American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Di-
lemmas of National Security. New York: Columbia Univ� Press, 
2012� 367pp� $20
Richard Betts is one of the most distinguished strategists in the United States to-
day� He is the Salzman Professor of War and Peace Studies and the director of the 
International Security Policy Program at Columbia University� Not only has he 
written five prizewinning scholarly books, but he has a wealth of practical experi-
ence in formulating and implementing U�S� national security policy and strategy� 
He has served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Com-
mittee), the National Security Council during the Carter administration in the 
1970s, and on the National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission) 
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001�
In American Force Betts synthesizes his scholarship and practical experience 
in a book that is in part a collection of articles he has written since the end of 
the Cold War and in part a kind of intellectual autobiography—a quasi memoir� 
He tells the story of his transformation from being a Cold War hawk along the 
lines of Senator “Scoop” Jackson into a post–Cold War dove, somewhere between 
now–Secretary of State John Kerry and Congressman Dennis Kucinich� Some 
might find this transformation inconsistent, but Betts is a political realist� The na-
ture of the threat during the Cold War required national self-assertion� The end 
of the Cold War made such assertion less necessary, but, Betts laments, American 
political leaders rushed too hastily to fill a power vacuum, and this effort to glob-
alize the American system was bound to produce a backlash� 
For Betts, U�S� political leaders made two different kinds of strategic mistakes 
in the aftermath of the Cold War, one resulting 
from fecklessness, the other from recklessness� 
The Clintonites were feckless� As crises developed 
around the world and public pressure mounted to 
“do something,” they became willing to intervene 
in Somalia and the Balkans and elsewhere but not 
to do anything that might prove politically unpop-
ular, that might cost or risk much in public opinion 
polls� The result was halfhearted compromises—
enough presence to put Americans in uniform in 
Professor Walling served as an interrogator in the 
U.S. Army from 1976 to 1980. After earning his BA 
in liberal arts from St. John’s College in Annapolis, 
Maryland, in 1984, he completed a joint PhD with 
the Department of Political Science and Commit-
tee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago 
in 1992. Since 2000, following teaching and research 
appointments with Harvard University, Carleton 
College, and the Liberty Fund, he has served at the 
Naval War College.
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harm’s way but not enough force for them to achieve anything decisive� Quoting 
Clausewitz, Betts observes that “a short jump is certainly easier than a long one, but 
no one wanting to get across a wide ditch would begin by jumping half-way�” Self- 
defeating as such faintheartedness might be, Betts is much more incensed by the 
recklessness he associates with the second Bush administration� Following Sam-
uel Huntington and Walter Russell Mead, he worries about self-inflicted clashes 
of civilizations arising from ambitions to remake the world order in the Ameri-
can image� This cure may often be worse than the disease, as it spreads disorder, 
chaos, terror, murder, and even genocide throughout regions, the Middle East 
especially� Hence, one of Betts’s best chapters consists of advice against preventive 
wars, which rarely turn out well and usually compromise the legitimacy of the 
instigator of the war� For Betts, preventive wars are almost always opportunities 
well lost� 
The reason lies in the most provocative and deeply theoretical chapter in the 
book, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” If it is, many who teach at war colleges may need 
to find a new line of work, so the question deserves careful attention� The chap-
ter was first published as an article in International Security in 2000; Betts has 
updated it to apply to the present� For Betts, strategy is meant to be the bridge 
between policy and operations� In principle, national interest, grand strategy, 
policy, strategy, operations, and even tactics are linked in a rational way, with 
lower means serving ever higher ends� But is such a chain of cause and effect re-
ally possible when political leaders choose to use force as an instrument of policy? 
Betts produces ten critiques of the very possibility of this sort of instrumental 
rationality� These range from the difficulty in all wars of predicting what the 
political result of using force might be to the possibility that nonrational psy-
chological and cultural mind-sets may blind leaders to what actually motivates 
them� These include cognitive constraints on the ability of anyone in war to 
comprehend all its variables, especially when “nonlinear” dimensions need to be 
factored into the strategic calculus; “goal displacement,” in which standard op-
erating procedures of complex organizations become ends in themselves rather 
than entirely changeable means of achieving strategic objectives; interaction with 
the enemy; and “friction�” In the United States especially, they include democratic 
pluralism, which makes it difficult to set a coherent policy or to tailor strategy to 
it, and the need for compromise, which makes it highly likely that more than a 
few political leaders will jump only halfway across Clausewitz’s ditch, thus failing 
to achieve their objectives�
Betts attempts to “salvage strategy” by refuting each of these critiques, showing 
they are at best partial and do not prove that strategy is impossible, but their cu-
mulative weight makes him well aware that if anything can go wrong in strategy, it 
often will, which makes him skeptical of those whose fecklessness or recklessness 
Book 1.indb   132 2/4/15   10:24 AM
137
Naval War College: Spring 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 R E V I E W  E S S AYS  1 3 3
leads them too eagerly to follow Shakespeare’s Mark Antony in “cry[ing] ‘Havoc!,’ 
and let[ting] slip the dogs of war.” As much as anything, this explains why Betts 
became a post–Cold War dove. You never know for sure where the dogs of war 
will go. Hence, it would be folly to fight preventive wars. Betts is not a pacifist, 
but he insists on restraint, which is not the same as isolation. There is so much 
uncertainty that wars need to be avoided unless the stakes are extraordinarily 
high and there is good evidence that a reasonable chance exists of return on the 
investment of lives, treasure, prestige, and legitimacy. Strategy is not an illusion, 
but we should avoid the delusion that it can ever be easy. When force is to be 
used, however, Betts is a hawk. Concentrate force for decisive victory, preferably 
a quick one, which is often the most humanitarian way to fight as well. Also, be-
cause of the cumulative weight of the critiques of the very possibility of strategy, 
Betts insists on simplicity in planning. The fewer the parts in any plan, the less 
chance there will be for friction among them. Above all, Betts wants his readers to 
be mindful of stakes. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are threats, but 
not of the same kind as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. The greatest threat in 
the twenty-first century is likely to be of the same kind as in the twentieth century 
—namely, great-power war—so prioritizing against potential peer competitors is 
the essence of strategic prudence today.
In strategy, it seems, everything old is new again. Perhaps unintentionally, 
Betts winds up sounding a great deal like Colin Powell. He has almost reinvented 
the Powell Doctrine, blending caution against resorting to war with overwhelm-
ing force when war is chosen as an instrument of policy. At times he sounds like 
a cheerleader for the Obama administration: “Don’t do stupid stuff.” But even 
that administration has found it difficult to follow the all-or-nothing approach 
of the Betts (aka Powell) Doctrine. Middle-range threats may require something 
between all and nothing, like drone strikes and special operations, for example. 
Middle-range threats—dare one say it?—may require more “flexible responses” 
than Betts seems willing to endorse, though always with some risk that they 
will be mere half-measures. That said, this book is a marvelous blend of theory, 
historical cases, and social-science insight, the sort most war college professors 
could only dream of writing. It merits careful study by all who labor to ensure 
that strategy is not an illusion.
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THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY TO CURRENT MILITARY CHALLENGES
Tangredi, Sam J� Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies. Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute 
Press, 2013� 320pp� $47�95
Longtime and well-known analyst of 
maritime affairs Dr� Sam Tangredi, a 
retired U�S� Navy captain, has written 
a timely, informative, and useful book� 
First, he provides historical context to 
contemporary antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD) strategies� By reinterpreting 
well-known historical episodes (the 
efforts of Greek city-states to resist 
Persia in the fifth century bc) from 
an antiaccess perspective, he confirms 
once again what historians and strate-
gists have long known—the relevance of 
history to current military challenges� 
Second, Tangredi details the recent his-
tory of thinking about antiaccess strate-
gies and ways to defeat them� He cleverly 
describes a narrative in which the wars 
with Iraq, technological developments 
dating to the 1970s, and strategic think-
ing inside the U�S� Navy and Air Force, 
the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assess-
ment, and private think tanks like the 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments all combined to shape the 
approaches of the United States (such as 
Air-Sea Battle) to a host of challenges to 
American power-projection capabilities� 
Tangredi also explores the complexity of 
the interaction of antiaccess strategies 
with counter-antiaccess strategies, in six 
case studies� Three represent successful 
instances of a weaker defending force 
denying access to a larger force, and 
three examples are given where entrance 
into a critical region was achieved� To 
add even further depth to his analysis, 
Tangredi examines contemporary or 
potential future scenarios in which the 
United States, with or without allied 
support, might be denied access in 
East Asia, South Asia, Northeast Asia, 
and Central Asia� While insiders and 
experts might quibble with the details 
of Tangredi’s specific judgments, all will 
find insights into the general problem 
of countering antiaccess strategies and 
the specific challenges posed by known 
foes and geographical conditions� 
If I had to take issue with this book, it 
would be to ask for even more, especially 
at the level of strategy or, perhaps bet-
ter, grand strategy� Tangredi presumes, 
like many naval officers, scholars, and 
analysts contributing to current debates 
Book 1.indb   135 2/4/15   10:24 AM
140
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 1 3 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
over sea power, that access and its 
handmaiden forward presence are the 
essentials of American defense strategy. 
The logic underlying this assumption 
is seductive in its simplicity: the United 
States needs access to allow it to use 
force at times and places of its choosing 
in the service of its national interests. 
Yet rarely does Tangredi ask whether 
the assumed national interests are worth 
the enormous financial, technological 
(in terms of opportunities forgone), 
and even human cost of countering 
A2/AD strategies, given the challenges 
of geography, the growing capabili-
ties of potential adversaries, and the 
evolving nature of modern warfare. 
After all, what specific national objec-
tives are at stake in, for example, the 
Taiwan Strait scenario that could not 
be achieved by other means? Moreover, 
the author gives insufficient attention 
to the downside of forward presence 
and, especially, to the potential negative 
consequences of executing counter- 
A2/AD strategies. Some downsides can, 
of course, be intuited from the histori-
cal case studies included in chapters 3 
and 4. However, to stress this weakness, 
serious as it is for the state of maritime 
and naval strategy in general, would 
be unfair to Sam Tangredi, because it 
would ask him to write a book that he 
chose not to write. He chose to explain 
and analyze antiaccess warfare in both 
contemporary and historical contexts, 
and he has done an excellent job of it. 
I highly recommend that the readers 
of this journal find room for Anti-
Access Warfare on their bookshelves.
PETER DOMBROWSKI
Naval War College
Mulqueen, Michael, Deborah Sanders, and Ian 
Speller, eds. Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for 
Small Navies in War and Peace. Burlington, Vt.: 
Ashgate, 2014. 247pp. $39.95
Small Navies is a selection of essays 
presented at the Small Navies Confer-
ence held in October 2012 at the Na-
tional University of Ireland, Maynooth, 
cosponsored by the Corbett Centre for 
Maritime Policy Studies, King’s Col-
lege London, and the Centre for Ap-
plied Research in Security Innovation, 
Liverpool Hope University. The first 
three essays examine existing classifica-
tions of what constitutes a small navy. 
Chapters 4 and 5 reflect on the condi-
tions that inspire innovation within 
small navies. The remaining eight essays 
analyze the small navies of several states 
and discuss their characteristics and 
employment, the relationships between 
strategy and naval force structure, and 
the particular challenges they face. 
The first theme in the collection is 
the question of what constitutes a 
small navy. Several definitions are 
proposed; the traditional quantitative 
methods of comparing and measur-
ing navies are discussed, as well as 
movements beyond such histori-
cal measurements of naval power as 
tonnage, hulls, and capital ships. 
Eric Grove, Geoffrey Till, and Basil 
Germond review navy hierarchical clas-
sification criteria proposed by analysts 
during the past three decades. They con-
sider naval warfare principles and com-
mon naval functions and missions. Till’s 
essay evaluates the differences and simi-
larities between large and small navies, 
arguing that “small navies are simply 
big navies in miniature.” He considers 
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functions common to all navies, the im-
pact of cooperation among navies of all 
sizes, and the common pressure placed 
on navies to align resources with opera-
tions and mission execution� Germond’s 
essay compares classification criteria and 
argues that twenty-first-century navies 
should be classified by their “order of 
effect” vice their “order of battle�” 
This book as a whole does not propose 
its own definition generally accepted 
by the authors� It is instead a thought-
ful examination of the conditions 
in the twenty-first-century security 
environment that challenge preexisting 
classifications while broadly observ-
ing that the size of a navy is an in-
sufficient basis of classification� 
Building a small navy is a national 
choice� Essays in this work examine 
the conditions of the strategic envi-
ronment that cause states to build 
them, finding that because of the 
effects of globalization, technology, 
and economics, navies are valuable 
to states for a variety of reasons� 
Several essays discuss the necessity 
for small navies to provide perceived 
or actual returns on national invest-
ment in naval force structure� Absent a 
nationally valued return, small navies 
face an existential threat, which may 
explain the observation that many 
small navies have made the practi-
cal decision to build constabulary and 
coastal-defense forces� Such navies focus 
on maritime missions that promote 
national-security and economic inter-
ests through operations in territorial 
seas and exclusive economic zones� 
Small Navies is a thoughtful collection 
of concepts and ideas now present in 
naval force planning� This book assesses 
the range of strategic and domestic 
influences facing states and navies 
engaged in maritime force-structure 
decision making� Today, naval ship-
building costs are on the rise, potential 
adversaries have access to technology 
that complicates the threat to maritime 
forces, and states struggle to dedicate 
more than a few percentage points of 
gross domestic product to defense� 
These trends portend that a grow-
ing number of states will possess the 
capacity to build only small navies� 
SEAN SULLIVAN
Naval War College
Moten, Matthew� Presidents & Their Generals: 
An American History of Command in War. Cam-
bridge, Mass�: Harvard Univ� Press, 2014� 443pp� 
$39�95
The author delivers a chronological 
review of how the relationship between 
the president and senior Army leaders 
has evolved over the life of the Republic� 
The book is part history, tracing the 
evolution of U�S� civil-military relations 
from an uncertain beginning to a level 
of increasing professionalism, to the 
current state, which the author finds 
excessively partisan� It also belongs on 
any shelf devoted to government policy, 
since it presents a convincing argu-
ment that Samuel Huntington’s concept 
of operational control is as artificial 
a construct as the frictionless plane 
described in most physics textbooks� 
Moten is not the first author to suggest 
this� For example, Mackubin Owens, of 
the Naval War College, has long held 
that the U�S� political-military relation-
ship is more akin to a contract that has 
been periodically renegotiated� How-
ever, Moten takes this a step farther by 
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arguing that the civil-military contract is 
under constant negotiation and that the 
reality of governance makes it inevitable 
that senior generals and political lead-
ers will be (and should be) involved in 
each other’s spheres of endeavor� This 
partnership is often an uneasy one and 
is always marked by tension, but when it 
works the country profits immeasurably� 
Moten argues convincingly that this 
key relationship works best when both 
partners are competent practitioners 
of their respective arts, when each 
respects the other’s roles and abilities, 
and when each is willing to engage in 
frank, even adversarial discourse to gain 
the best possible understanding and 
strategy� He argues there are times when 
military leaders should offer advice that 
requires political understanding and 
times when a president should inter-
vene in military affairs� The relationship 
is not an equal partnership; the civil 
partner must take precedence over the 
military� The pairings of U� S� Grant 
and Abraham Lincoln and of George C� 
Marshall and Franklin D� Roosevelt are 
regarded as the best the nation has seen� 
Although civil-military relations also 
evolve during times of peace, Moten 
confines his examination to wartime 
leaders, arguing that it is during conflict 
that these relationships can do the most 
good or harm to the nation and put the 
maximum strain on the participants� 
He also all but exclusively confines 
his work to the relationships between 
presidents and generals� Presidents & 
Their Generals does not suffer as a result� 
Moten is on his most solid ground when 
he discusses historical relations up to the 
end of the Cold War� His observations 
are logical, his analysis solid, and his 
tone temperate� Much of this work may 
be unfamiliar and therefore even more 
welcome to readers whose knowledge 
of civil-military relations only connects 
the dots represented by the presidencies 
and wars of George Washington, Abe 
Lincoln, FDR, and Lyndon B� Johnson� 
Presidents & Their Generals also does 
justice to some of the warmer mo-
ments of the Cold War, such as the 
Bay of Pigs and the long involvement 
in Vietnam� As with Moten’s discus-
sion of earlier conflicts, there is no 
lack of willingness to find fault and 
identify weaknesses� For example, his 
dispassionate accounting and analysis 
of Secretary of Defense Robert Mc-
Namara strikes just the right note� 
Unfortunately that note sounds increas-
ingly sour as Moten turns his atten-
tion to post–Cold War civil-military 
relations� His criticisms come across as 
increasingly personal, and his assertions 
appear not to be well supported� The 
choice of adjectives and other descrip-
tions becomes increasingly pejorative� 
This tendency reaches a crescendo when 
Moten describes Operations ENDURING  
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, which 
he clearly views as among the nation’s 
worst failures of the civil-military part-
nership� He is scathing in his descrip-
tions of General Tommy Franks, Vice 
President Richard Cheney, Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and 
others� This is not to say that he does 
not present a case, but he should, as 
much as possible, maintain objectiv-
ity and limit inflammatory writing� 
The book concludes, rather hurriedly, 
with a series of recommendations to 
strengthen the strategic partnership� 
If anything, this chapter is much too 
short� However, taken in its entirety, 
Presidents & Their Generals is a worthy 
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addition to the genre and deserves 
serious consideration not only by 
scholars but also by general readers� 
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Lemnitzer, Jan Martin� Power, Law, and the End 
of Privateering. Basingstoke, U�K�: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2014� 254pp� $95
Jan Martin Lemnitzer has made a very 
important contribution to interna-
tional history in this study of the 1856 
Declaration of Paris and its immediate 
aftermath� Having begun his research as 
a graduate student at the University of 
Heidelberg, Lemnitzer completed it as a 
PhD thesis in the Department of Inter-
national History at the London School 
of Economics in 2010� With a highly 
structured approach and a persuasively 
presented argument, Lemnitzer has 
made excellent use of primary-source 
materials from Austria, Britain, France, 
Germany, and the United States� He has 
brought to light much new and detailed 
material, which he complements with 
broad-gauged and valuable insight� 
Most importantly, Lemnitzer places 
his story in the context of the com-
plex balance required to create and 
maintain international law in matters 
of warfare� On the one hand, this is a 
balance between law and power; on 
the other, between great powers and 
smaller states� Lemnitzer demonstrates 
that the 1856 Declaration of Paris was 
the event that clearly established the 
manner in which modern international 
law is created� Likening it to a global 
opinion poll among national govern-
ments, he shows how the congress of 
nations at Paris after the Crimean War 
created instantaneous international 
law through what has since become 
common under the modern rubric of 
“multilateral law-making treaties�”
Historians are often puzzled about 
why the United States never signed the 
declaration, and they have asserted a 
variety of explanations� Through his 
careful research, Lemnitzer unveils the 
fascinating story of how Britain and 
the world’s leading powers focused the 
declaration’s ban on privateering directly 
on American policy� For most countries 
at that time, privateering was a largely 
forgotten weapon� But Britain and the 
United States had the largest merchant 
shipping fleets in the world, and there 
was a danger of war between the two� 
Since America had a small and weak 
navy, its merchant ships, which could 
easily be converted to privateers, were 
collectively its main strategic weapon� 
Since they could effectively attack Brit-
ain’s network of global trade, statesmen 
in London had a major strategic interest 
in eliminating that threat, which could 
crush British control over global trade�
Lemnitzer follows the development 
from the experience of the Crimean War 
and shows how that first major conflict 
involving steam-powered warships 
raised a range of questions about the 
future course of warfare at sea� The idea 
that privateering should be banned first 
arose in 1853� While for some it was an 
advance, the banning by the civilized 
world of an ancient barbaric practice, 
for others it was a clear-eyed way to 
prevent smaller nations from causing 
major damage� Lemnitzer shows that the 
declaration was a deliberate attempt to 
isolate the United States diplomatically 
and force it to accept the abolition of pri-
vateering to suit British strategic ends� 
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America actively attempted to thwart 
these developments, creating a major 
diplomatic campaign for the perma-
nent establishment of neutral trading 
rights in wartime without restriction 
on privateering� Secretary of State 
William Marcy proposed, in what was 
soon dubbed the “Marcy amendment,” 
that the United States would accept the 
abolition of privateering only if it was 
linked to the complete immunity of 
merchant shipping in wartime, regard-
less of flag� Through the initiative of the 
business community in the city-state of 
Bremen, this diplomatic initiative nearly 
isolated Britain� During the American 
Civil War, as the Confederacy issued 
letters of marque, the United States 
offered to join the declaration, only 
to withdraw its offer when it became 
apparent that France and Britain would 
not attack Southern privateers�
The participants in the Austro-Prussian 
War of 1866 nearly created a precedent 
in practice for Marcy’s suggestion� The 
subsequent Franco-Prussian War in 
1870–71 involved a global French war 
on German trade that even led French 
warships into American waters in search 
of their prey� Germans saw the French 
blockade as illegal in terms of the decla-
ration� At first Prussia invoked Marcy’s 
principle, but when Otto von Bismarck 
saw what he termed French violations of 
the declaration he responded in a way 
based on his belief that the violation of 
international law justified unrestricted 
attacks on French trade� Convinced that 
when a neutral state is wronged it has the 
unqualified right of reprisal, Bismarck 
established a singular interpretation of 
international law, which it would use 
again in its policy of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare of the First World War�
In conclusion, Lemnitzer comments rue-
fully that “it is the enforcement dilemma 
that constantly reminds us that for all 
our progress, our present international 
community centered on the [United Na-
tions] is a thin veneer, masking the fact 
that the basic fabric that holds our rap-
idly globalizing world together is a cloth 
made in the late nineteenth century�” 
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
Naval War College
Rickards, James� The Death of Money: The Com-
ing Collapse of the International Monetary System. 
New York: Penguin, 2014� 356pp� $28�95
Admiral Michael Mullen, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
stated in a 21 January 2014 speech that 
the national debt is the biggest threat 
to national security� James Rickards 
underscores that view in this sequel to 
his earlier Currency Wars: The Mak-
ing of the Next Global Crisis (reprinted 
2012)� Rickards, a consultant to both the 
Defense Department and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, addresses a range 
of other national-security issues in 
the financial realm� Among them are 
currency inflation and deflation, cyber 
attacks, and financial manipulations by 
terrorist groups and other adversaries�
Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL; also called ISIS) have become 
adept at “insider” trading and other 
schemes to enrich themselves at the 
expense of Western nations� As the 
author notes, such activity was present 
well before 9/11, but lacking exper-
tise in financial operations, the CIA 
failed to spot it as an indication of a 
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possible attack� Fortunately, the au-
thor argues, this deficiency has been 
partly corrected with the acquisition of 
expertise in “market intelligence,” the 
ability to analyze “big data” in stock 
exchange trading for unusual activity�
The author discusses at length Chi-
nese financial and cyber capabili-
ties and vulnerabilities� Cyber attack 
and financial/currency manipulation 
have become Chinese specialties, as 
manifested in recent attacks on the U�S� 
Postal Service� At the same time, the 
Chinese economy has become shaky as 
a result of poor investments, exempli-
fied by the construction of numerous 
huge buildings with no prospect of 
occupation and by capital flight� The 
latter results from the placement by 
financial elite of their capital gains in 
safe havens, mainly the United States� 
On the other side of the world, Ger-
many, under the leadership of Angela 
Merkel, has become the dominant player 
in the European Union, through its 
powerful position in the EU central 
bank� According to the author, however, 
the strengthened euro is threatened by 
the weakened U�S� dollar, through the 
export of inflation� Rickards discusses 
how the U�S� Federal Reserve’s “print-
ing” of money to support the national 
deficit has led to such export and the 
dangers it poses for the world economy� 
The weakening of the dollar, until 
now the world’s “reserve currency,” 
has led to demands that it be replaced 
by “special drawing rights” (SDRs) 
on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), a creation of the post–World 
War II Bretton Woods agreements�
Rickards discusses how uncertainties 
inherent in fiat currencies (the U�S� 
dollar, the Chinese yuan, the EU euro, 
IMF SDRs, etc�) have led to propos-
als for return to the pre-1914 gold 
standard� The possibility, even likeli-
hood, of the adoption of that currency 
standard has resulted in buildups of 
national gold reserves, especially by 
the Chinese� Rickards closes with an 
analysis of a maelstrom that may very 
well result if the present currency and 
financial threats are not resolved�
Like its predecessor, this work will be 
of interest to military officers be-
cause of its analyses and predictions 
of economic stress and the associ-
ated effects on national defense� 
CDR� ROBERT C� WHITTEN, U�S� NAVY RESERVE 
(RET�)
Cupertino, Calif.
Krepinevich, Andrew, and Barry Watts� The Last 
Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of 
Modern American Defense Strategy� New York: 
Basic Books, 2014� 336pp� $29�99
I remember the first time that I heard 
the name of Andrew Marshall� Here was 
a man, I was told, who in his early nine-
ties, a man of the “greatest generation,” 
was still working away in a small office 
in the Pentagon� He had worked for 
every president since Richard Nixon and 
every Secretary of Defense since James 
Schlesinger� I was both curious and 
awed� Who has the grit to last so long in 
our bureaucracy? I could only imagine 
the level of intellectual power it would 
take to remain trusted and valued not 
only for a few years but decades� With 
Marshall’s upcoming retirement in early 
2015, it is only fitting that someone write 
a biography of this great civil servant, 
an assessment of his forty-plus years of 
public service and of the impact of his 
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office—the Office of Net Assessment 
—on senior government decision 
makers� Enter Andrew Krepinevich 
and Barry Watts’s excellent biography�
Krepinevich and Watts are no strangers 
to Marshall� They were a part of what 
is fondly called “St� Andrew’s Prep,” 
the some ninety or so people who over 
the years have worked for Marshall� 
Many of them have gone on to have 
impacts elsewhere in government or 
in the private sector, identifying and 
discussing national-security issues 
with the same rigor and intellectual 
chops that their boss in the Office of 
Net Assessment brought to the job�
Krepinevich and Watts handle his story 
with objectivity, aiming to show his 
“intellectual contributions to US defense 
strategy�” Thus the story begins with 
a young Andrew Marshall, an autodi-
dact, reading widely and voraciously 
in Detroit� He goes on to the Univer-
sity of Chicago, earning a master’s in 
economics� He then considers earn-
ing a PhD in statistics but instead 
decides, in the 1950s, to work for the 
then-fledgling RAND Corporation� 
Marshall there meets some influen-
tial people who would change his life 
and would help propel him into the 
perch he has held from 1973 to today� 
It is a credit to the authors that they can 
craft a thorough biography about a man 
whose work is largely classified� In fact, 
only one of his assessments has ever 
been written at the unclassified level� But 
his intellectual fingerprint has been so 
prevalent that there is plenty to discuss� 
The authors go into great detail about 
how Marshall developed the idea of 
net assessment, arguing that he looked 
further out than others, identifying 
issues that might challenge American 
decision makers in the future� He was 
so prescient that the discussions many 
of us are having today about China’s rise 
were presaged by what Marshall and 
his office were thinking about as early 
as the late 1980s and into the 1990s� 
Marshall left it to his subordinates to 
best figure out for themselves what 
net assessments were; he balanced 
intellectual guidance with demand-
ing thoroughness� In a building where 
egos loom large and people posture 
for influence, Marshall remained out 
of the limelight, quietly but diligently 
working to identify the right questions, 
the ones that needed to be explored� 
Marshall’s exit will leave a hole� But 
this excellent biography and the 
men and women he mentored are 
testaments to his impact and a re-
minder that we have much to do to 
remain competitive in the future�
LT� CDR� CHRISTOPHER NELSON, U�S� NAVY
Naval War College
Linn, Brian McAllister� The U.S. Army and Coun-
terinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902. 
Chapel Hill: Univ� of North Carolina Press, 2000� 
258pp� $36�97 (paperback)
Brian McAllister Linn, professor of 
history and liberal arts at Texas A&M 
University, addresses here the war 
between the United States and the 
fledgling Philippine Republic, detailing 
the prolonged guerrilla struggle that 
followed� First published in 1989 and 
reprinted in 2000, Linn’s book presents 
the struggle between the U�S� Army and 
guerrillas on the island of Luzon as a 
series of regionalized conflicts� Eschew-
ing a conventional campaign history, 
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the author argues that circumstances of 
culture, ethnicity, religion, and terrain 
made the challenges in each region 
unique� The book demonstrates that the 
Army defeated the insurgency because 
commanders focused their efforts on 
the idiosyncrasies of each district, rather 
than following a campaign plan handed 
down from headquarters in Manila� 
While this flexible and decentralized 
approach may not have been intentional, 
Linn argues that it succeeded because 
it allowed commanders the latitude 
to implement measures responsive to 
each local situation� This regionalized 
view demonstrates the value of what 
modern practitioners refer to as “mis-
sion command,” and that is what makes 
this work relevant for readers today� 
The book is organized into six chapters 
—an introduction, four regional case 
studies, and a short conclusion� The 
first chapter is a sweeping synopsis of 
the conventional war in the Philippines 
and a brief but excellent introduc-
tion to the geography of the islands, 
the Spanish colonization of Luzon, 
and the nascent Filipino reformist 
and nationalist movements that led to 
open revolt against Spain in 1896� 
In the following chapters Linn describes 
counterinsurgency operations in four 
numbered districts� Using several 
examples in each of the districts, he 
skillfully supports his claim that the 
insurgency varied widely from one 
area to the next� For instance, in the 
Fourth District, the Department of 
Northern Luzon, the Army exploited 
cultural rifts in the provinces by play-
ing antirevolutionary elements of the 
population against the guerrillas, who 
themselves eroded what local support 
they enjoyed by heavy-handed terrorism 
against the populace� In contrast 
to guerrilla campaigns in the other 
districts, the insurgents in the Fourth 
District suffered from poor leadership 
and slipshod organization� The Army 
rapidly gained the support of the local 
elite, and pacification soon followed� 
Linn describes the counterinsurgency in 
the remaining districts� Wildly different 
circumstances prevailed in each� In his 
description of the Army’s responses Linn 
supports the validity of his claim that the 
U�S� Army eventually pacified the archi-
pelago by making campaign decisions at 
the right level and on the basis of local 
circumstances, rather than by forcing 
a centralized, top-down approach�
Linn makes a well-organized argument 
in support of his regionalized thesis, but 
his effort is not without some shortcom-
ings� First, his case studies apply only to 
the island of Luzon� Details of American 
efforts elsewhere in the archipelago 
would have broadened understanding 
of the war� Second, Linn only makes 
cursory mention of the logistical chal-
lenges presented by the terrain and 
the disjointedness of the theaters of 
operation� A brief but comprehensive 
look at the logistics in each of the case 
studies would have been appropriate, 
especially a discussion of how logisti-
cal problems affected areas differently� 
Finally, the text includes several pho-
tographs, but the six maps are lacking 
in topographic detail that would have 
visually reinforced the remoteness and 
disparate nature of the four districts� 
In each district, the Army prevailed be-
cause commanders implemented plans 
that suited the unique circumstances 
of the insurgency in their respective 
districts or provinces� This decentral-
ized approach avoided strict adherence 
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to doctrine that did not suit situations 
on the ground and saw the employment 
of effective, sophisticated, counterinsur-
gency measures that reflected the local 
state of affairs. Although not achieved 
without controversy, the victory in the 
Philippines represents the most suc-
cessful counterinsurgency campaign in 
U.S. military history. Though it details 
a war fought over a century ago, the 
book holds valuable lessons for today. It 
provides not only a historical framework 
for understanding counterinsurgency 
but also a glimpse into the complexities 
that have confronted the U.S. military 
over the last thirteen years and points to 
the wisdom of a decentralized com-
mand structure for such cases. Linn 
leaves the reader with a reminder that 
even when the strategic objective is 
President William McKinley’s “benevo-
lent assimilation,” or the winning of 
George Orwell’s “hearts and minds,” 
nonmilitary efforts toward achieving it 
will not work without victory over the 
insurgents responsible for the instability. 
LT. CDR. MATTHEW NOLAND, U.S. NAVY
Naval War College
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IN MY VIEW
PRESTIGE AND PARTICIPATION
Sir:
To the section “The Pacific War,” pages 24–25, in Peter J. Dean’s Autumn 2014 ar-
ticle in this journal, “Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian De-
fense Policy,” could be added discussion of the 1945 Australian operation against 
previously bypassed Japanese-held areas and Australian operations against Dutch 
Borneo. These operations were conceived, developed, and implemented because 
of Australian domestic political and economic factors, the ambition of Australian 
general Thomas Blamey and others who would execute these operations, and 
long-range postwar political and diplomatic objectives. These operations were 
opposed by General Douglas MacArthur.
The Australian people wanted their troops used in combat in 1945 or demobi-
lized for civilian work. Anticipating these operations, Australian prime minister 
John Curtin informed British prime minister Winston Churchill on 8 October 
1943 (quoting hereafter from my article in the January 1985 Military Affairs), 
“‘The Government [of Australia] considers it to be a matter of vital importance . . . 
that her military effort should be concentrated as much as possible in the Pacific 
and that it should be on a scale to guarantee her an effective voice in the peace 
settlement.’ In June 1945, answering criticism of the use of Australian forces to 
liquidate previously bypassed Japanese-held areas, Prime Minister [Ben] Chifley 
explained, ‘From the aspect of prestige and participation in the Pacific peace set-
tlement, it is of great imperative [sic] to Australia to be associated with the drive 
to defeat Japan.’ At the San Francisco Conference a few weeks later, the Australian 
representatives ‘stressed that the war effort that Australia has made and intends to 
continue until Japan is defeated entitles us to a special consideration of our views 
on and our part in the final Pacific settlement.’ 
[paragraph omitted]
“Prime Minister Curtin told his House of Representatives [on 24 April 1945] 
the Australian government ‘considered it was both logical and appropriate that 
6838_InMyView-Forbes.indd   145 2/11/15   8:55 AM
150
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/1
 1 4 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Australian forces should take over the islands which formed our outer screen of 
defence and which were mostly our own territory�’ And he went on: ‘The Govern-
ment accepts full responsibility for the operations that are being carried out�’ The 
Australian general in charge, Blamey, kept MacArthur informed of those opera-
tions, but MacArthur, of course, gave ‘no specific instructions’ regarding them� 
The local commander in these operations had ‘considerable freedom of action as 
to methods to be employed�’ The Australian commanders involved chose ‘to carry 
out active operations in effecting neutralization where other commanders might 
decide on more passive measures�’
“When Curtin asked MacArthur his opinion of Blamey’s proposal ‘to attack the 
Japanese instead of using passive defense measures,’ MacArthur told Curtin that 
‘the tactics of the problem naturally were a responsibility of the local commander,’ 
but that he ‘was in disapproval of the method suggested as being unnecessary and 
wasteful of lives and resources�’ MacArthur ‘advised him [Curtin] strongly not to 
permit the tactical program suggested by General Blamey�’ Charges were raised 
in the Australian press that these Australian operations were not adequately 
equipped, supplied, and supported� These criticisms were not attacks upon 
MacArthur, since they concerned ‘the adequacy of Australian equipment and 
procedures,’ which were matters beyond the scope of MacArthur’s authority� And 
upon investigation, the charges were revealed to have been unfounded�”
JOSEPH FORBES
Pittsburgh, Pa.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
RECENT BOOKS
A selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as de-
scribed by their publishers:
Manthorpe, William H� J�, Jr� A Century of Service: The U.S. Navy on Cape Hen-
lopen, Lewes, Delaware, 1898–1996. Wilmington, Del�: Cedar Tree Books, 2014� 
164pp� $20
This book chronicles the history of the little known association of the Navy with 
Cape Henlopen and the citizens of Lewes, Delaware� 
Johnson-Freese, Joan� Educating America’s Military. New York: Routledge, 2013�
144pp� $35�95 
Dr� Johnson-Freese offers a detailed examination of the professional military 
education system in the United States, specifically the war colleges, from a criti-
cal, insider’s perspective� 
Weintraub, Stanley� A Christmas Far from Home: An Epic Tale of Courage and 
Survival during the Korean War. Boston: Da Capo, 2014� 276pp� $26�99
Weather, terrain, Chinese firepower, and a four-thousand-foot chasm made an 
escape seem impossible in the face of a vanishing Christmas� Yet endurance and 
sacrifice prevailed, and the last troopships weighed anchor on Christmas Eve� In 
the tradition of his Silent Night and Pearl Harbor Christmas, Weintraub presents 
another gripping narrative of a wartime Christmas season�
Jeansonne, Glen, and David Luhrssen� War on the Silver Screen: Shaping America’s 
Perception of History. Lincoln: Univ� of Nebraska Press, 2014� 184pp� $19�95
This book draws on more than a century of films and history, including classics 
such as All Quiet on the Western Front, Apocalypse Now, and The Hurt Locker, 
to examine the legacy of American cinema on the twentieth- and twenty-first-
century attitudes about war� 
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Patterson, Eric, ed� Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond. Lanham, 
Md�: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014� 226pp� $72
In this edited volume, practitioners and scholars chronicle the changes that have 
happened in the field during the first part of the twenty-first century� Using 
concrete examples, they take a critical look at the rapidly changing role of the 
military chaplain and raise issues vital to U�S� foreign and national security policy 
and diplomacy� 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 One of the primary missions of the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) is to encourage sailors of all ranks to read 
for professional development, for self-improvement, and for entertainment and 
relaxation� A very interesting website, WhytoReadBooks (WhytoRead�com), 
provides a wealth of knowledge about interesting and informative books, and a 
recent post on that site provided the following list (slightly edited and used by 
permission) of reasons why you should read more books: 
Ten Reasons Why You Should Read More Books:
1. To Develop Your Verbal Abilities. Although it doesn’t always make you a bet-
ter communicator, those who read tend to have a more varied range of words to 
express how they feel and to get their point across� This increases exponentially 
with the more volumes you consume, giving you a higher level of vocabulary to 
use in everyday life�
2. Improves Your Focus and Concentration. Unlike blog posts and news articles, 
sitting down with a book takes long periods of focus and concentration, which at 
first is hard to do� Being fully engaged in a book involves closing off the outside 
world and immersing yourself into the text, which over time will strengthen your 
attention span�
3. Readers Enjoy the Arts and Improve the World. A study done by the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) explains that people who read for pleasure are 
many times more likely to visit museums and attend concerts than those who do 
not, and almost three times more likely to perform volunteer and charity work� 
Readers are active participants in the world around them, and that engagement is 
critical to individual and social well-being�
4. It Improves Your Imagination. You are only limited by what you can imagine, 
and the worlds described in books, as well as other people’s views and opinions, 
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will help you expand your understanding of what is possible� By reading a writ-
ten description of an event or a place, your mind is responsible for creating that 
image in your head, instead of having the image placed in front of you when you 
watch television�
5. Reading Makes You Smarter. Books offer an outstanding wealth of learning 
and at a much cheaper price than taking a course� Reading gives you a chance to 
consume a huge amount of research in a relatively short amount of time� Anne E� 
Cunningham and Keith E� Stanovich’s book What Reading Does for the Mind also 
notes that heavy readers tend to display greater knowledge of how things work 
and who or what people were� Additionally, books at home have been strongly 
linked to improved academic achievement�
6. It Makes You Interesting and Attractive. This goes hand in hand with reading 
to become smarter� Having a library of information that you have picked up from 
nonfiction reading will come in handy in any academic or scholarly conversation� 
You will be able to hold your own and add to the conversation instead of having 
to make your excuses and leave� You will be able to engage a wider variety of peo-
ple in conversation and in turn improve your knowledge and conversation skills� 
7. It Reduces Stress. A study by consultancy firm Mindlab International at the 
University of Sussex showed that reading reduces stress� Subjects only needed to 
read, silently, for six minutes to slow down the heart rate and ease tension in the 
muscles� In fact, it resulted in lower stress levels than before they started reading� 
8. It Improves Your Memory. In her book Proust and the Squid: The Story and 
Science of the Reading Brain, Maryanne Wolf explains that “typically, when you 
read, you have more time to think� Reading gives you a unique pause button for 
comprehension and insight� By and large, with oral language—when you watch 
a film or listen to a tape—you don’t press pause�” The benefits of this increased 
activity keeps your memory sharp and your learning capacity nimble�
9. To Discover and Create Yourself. In his book How to Read and Why, Harold 
Bloom says that we should read slowly, with love, openness, and with our inner 
ear cocked� He explains we should read to increase our wit and imagination, our 
sense of intimacy—in short, our entire consciousness—and also to heal our pain� 
“Until you become yourself, what benefit can you be to others?” With the endless 
amount of perspectives and lives we can read about, books can give us an oppor-
tunity to have experiences that we haven’t had the opportunity to, and still allow 
us to learn the life skills they entail� Books are a fast track to creating yourself�
10. For Entertainment. All the benefits of reading mentioned so far are a bo-
nus result of the most important benefit of reading: its entertainment value� If it 
were not for the entertainment value, reading would be a chore but it needn’t be� 
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Reading is not only fun, but it has all the added benefits that we have discussed 
so far� Much more enthralling than watching a movie or a TV show (although 
they have their many benefits as well), a good book can keep us amused while 
developing our life skills�
We hope you will find one or more compelling reasons from the list above to pick 
up a book (from the CNO-PRP, or elsewhere) and enrich your life� And check 
out WhytoRead�com to find book lists from a number of genres to inspire you 
to read more�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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